/* $OpenBSD: pwd_mkdb.c,v 1.50 2015/08/27 19:11:37 gsoares Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Jason Downs. All rights reserved. * Portions Copyright (c) 1998, Todd C. Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include /* MAXBSIZE */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define INSECURE 1 #define SECURE 2 #define PERM_INSECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH) #define PERM_SECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR) #define FILE_SECURE 0x01 #define FILE_INSECURE 0x02 #define FILE_ORIG 0x04 #define SHADOW_GROUP "_shadow" HASHINFO openinfo = { 4096, /* bsize */ 32, /* ffactor */ 256, /* nelem */ 2048 * 1024, /* cachesize */ NULL, /* hash() */ 0 /* lorder */ }; static char *pname; /* password file name */ static char *basedir; /* dir holding master.passwd */ static int clean; /* what to remove on cleanup */ static int hasyp; /* are we running YP? */ void cleanup(void); __dead void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))); __dead void fatalc(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))); __dead void fatalx(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))); int write_old_entry(FILE *, const struct passwd *); void cp(char *, char *, mode_t); void mv(char *, char *); int scan(FILE *, struct passwd *, int *); void usage(void); char *changedir(char *path, char *dir); void db_store(FILE *, FILE *, DB *, DB *,struct passwd *, int, char *, uid_t); int main(int argc, char **argv) { DB *dp, *edp; DBT data, key; FILE *fp, *oldfp = NULL; struct stat st; struct passwd pwd; struct group *grp; sigset_t set; uid_t olduid; gid_t shadow; int ch, tfd, makeold, secureonly, flags, checkonly; char *username, buf[MAX(PATH_MAX, LINE_MAX * 2)]; flags = checkonly = makeold = secureonly = 0; username = NULL; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "cd:psu:v")) != -1) switch (ch) { case 'c': /* verify only */ checkonly = 1; break; case 'd': basedir = optarg; if (strlen(basedir) > PATH_MAX - 40) errx(1, "basedir too long"); break; case 'p': /* create V7 "file.orig" */ makeold = 1; break; case 's': /* only update spwd.db */ secureonly = 1; break; case 'u': /* only update this record */ username = optarg; if (strlen(username) > _PW_NAME_LEN) errx(1, "username too long"); break; case 'v': /* backward compatible */ break; case '?': default: usage(); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (argc != 1 || (makeold && secureonly) || (username && (*username == '+' || *username == '-'))) usage(); if ((grp = getgrnam(SHADOW_GROUP)) == NULL) errx(1, "cannot find `%s' in the group database, aborting", SHADOW_GROUP); shadow = grp->gr_gid; /* * This could be changed to allow the user to interrupt. * Probably not worth the effort. */ sigemptyset(&set); sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP); sigaddset(&set, SIGHUP); sigaddset(&set, SIGINT); sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT); sigaddset(&set, SIGTERM); (void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, (sigset_t *)NULL); /* We don't care what the user wants. */ (void)umask(0); if (**argv != '/' && basedir == NULL) errx(1, "%s must be specified as an absolute path", *argv); if ((pname = strdup(changedir(*argv, basedir))) == NULL) err(1, NULL); /* Open the original password file */ if (!(fp = fopen(pname, "r"))) fatal("%s", pname); /* Check only if password database is valid */ if (checkonly) { u_int cnt; for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd, &flags); ++cnt) ; exit(0); } if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) fatal("%s", pname); /* Tweak openinfo values for large passwd files. */ if (st.st_size > (off_t)100*1024) openinfo.cachesize = MINIMUM(st.st_size * 20, (off_t)12*1024*1024); if (st.st_size / 128 > openinfo.nelem) openinfo.nelem = st.st_size / 128; /* If only updating a single record, stash the old uid */ if (username) { dp = dbopen(_PATH_MP_DB, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, NULL); if (dp == NULL) fatal(_PATH_MP_DB); buf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNAME; strlcpy(buf + 1, username, sizeof(buf) - 1); key.data = (u_char *)buf; key.size = strlen(buf + 1) + 1; if ((dp->get)(dp, &key, &data, 0) == 0) { char *p = (char *)data.data; /* Skip to uid field */ while (*p++ != '\0') ; while (*p++ != '\0') ; memcpy(&olduid, p, sizeof(olduid)); } else olduid = UID_MAX; (dp->close)(dp); } /* Open the temporary encrypted password database. */ (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp", changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir)); if (username) { cp(changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir), buf, PERM_SECURE); edp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); } else { edp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); } if (!edp) fatal("%s", buf); if (fchown(edp->fd(edp), (uid_t)-1, shadow) != 0) warn("%s: unable to set group to %s", _PATH_SMP_DB, SHADOW_GROUP); else if (fchmod(edp->fd(edp), PERM_SECURE|S_IRGRP) != 0) warn("%s: unable to make group