/* * Copyright (c) 1999 Todd C. Miller * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed by Frank Cusack * . * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor * may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written * permission from the author. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "config.h" #include #ifdef STDC_HEADERS #include #endif /* STDC_HEADERS */ #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H #include #endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */ #ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H #include #endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */ #include #include #include #include #include "sudo.h" #include "sudo_auth.h" #ifndef lint static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: kerb5.c,v 1.10 1999/10/13 02:34:55 millert Exp $"; #endif /* lint */ static int verify_krb_v5_tgt __P((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, char *)); static struct _sudo_krb5_data { krb5_context sudo_context; krb5_principal princ; krb5_ccache ccache; } sudo_krb5_data = { NULL, NULL, NULL }; typedef struct _sudo_krb5_data *sudo_krb5_datap; extern krb5_cc_ops krb5_mcc_ops; int kerb5_init(pw, promptp, auth) struct passwd *pw; char **promptp; sudo_auth *auth; { krb5_context sudo_context; krb5_ccache ccache; krb5_principal princ; krb5_error_code error; char cache_name[64]; char *pname; auth->data = (VOID *) &sudo_krb5_data; /* Stash all our data here */ if (error = krb5_init_context(&(sudo_krb5_data.sudo_context))) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to initialize context: %s", auth->name, error_message(error)); return(AUTH_FAILURE); } sudo_context = sudo_krb5_data.sudo_context; if (error = krb5_parse_name(sudo_context, pw->pw_name, &(sudo_krb5_data.princ))) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to parse '%s': %s", auth->name, pw->pw_name, error_message(error)); return(AUTH_FAILURE); } princ = sudo_krb5_data.princ; /* * Really, we need to tell the caller not to prompt for password. * The API does not currently provide this unless the auth is standalone. */ #if 1 if (error = krb5_unparse_name(sudo_context, princ, &pname)) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to unparse princ ('%s'): %s", auth->name, pw->pw_name, error_message(error)); return(AUTH_FAILURE); } /* Only rewrite prompt if user didn't specify their own. */ /*if (!strcmp(prompt, PASSPROMPT)) { */ easprintf(promptp, "Password for %s: ", pname); /*}*/ free(pname); #endif /* For CNS compatibility */ if (error = krb5_cc_register(sudo_context, &krb5_mcc_ops, FALSE)) { if (error != KRB5_CC_TYPE_EXISTS) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to use Memory ccache: %s", auth->name, error_message(error)); return(AUTH_FAILURE); } } (void) snprintf(cache_name, sizeof(cache_name), "MEMORY:sudocc_%ld", (long) getpid()); if (error = krb5_cc_resolve(sudo_context, cache_name, &(sudo_krb5_data.ccache))) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to resolve ccache: %s", auth->name, error_message(error)); return(AUTH_FAILURE); } ccache = sudo_krb5_data.ccache; if (error = krb5_cc_initialize(sudo_context, ccache, princ)) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to initialize ccache: %s", auth->name, error_message(error)); return(AUTH_FAILURE); } return(AUTH_SUCCESS); } int kerb5_verify(pw, pass, auth) struct passwd *pw; char *pass; sudo_auth *auth; { krb5_context sudo_context; krb5_principal princ; krb5_ccache ccache; krb5_creds creds; krb5_error_code error; krb5_get_init_creds_opt opts; char cache_name[64]; sudo_context = ((sudo_krb5_datap) auth->data)->sudo_context; princ = ((sudo_krb5_datap) auth->data)->princ; ccache = ((sudo_krb5_datap) auth->data)->ccache; /* Initialize options to defaults */ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&opts); /* Note that we always obtain a new TGT to verify the user */ if (error = krb5_get_init_creds_password(sudo_context, &creds, princ, pass, krb5_prompter_posix, NULL, 0, NULL, &opts)) { if (error == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY) /* Bad password */ return(AUTH_FAILURE); /* Some other error */ log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to get credentials: %s", auth->name, error_message(error)); return(AUTH_FAILURE); } /* Stash the TGT so we can verify it. */ if (error = krb5_cc_store_cred(sudo_context, ccache, &creds)) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to store credentials: %s", auth->name, error_message(error)); } else { error = verify_krb_v5_tgt(sudo_context, ccache, auth->name); } krb5_free_cred_contents(sudo_context, &creds); return (error ? AUTH_FAILURE : AUTH_SUCCESS); } int kerb5_cleanup(pw, auth) struct passwd *pw; sudo_auth *auth; { krb5_context sudo_context; krb5_principal princ; krb5_ccache ccache; sudo_context = ((sudo_krb5_datap) auth->data)->sudo_context; princ = ((sudo_krb5_datap) auth->data)->princ; ccache = ((sudo_krb5_datap) auth->data)->ccache; if (sudo_context) { if (ccache) krb5_cc_destroy(sudo_context, ccache); if (princ) krb5_free_principal(sudo_context, princ); krb5_free_context(sudo_context); } return(AUTH_SUCCESS); } /* * This routine with some modification is from the MIT V5B6 appl/bsd/login.c * * Verify the Kerberos ticket-granting ticket just retrieved for the * user. If the Kerberos server doesn't respond, assume the user is * trying to fake us out (since we DID just get a TGT from what is * supposedly our KDC). If the host/ service is unknown (i.e., * the local keytab doesn't have it), return success but log the error. * * This needs to run as root (to read the host service ticket). * * Returns 0 for successful authentication, non-zero for failure. */ static int verify_krb_v5_tgt(sudo_context, ccache, auth_name) krb5_context sudo_context; krb5_ccache ccache; char *auth_name; /* For error reporting */ { char phost[BUFSIZ]; krb5_error_code error; krb5_principal princ; krb5_data packet; krb5_keyblock *keyblock = 0; krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; packet.data = 0; /* * Get the server principal for the local host. * (Use defaults of "host" and canonicalized local name.) */ if (error = krb5_sname_to_principal(sudo_context, NULL, NULL, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &princ)) { log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: unable to get host principal: %s", auth_name, error_message(error)); return(-1); } /* Extract the name directly. Yow. */ strncpy(phost, krb5_princ_component(sudo_context, princ, 1)->data, sizeof(phost) - 1); phost[sizeof(phost) - 1] = '\0'; /* * Do we have host/ keys? * (use default keytab, kvno IGNORE_VNO to get the first match, * and enctype is currently ignored anyhow.) */ if (error = krb5_kt_read_service_key(sudo_context, NULL, princ, 0, ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, &keyblock)) { /* Keytab or service key does not exist. */ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s: host service key not found: %s", auth_name, error_message(error)); error = 0; goto cleanup; } if (keyblock) krb5_free_keyblock(sudo_context, keyblock); /* Talk to the kdc and construct the ticket. */ error = krb5_mk_req(sudo_context, &auth_context, 0, "host", phost, NULL, ccache, &packet); if (auth_context) { krb5_auth_con_free(sudo_context, auth_context); auth_context = NULL; /* setup for rd_req */ } /* Try to use the ticket. */ if (!error) error = krb5_rd_req(sudo_context, &auth_context, &packet, princ, NULL, NULL, NULL); cleanup: if (packet.data) krb5_free_data_contents(sudo_context, &packet); krb5_free_principal(sudo_context, princ); if (error) log_error(NO_EXIT|NO_MAIL, "%s: Cannot verify TGT! Possible attack!: %s", auth_name, error_message(error)); return(error); }