/* $OpenBSD: mft.c,v 1.10 2019/11/29 05:05:46 benno Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "extern.h" /* * Parse results and data of the manifest file. */ struct parse { const char *fn; /* manifest file name */ struct mft *res; /* result object */ }; static const char * gentime2str(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *time) { static char buf[64]; BIO *mem; if ((mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) cryptoerrx("BIO_new"); if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(mem, time)) cryptoerrx("ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print"); if (BIO_gets(mem, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) cryptoerrx("BIO_gets"); BIO_free(mem); return buf; } /* * Validate and verify the time validity of the mft. * Returns 1 if all is good, 0 if mft is stale, any other case -1. * XXX should use ASN1_time_tm_cmp() once libressl is used. */ static time_t check_validity(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *from, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *until, const char *fn, int force) { time_t now = time(NULL); if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(from) || !ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(until)) { warnx("%s: embedded time format invalid", fn); return -1; } /* check that until is not before from */ if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(until, from) < 0) { warnx("%s: bad update interval", fn); return -1; } /* check that now is not before from */ if (X509_cmp_time(from, &now) > 0) { warnx("%s: mft not yet valid %s", fn, gentime2str(from)); return -1; } /* check that now is not after until */ if (X509_cmp_time(until, &now) < 0) { warnx("%s: mft expired on %s%s", fn, gentime2str(until), force ? " (ignoring)" : ""); if (!force) return 0; } return 1; } /* * Parse an individual "FileAndHash", RFC 6486, sec. 4.2. * Return zero on failure, non-zero on success. */ static int mft_parse_filehash(struct parse *p, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os) { ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY *seq; const ASN1_TYPE *file, *hash; char *fn = NULL; const unsigned char *d = os->data; size_t dsz = os->length, sz; int rc = 0; struct mftfile *fent; if ((seq = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &d, dsz)) == NULL) { cryptowarnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: FileAndHash: " "failed ASN.1 sequence parse", p->fn); goto out; } else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(seq) != 2) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: FileAndHash: " "want 2 elements, have %d", p->fn, sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(seq)); goto out; } /* First is the filename itself. */ file = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, 0); if (file->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: FileAndHash: " "want ASN.1 IA5 string, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(file->type), file->type); goto out; } fn = strndup((const char *)file->value.ia5string->data, file->value.ia5string->length); if (fn == NULL) err(1, NULL); /* * Make sure we're just a pathname and either an ROA or CER. * I don't think that the RFC specifically mentions this, but * it's in practical use and would really screw things up * (arbitrary filenames) otherwise. */ if (strchr(fn, '/') != NULL) { warnx("%s: path components disallowed in filename: %s", p->fn, fn); goto out; } else if ((sz = strlen(fn)) <= 4) { warnx("%s: filename must be large enough for suffix part: %s", p->fn, fn); goto out; } if (strcasecmp(fn + sz - 4, ".roa") && strcasecmp(fn + sz - 4, ".crl") && strcasecmp(fn + sz - 4, ".cer")) { free(fn); fn = NULL; rc = 1; goto out; } /* Now hash value. */ hash = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, 1); if (hash->type != V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: FileAndHash: " "want ASN.1 bit string, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(hash->type), hash->type); goto out; } if (hash->value.bit_string->length != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: hash: " "invalid SHA256 length, have %d", p->fn, hash->value.bit_string->length); goto out; } /* Insert the filename and hash value. */ p->res->files = reallocarray(p->res->files, p->res->filesz + 1, sizeof(struct mftfile)); if (p->res->files == NULL) err(1, NULL); fent = &p->res->files[p->res->filesz++]; memset(fent, 0, sizeof(struct mftfile)); fent->file = fn; fn = NULL; memcpy(fent->hash, hash->value.bit_string->data, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); rc = 1; out: free(fn); sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(seq, ASN1_TYPE_free); return rc; } /* * Parse the "FileAndHash" sequence, RFC 6486, sec. 4.2. * Return zero on failure, non-zero on success. */ static int mft_parse_flist(struct parse *p, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os) { ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY *seq; const ASN1_TYPE *t; const unsigned char *d = os->data; size_t dsz = os->length; int i, rc = 0; if ((seq = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &d, dsz)) == NULL) { cryptowarnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2: fileList: " "failed ASN.1 sequence parse", p->fn); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(seq); i++) { t = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, i); if (t->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2: fileList: " "want ASN.1 sequence, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(t->type), t->type); goto out; } else if (!mft_parse_filehash(p, t->value.octet_string)) goto out; } rc = 1; out: sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(seq, ASN1_TYPE_free); return rc; } /* * Handle the eContent of the manifest object, RFC 6486 sec. 4.2. * Returns <0 on failure, 0 on stale, >0 on success. */ static int mft_parse_econtent(const unsigned char *d, size_t dsz, struct parse *p, int force) { ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY *seq; const ASN1_TYPE *t; const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *from, *until; int i, rc = -1; if ((seq = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &d, dsz)) == NULL) { cryptowarnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2: Manifest: " "failed ASN.1 sequence parse", p->fn); goto out; } /* The version is optional. */ if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(seq) != 5 && sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(seq) != 6) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2: Manifest: " "want 5 or 6 elements, have %d", p->fn, sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(seq)); goto out; } /* Start with optional version. */ i = 0; if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(seq) == 6) { t = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, i++); if (t->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: version: " "want ASN.1 integer, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(t->type), t->type); goto out; } } /* Now the manifest sequence number. */ t = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, i++); if (t->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: manifestNumber: " "want ASN.1 integer, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(t->type), t->type); goto out; } /* * Timestamps: this and next update time. * Validate that the current date falls into this interval. * This is required by section 4.4, (3). * If we're after the given date, then the MFT is stale. * This is made super complicated because it usees OpenSSL's * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME instead of ASN1_TIME, which we could * compare against the current time trivially. */ t = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, i++); if (t->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: thisUpdate: " "want ASN.1 generalised time, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(t->type), t->type); goto out; } from = t->value.generalizedtime; t = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, i++); if (t->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: nextUpdate: " "want ASN.1 generalised time, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(t->type), t->type); goto out; } until = t->value.generalizedtime; rc = check_validity(from, until, p->fn, force); if (rc != 1) goto out; /* File list algorithm. */ t = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, i++); if (t->type != V_ASN1_OBJECT) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: fileHashAlg: " "want ASN.1 object time, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(t->type), t->type); goto out; } else if (OBJ_obj2nid(t->value.object) != NID_sha256) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: fileHashAlg: " "want SHA256 object, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(OBJ_obj2nid(t->value.object)), OBJ_obj2nid(t->value.object)); goto out; } /* Now the sequence. */ t = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(seq, i++); if (t->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { warnx("%s: RFC 6486 section 4.2.1: fileList: " "want ASN.1 sequence, have %s (NID %d)", p->fn, ASN1_tag2str(t->type), t->type); goto out; } else if (!mft_parse_flist(p, t->value.octet_string)) goto out; rc = 1; out: sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(seq, ASN1_TYPE_free); return rc; } /* * Parse the objects that have been published in the manifest. * This conforms to RFC 6486. * Note that if the MFT is stale, all referenced objects are stripped * from the parsed content. * The MFT content is otherwise returned. */ struct mft * mft_parse(X509 **x509, const char *fn, int force) { struct parse p; int c, rc = 0; size_t i, cmsz; unsigned char *cms; memset(&p, 0, sizeof(struct parse)); p.fn = fn; cms = cms_parse_validate(x509, fn, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26", NULL, &cmsz); if (cms == NULL) return NULL; assert(*x509 != NULL); if ((p.res = calloc(1, sizeof(struct mft))) == NULL) err(1, NULL); if ((p.res->file = strdup(fn)) == NULL) err(1, NULL); if (!x509_get_ski_aki(*x509, fn, &p.res->ski, &p.res->aki)) goto out; /* * If we're stale, then remove all of the files that the MFT * references as well as marking it as stale. */ if ((c = mft_parse_econtent(cms, cmsz, &p, force)) == 0) { /* * FIXME: it should suffice to just mark this as stale * and have the logic around mft_read() simply ignore * the contents of stale entries, just like it does for * invalid ROAs or certificates. */ p.res->stale = 1; if (p.res->files != NULL) for (i = 0; i < p.res->filesz; i++) free(p.res->files[i].file); free(p.res->files); p.res->filesz = 0; p.res->files = NULL; } else if (c == -1) goto out; rc = 1; out: if (rc == 0) { mft_free(p.res); p.res = NULL; X509_free(*x509); *x509 = NULL; } free(cms); return p.res; } /* * Free an MFT pointer. * Safe to call with NULL. */ void mft_free(struct mft *p) { size_t i; if (p == NULL) return; if (p->files != NULL) for (i = 0; i < p->filesz; i++) free(p->files[i].file); free(p->aki); free(p->ski); free(p->file); free(p->files); free(p); } /* * Serialise MFT parsed content into the given buffer. * See mft_read() for the other side of the pipe. */ void mft_buffer(char **b, size_t *bsz, size_t *bmax, const struct mft *p) { size_t i; io_simple_buffer(b, bsz, bmax, &p->stale, sizeof(int)); io_str_buffer(b, bsz, bmax, p->file); io_simple_buffer(b, bsz, bmax, &p->filesz, sizeof(size_t)); for (i = 0; i < p->filesz; i++) { io_str_buffer(b, bsz, bmax, p->files[i].file); io_simple_buffer(b, bsz, bmax, p->files[i].hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); } io_str_buffer(b, bsz, bmax, p->aki); io_str_buffer(b, bsz, bmax, p->ski); } /* * Read an MFT structure from the file descriptor. * Result must be passed to mft_free(). */ struct mft * mft_read(int fd) { struct mft *p = NULL; size_t i; if ((p = calloc(1, sizeof(struct mft))) == NULL) err(1, NULL); io_simple_read(fd, &p->stale, sizeof(int)); io_str_read(fd, &p->file); io_simple_read(fd, &p->filesz, sizeof(size_t)); if ((p->files = calloc(p->filesz, sizeof(struct mftfile))) == NULL) err(1, NULL); for (i = 0; i < p->filesz; i++) { io_str_read(fd, &p->files[i].file); io_simple_read(fd, p->files[i].hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); } io_str_read(fd, &p->aki); io_str_read(fd, &p->ski); return p; }