readable", _PATH_SMP_DB); clean |= FILE_SECURE; /* Open the temporary insecure password database. */ if (!secureonly) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp", changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir)); if (username) { cp(changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir), buf, PERM_INSECURE); dp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); } else { dp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); } if (dp == NULL) fatal("%s", buf); clean |= FILE_INSECURE; } else dp = NULL; /* * Open file for old password file. Minor trickiness -- don't want to * change the file already existing, since someone (stupidly) might * still be using this for permission checking. So, open it first and * fdopen the resulting fd. The resulting file should be readable by * everyone. */ if (makeold) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname); if ((tfd = open(buf, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE)) < 0) fatal("%s", buf); if ((oldfp = fdopen(tfd, "w")) == NULL) fatal("%s", buf); clean |= FILE_ORIG; } /* * The databases actually contain three copies of the original data. * Each password file entry is converted into a rough approximation * of a ``struct passwd'', with the strings placed inline. This * object is then stored as the data for three separate keys. The * first key * is the pw_name field prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNAME * character. The second key is the pw_uid field prepended by the * _PW_KEYBYUID character. The third key is the line number in the * original file prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNUM character. (The special * characters are prepended to ensure that the keys do not collide.) * * If we see something go by that looks like YP, we save a special * pointer record, which if YP is enabled in the C lib, will speed * things up. */ /* * Write the .db files. * We do this three times, one per key type (for getpw{nam,uid,ent}). * The first time through we also check for YP, issue warnings * and save the V7 format passwd file if necessary. */ db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYNAME, username, olduid); db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYUID, username, olduid); db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYNUM, username, olduid); /* Store YP token, if needed. */ if (hasyp && !username) { key.data = (u_char *)_PW_YPTOKEN; key.size = strlen(_PW_YPTOKEN); data.data = (u_char *)NULL; data.size = 0; if ((edp->put)(edp, &key, &data, R_NOOVERWRITE) == -1) fatal("put"); if (dp && (dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, R_NOOVERWRITE) == -1) fatal("put"); } if ((edp->close)(edp)) fatal("close edp"); if (dp && (dp->close)(dp)) fatal("close dp"); if (makeold) { if (fclose(oldfp) == EOF) fatal("close old"); } /* Set master.passwd permissions, in case caller forgot. */ (void)fchmod(fileno(fp), S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR); if (fclose(fp) != 0) fatal("fclose"); /* Install as the real password files. */ if (!secureonly) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp", changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir)); mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir)); } (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp", changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir)); mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir)); if (makeold) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname); mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_PASSWD, basedir)); } /* * Move the master password LAST -- chpass(1), passwd(1) and vipw(8) * all use flock(2) on it to block other incarnations of themselves. * The rename means that everything is unlocked, as the original file * can no longer be accessed. */ mv(pname, changedir(_PATH_MASTERPASSWD, basedir)); exit(0); } int scan(FILE *fp, struct passwd *pw, int *flags) { static int lcnt; static char line[LINE_MAX]; char *p; if (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) == NULL) return (0); ++lcnt; /* * ``... if I swallow anything evil, put your fingers down my * throat...'' * -- The Who */ p = line; if (*p != '\0' && *(p += strlen(line) - 1) != '\n') { warnx("line too long"); goto fmt; } *p = '\0'; *flags = 0; if (!pw_scan(line, pw, flags)) { warnx("at line #%d", lcnt); fmt: fatalc(EFTYPE, "%s", pname); } return (1); } void cp(char *from, char *to, mode_t mode) { static char buf[MAXBSIZE]; int from_fd, rcount, to_fd, wcount; if ((from_fd = open(from, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) fatal("%s", from); if ((to_fd = open(to, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)) < 0) fatal("%s", to); while ((rcount = read(from_fd, buf, MAXBSIZE)) > 0) { wcount = write(to_fd, buf, rcount); if (rcount != wcount || wcount == -1) fatal("%s to %s", from, to); } if (rcount < 0) fatal("%s to %s", from, to); close(to_fd); close(from_fd); } void mv(char *from, char *to) { if (rename(from, to)) fatal("%s to %s", from, to); } void