/* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.60 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $"); #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "log.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "bufaux.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "misc.h" #include "bufaux.h" #include "packet.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; /* Debugging messages */ Buffer auth_debug; int auth_debug_init; /* * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't * listed there, false will be returned. * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. * Otherwise true is returned. */ int allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) { struct stat st; const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL; char *shell; u_int i; /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) return 0; /* * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */ if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); return 0; } if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); return 0; } if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); } /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.deny_users[i])) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because listed in DenyUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.allow_users[i])) break; /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, options.num_deny_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups * isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, options.num_allow_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because none of user's groups are listed " "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } ga_free(); } /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ return 1; } void auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) { void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; char *authmsg; /* Raise logging level */ if (authenticated == 1 || !authctxt->valid || authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || strcmp(method, "password") == 0) authlog = logit; if (authctxt->postponed) authmsg = "Postponed"; else authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", authmsg, method, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), info); } /* * Check whether root logins are disallowed. */ int auth_root_allowed(char *method) { switch (options.permit_root_login) { case PERMIT_YES: return 1; break; case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) return 1; break; case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: if (forced_command) { logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); return 1; } break; } logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); return 0; } /* * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. * * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. */ static char * expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) { char *file, *ret; file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); /* * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward * compatible and prepend the '%h/' */ if (*file == '/') return (file); ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN || strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN || strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN) fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); xfree(file); return (ret); } char * authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw) { return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw); } char * authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw) { return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw); } /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) { Key *found; char *user_hostfile; struct stat st; HostStatus host_status; /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */ found = key_new(key->type); host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL); if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) { user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); if (options.strict_modes && (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad owner or modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); } else { temporarily_use_uid(pw); host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, host, key, found, NULL); restore_uid(); } xfree(user_hostfile); } key_free(found); debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ? "ok" : "not found", host); return host_status; } /* * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. * * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? * * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and * error buffer plus max size as arguments. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ int secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, char *err, size_t errlen) { uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid; char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; char *cp; int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) comparehome = 1; /* check the open file to avoid races */ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 || (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; } /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ for (;;) { if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); return -1; } strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); return -1; } /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) { debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", buf); break; } /* * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too */ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) break; } return 0; } struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP extern login_cap_t *lc; #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif #endif struct passwd *pw; pw = getpwnam(user); if (pw == NULL) { logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", user, get_remote_ipaddr()); return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(pw)) return (NULL); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); return (NULL); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { debug("Approval failure for %s", user); pw = NULL; } if (as != NULL) auth_close(as); #endif #endif if (pw != NULL) return (pwcopy(pw)); return (NULL); } void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; if (!auth_debug_init) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf); } void auth_debug_send(void) { char *msg; if (!auth_debug_init) return; while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL); packet_send_debug("%s", msg); xfree(msg); } } void auth_debug_reset(void) { if (auth_debug_init) buffer_clear(&auth_debug); else { buffer_init(&auth_debug); auth_debug_init = 1; } } struct passwd * fakepw(void) { static struct passwd fake; memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_passwd = "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1; fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1; fake.pw_class = ""; fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; return (&fake); }