fatal(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vwarn(fmt, ap); va_end(ap); cleanup(); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } void fatalc(int code, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vwarnc(code, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); cleanup(); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } void fatalx(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vwarnx(fmt, ap); va_end(ap); cleanup(); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } void cleanup(void) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; if (clean & FILE_ORIG) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname); (void)unlink(buf); } if (clean & FILE_SECURE) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp", changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir)); (void)unlink(buf); } if (clean & FILE_INSECURE) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp", changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir)); (void)unlink(buf); } } void usage(void) { (void)fprintf(stderr, "usage: pwd_mkdb [-c] [-p | -s] [-d directory] [-u username] file\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } char * changedir(char *path, char *dir) { static char fixed[PATH_MAX]; char *p; if (!dir) return (path); if ((p = strrchr(path, '/')) != NULL) path = p + 1; snprintf(fixed, sizeof(fixed), "%s/%s", dir, path); return (fixed); } int write_old_entry(FILE *to, const struct passwd *pw) { char gidstr[16], uidstr[16]; if (to == NULL) return (0); /* Preserve gid/uid -1 */ if (pw->pw_gid == (gid_t)-1) strlcpy(gidstr, "-1", sizeof(gidstr)); else snprintf(gidstr, sizeof(gidstr), "%u", (u_int)pw->pw_gid); if (pw->pw_uid == (uid_t)-1) strlcpy(uidstr, "-1", sizeof(uidstr)); else snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid); return (fprintf(to, "%s:*:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n", pw->pw_name, uidstr, gidstr, pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell)); } void db_store(FILE *fp, FILE *oldfp, DB *edp, DB *dp, struct passwd *pw, int keytype, char *username, uid_t olduid) { char *p, *t, buf[LINE_MAX * 2], tbuf[_PW_BUF_LEN]; int flags = 0, dbmode, found = 0; static int firsttime = 1; DBT data, key; size_t len; u_int cnt; /* If given a username just add that record to the existing db. */ dbmode = username ? 0 : R_NOOVERWRITE; rewind(fp); data.data = (u_char *)buf; key.data = (u_char *)tbuf; for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, pw, &flags); ++cnt) { if (firsttime) { /* Look like YP? */ if ((pw->pw_name[0] == '+') || (pw->pw_name[0] == '-')) hasyp++; /* Warn about potentially unsafe uid/gid overrides. */ if (pw->pw_name[0] == '+') { if (!(flags & _PASSWORD_NOUID) && !pw->pw_uid) warnx("line %d: superuser override in " "YP inclusion", cnt); if (!(flags & _PASSWORD_NOGID) && !pw->pw_gid) warnx("line %d: wheel override in " "YP inclusion", cnt); } /* Create V7 format password file entry. */ if (write_old_entry(oldfp, pw) == -1) fatal("write old"); } /* Are we updating a specific record? */ if (username) { if (strcmp(username, pw->pw_name) != 0) continue; found = 1; /* If the uid changed, remove the old record by uid. */ if (olduid != UID_MAX && olduid != pw->pw_uid) { tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYUID; memcpy(tbuf + 1, &olduid, sizeof(olduid)); key.size = sizeof(olduid) + 1; (edp->del)(edp, &key, 0); if (dp) (dp->del)(dp, &key, 0); } /* XXX - should check to see if line number changed. */ } /* Build the key. */ tbuf[0] = keytype; switch (keytype) { case _PW_KEYBYNUM: memmove(tbuf + 1, &cnt, sizeof(cnt)); key.size = sizeof(cnt) + 1; break; case _PW_KEYBYNAME: len = strlen(pw->pw_name); memmove(tbuf + 1, pw->pw_name, len); key.size = len + 1; break; case _PW_KEYBYUID: memmove(tbuf + 1, &pw->pw_uid, sizeof(pw->pw_uid)); key.size = sizeof(pw->pw_uid) + 1; break; } #define COMPACT(e) t = e; while ((*p++ = *t++)); /* Create the secure record. */ p = buf; COMPACT(pw->pw_name); COMPACT(pw->pw_passwd); memmove(p, &pw->pw_uid, sizeof(uid_t)); p += sizeof(uid_t); memmove(p, &pw->pw_gid, sizeof(gid_t)); p += sizeof(gid_t); memmove(p, &pw->pw_change, sizeof(time_t)); p += sizeof(time_t); COMPACT(pw->pw_class); COMPACT(pw->pw_gecos); COMPACT(pw->pw_dir); COMPACT(pw->pw_shell); memmove(p, &pw->pw_expire, sizeof(time_t)); p += sizeof(time_t); memmove(p, &flags, sizeof(int)); p += sizeof(int); data.size = p - buf; /* Write the secure record. */ if ((edp->put)(edp, &key, &data, dbmode) == -1) fatal("put"); if (dp == NULL) continue; /* Star out password to make insecure record. */ p = buf + strlen(pw->pw_name) + 1; /* skip pw_name */ len = strlen(pw->pw_passwd); explicit_bzero(p, len); /* zero pw_passwd */ t = p + len + 1; /* skip pw_passwd */ if (len != 0) *p++ = '*'; *p++ = '\0'; memmove(p, t, data.size - (t - buf)); data.size -= len - 1; /* Write the insecure record. */ if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, dbmode) == -1) fatal("put"); } if (firsttime) { firsttime = 0; if (username && !found && olduid != UID_MAX) fatalx("can't find user in master.passwd"); } }