/* $OpenBSD: lka.c,v 1.164 2014/02/04 13:44:41 eric Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008 Pierre-Yves Ritschard * Copyright (c) 2008 Gilles Chehade * Copyright (c) 2012 Eric Faurot * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "smtpd.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssl.h" static void lka_imsg(struct mproc *, struct imsg *); static void lka_shutdown(void); static void lka_sig_handler(int, short, void *); static int lka_authenticate(const char *, const char *, const char *); static int lka_credentials(const char *, const char *, char *, size_t); static int lka_userinfo(const char *, const char *, struct userinfo *); static int lka_addrname(const char *, const struct sockaddr *, struct addrname *); static int lka_X509_verify(struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *, const char *, const char *); static void lka_imsg(struct mproc *p, struct imsg *imsg) { struct table *table; int ret; struct pki *pki; struct iovec iov[3]; static struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *req_ca_vrfy_smtp = NULL; static struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *req_ca_vrfy_mta = NULL; struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *req_ca_vrfy_chain; struct ca_vrfy_resp_msg resp_ca_vrfy; struct ca_cert_req_msg *req_ca_cert; struct ca_cert_resp_msg resp_ca_cert; struct sockaddr_storage ss; struct userinfo userinfo; struct addrname addrname; struct envelope evp; struct msg m; union lookup lk; char buf[SMTPD_MAXLINESIZE]; const char *tablename, *username, *password, *label; uint64_t reqid; size_t i; int v; const char *cafile = NULL; if (imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_HOST || imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_PTR || imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_MX || imsg->hdr.type == IMSG_DNS_MX_PREFERENCE) { dns_imsg(p, imsg); return; } if (p->proc == PROC_SMTP) { switch (imsg->hdr.type) { case IMSG_LKA_EXPAND_RCPT: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_id(&m, &reqid); m_get_envelope(&m, &evp); m_end(&m); lka_session(reqid, &evp); return; case IMSG_LKA_HELO: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_id(&m, &reqid); m_get_string(&m, &tablename); m_get_sockaddr(&m, (struct sockaddr *)&ss); m_end(&m); ret = lka_addrname(tablename, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &addrname); m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_HELO, 0, 0, -1); m_add_id(p, reqid); m_add_int(p, ret); if (ret == LKA_OK) m_add_string(p, addrname.name); m_close(p); return; case IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT: req_ca_cert = imsg->data; resp_ca_cert.reqid = req_ca_cert->reqid; xlowercase(buf, req_ca_cert->name, sizeof(buf)); log_debug("debug: lka: looking up pki \"%s\"", buf); pki = dict_get(env->sc_pki_dict, buf); if (pki == NULL) { resp_ca_cert.status = CA_FAIL; m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_cert, sizeof(resp_ca_cert)); return; } resp_ca_cert.status = CA_OK; resp_ca_cert.cert_len = pki->pki_cert_len; resp_ca_cert.key_len = pki->pki_key_len; iov[0].iov_base = &resp_ca_cert; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(resp_ca_cert); iov[1].iov_base = pki->pki_cert; iov[1].iov_len = pki->pki_cert_len; iov[2].iov_base = pki->pki_key; iov[2].iov_len = pki->pki_key_len; m_composev(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, iov, nitems(iov)); return; case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CERT: req_ca_vrfy_smtp = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_smtp, "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_smtp->cert = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data + sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_smtp, req_ca_vrfy_smtp->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->n_chain, sizeof (unsigned char *), "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert_len = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->n_chain, sizeof (off_t), "lka:ca_vrfy"); return; case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CHAIN: if (req_ca_vrfy_smtp == NULL) fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: chain without a certificate"); req_ca_vrfy_chain = imsg->data; req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert[req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_offset] = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data + sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_chain, req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert_len[req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_offset] = req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len; req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_offset++; return; case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY: if (req_ca_vrfy_smtp == NULL) fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: verify without a certificate"); resp_ca_vrfy.reqid = req_ca_vrfy_smtp->reqid; pki = dict_xget(env->sc_pki_dict, req_ca_vrfy_smtp->pkiname); cafile = CA_FILE; if (pki->pki_ca_file) cafile = pki->pki_ca_file; if (! lka_X509_verify(req_ca_vrfy_smtp, cafile, NULL)) resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_FAIL; else resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_OK; m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_vrfy, sizeof resp_ca_vrfy); for (i = 0; i < req_ca_vrfy_smtp->n_chain; ++i) free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert[i]); free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert); free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->chain_cert_len); free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp->cert); free(req_ca_vrfy_smtp); return; case IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_id(&m, &reqid); m_get_string(&m, &tablename); m_get_string(&m, &username); m_get_string(&m, &password); m_end(&m); if (!tablename[0]) { m_create(p_parent, IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE, 0, 0, -1); m_add_id(p_parent, reqid); m_add_string(p_parent, username); m_add_string(p_parent, password); m_close(p_parent); return; } ret = lka_authenticate(tablename, username, password); m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE, 0, 0, -1); m_add_id(p, reqid); m_add_int(p, ret); m_close(p); return; } } if (p->proc == PROC_MDA) { switch (imsg->hdr.type) { case IMSG_LKA_USERINFO: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_id(&m, &reqid); m_get_string(&m, &tablename); m_get_string(&m, &username); m_end(&m); ret = lka_userinfo(tablename, username, &userinfo); m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_USERINFO, 0, 0, -1); m_add_id(p, reqid); m_add_int(p, ret); if (ret == LKA_OK) m_add_data(p, &userinfo, sizeof(userinfo)); m_close(p); return; } } if (p->proc == PROC_MTA) { switch (imsg->hdr.type) { case IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT: req_ca_cert = imsg->data; resp_ca_cert.reqid = req_ca_cert->reqid; xlowercase(buf, req_ca_cert->name, sizeof(buf)); log_debug("debug: lka: looking up pki \"%s\"", buf); pki = dict_get(env->sc_pki_dict, buf); if (pki == NULL) { resp_ca_cert.status = CA_FAIL; m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_cert, sizeof(resp_ca_cert)); return; } resp_ca_cert.status = CA_OK; resp_ca_cert.cert_len = pki->pki_cert_len; resp_ca_cert.key_len = pki->pki_key_len; iov[0].iov_base = &resp_ca_cert; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(resp_ca_cert); iov[1].iov_base = pki->pki_cert; iov[1].iov_len = pki->pki_cert_len; iov[2].iov_base = pki->pki_key; iov[2].iov_len = pki->pki_key_len; m_composev(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_INIT, 0, 0, -1, iov, nitems(iov)); return; case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CERT: req_ca_vrfy_mta = xmemdup(imsg->data, sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_mta, "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_mta->cert = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data + sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_mta, req_ca_vrfy_mta->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_mta->n_chain, sizeof (unsigned char *), "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert_len = xcalloc(req_ca_vrfy_mta->n_chain, sizeof (off_t), "lka:ca_vrfy"); return; case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY_CHAIN: if (req_ca_vrfy_mta == NULL) fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: verify without a certificate"); req_ca_vrfy_chain = imsg->data; req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert[req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_offset] = xmemdup((char *)imsg->data + sizeof *req_ca_vrfy_chain, req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len, "lka:ca_vrfy"); req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert_len[req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_offset] = req_ca_vrfy_chain->cert_len; req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_offset++; return; case IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY: if (req_ca_vrfy_mta == NULL) fatalx("lka:ca_vrfy: verify without a certificate"); resp_ca_vrfy.reqid = req_ca_vrfy_mta->reqid; pki = dict_get(env->sc_pki_dict, req_ca_vrfy_mta->pkiname); cafile = CA_FILE; if (pki && pki->pki_ca_file) cafile = pki->pki_ca_file; if (! lka_X509_verify(req_ca_vrfy_mta, cafile, NULL)) resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_FAIL; else resp_ca_vrfy.status = CA_OK; m_compose(p, IMSG_LKA_SSL_VERIFY, 0, 0, -1, &resp_ca_vrfy, sizeof resp_ca_vrfy); for (i = 0; i < req_ca_vrfy_mta->n_chain; ++i) free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert[i]); free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert); free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->chain_cert_len); free(req_ca_vrfy_mta->cert); free(req_ca_vrfy_mta); return; case IMSG_LKA_SECRET: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_id(&m, &reqid); m_get_string(&m, &tablename); m_get_string(&m, &label); m_end(&m); lka_credentials(tablename, label, buf, sizeof(buf)); m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_SECRET, 0, 0, -1); m_add_id(p, reqid); m_add_string(p, buf); m_close(p); return; case IMSG_LKA_SOURCE: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_id(&m, &reqid); m_get_string(&m, &tablename); m_end(&m); table = table_find(tablename, NULL); m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_SOURCE, 0, 0, -1); m_add_id(p, reqid); if (table == NULL) { log_warn("warn: source address table %s missing", tablename); m_add_int(p, LKA_TEMPFAIL); } else { ret = table_fetch(table, K_SOURCE, &lk); if (ret == -1) m_add_int(p, LKA_TEMPFAIL); else if (ret == 0) m_add_int(p, LKA_PERMFAIL); else { m_add_int(p, LKA_OK); m_add_sockaddr(p, (struct sockaddr *)&lk.source.addr); } } m_close(p); return; case IMSG_LKA_HELO: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_id(&m, &reqid); m_get_string(&m, &tablename); m_get_sockaddr(&m, (struct sockaddr *)&ss); m_end(&m); ret = lka_addrname(tablename, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &addrname); m_create(p, IMSG_LKA_HELO, 0, 0, -1); m_add_id(p, reqid); m_add_int(p, ret); if (ret == LKA_OK) m_add_string(p, addrname.name); m_close(p); return; } } if (p->proc == PROC_PARENT) { switch (imsg->hdr.type) { case IMSG_CONF_START: return; case IMSG_CONF_END: if (verbose & TRACE_TABLES) table_dump_all(); table_open_all(); /* Start fulfilling requests */ mproc_enable(p_mda); mproc_enable(p_mta); mproc_enable(p_smtp); return; case IMSG_CTL_VERBOSE: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_int(&m, &v); m_end(&m); log_verbose(v); return; case IMSG_CTL_PROFILE: m_msg(&m, imsg); m_get_int(&m, &v); m_end(&m); profiling = v; return; case IMSG_PARENT_FORWARD_OPEN: lka_session_forward_reply(imsg->data, imsg->fd); return; case IMSG_LKA_AUTHENTICATE: m_forward(p_smtp, imsg); return; } } if (p->proc == PROC_CONTROL) { switch (imsg->hdr.type) { case IMSG_LKA_UPDATE_TABLE: table = table_find(imsg->data, NULL); if (table == NULL) { log_warnx("warn: Lookup table not found: " "\"%s\"", (char *)imsg->data); return; } table_update(table); return; } } errx(1, "lka_imsg: unexpected %s imsg", imsg_to_str(imsg->hdr.type)); } static void lka_sig_handler(int sig, short event, void *p) { int status; pid_t pid; switch (sig) { case SIGINT: case SIGTERM: lka_shutdown(); break; case SIGCHLD: do { pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG); } while (pid > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)); break; default: fatalx("lka_sig_handler: unexpected signal"); } } void lka_shutdown(void) { log_info("info: lookup agent exiting"); _exit(0); } pid_t lka(void) { pid_t pid; struct passwd *pw; struct event ev_sigint; struct event ev_sigterm; struct event ev_sigchld; switch (pid = fork()) { case -1: fatal("lka: cannot fork"); case 0: post_fork(PROC_LKA); break; default: return (pid); } purge_config(PURGE_LISTENERS); if ((pw = getpwnam(SMTPD_USER)) == NULL) fatalx("unknown user " SMTPD_USER); config_process(PROC_LKA); if (setgroups(1, &pw->pw_gid) || setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) || setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid)) fatal("lka: cannot drop privileges"); imsg_callback = lka_imsg; event_init(); signal_set(&ev_sigint, SIGINT, lka_sig_handler, NULL); signal_set(&ev_sigterm, SIGTERM, lka_sig_handler, NULL); signal_set(&ev_sigchld, SIGCHLD, lka_sig_handler, NULL); signal_add(&ev_sigint, NULL); signal_add(&ev_sigterm, NULL); signal_add(&ev_sigchld, NULL); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); config_peer(PROC_PARENT); config_peer(PROC_QUEUE); config_peer(PROC_SMTP); config_peer(PROC_MDA); config_peer(PROC_MTA); config_peer(PROC_CONTROL); config_done(); /* Ignore them until we get our config */ mproc_disable(p_mda); mproc_disable(p_mta); mproc_disable(p_smtp); if (event_dispatch() < 0) fatal("event_dispatch"); lka_shutdown(); return (0); } static int lka_authenticate(const char *tablename, const char *user, const char *password) { struct table *table; union lookup lk; log_debug("debug: lka: authenticating for %s:%s", tablename, user); table = table_find(tablename, NULL); if (table == NULL) { log_warnx("warn: could not find table %s needed for authentication", tablename); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); } switch (table_lookup(table, user, K_CREDENTIALS, &lk)) { case -1: log_warnx("warn: user credentials lookup fail for %s:%s", tablename, user); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); case 0: return (LKA_PERMFAIL); default: if (!strcmp(lk.creds.password, crypt(password, lk.creds.password))) return (LKA_OK); return (LKA_PERMFAIL); } } static int lka_credentials(const char *tablename, const char *label, char *dst, size_t sz) { struct table *table; union lookup lk; char *buf; int buflen, r; table = table_find(tablename, NULL); if (table == NULL) { log_warnx("warn: credentials table %s missing", tablename); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); } dst[0] = '\0'; switch(table_lookup(table, label, K_CREDENTIALS, &lk)) { case -1: log_warnx("warn: credentials lookup fail for %s:%s", tablename, label); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); case 0: log_warnx("warn: credentials not found for %s:%s", tablename, label); return (LKA_PERMFAIL); default: if ((buflen = asprintf(&buf, "%c%s%c%s", '\0', lk.creds.username, '\0', lk.creds.password)) == -1) { log_warn("warn"); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); } r = base64_encode((unsigned char *)buf, buflen, dst, sz); free(buf); if (r == -1) { log_warnx("warn: credentials parse error for %s:%s", tablename, label); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); } return (LKA_OK); } } static int lka_userinfo(const char *tablename, const char *username, struct userinfo *res) { struct table *table; union lookup lk; log_debug("debug: lka: userinfo %s:%s", tablename, username); table = table_find(tablename, NULL); if (table == NULL) { log_warnx("warn: cannot find user table %s", tablename); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); } switch (table_lookup(table, username, K_USERINFO, &lk)) { case -1: log_warnx("warn: failure during userinfo lookup %s:%s", tablename, username); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); case 0: return (LKA_PERMFAIL); default: *res = lk.userinfo; return (LKA_OK); } } static int lka_addrname(const char *tablename, const struct sockaddr *sa, struct addrname *res) { struct table *table; union lookup lk; const char *source; source = sa_to_text(sa); log_debug("debug: lka: helo %s:%s", tablename, source); table = table_find(tablename, NULL); if (table == NULL) { log_warnx("warn: cannot find helo table %s", tablename); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); } switch (table_lookup(table, source, K_ADDRNAME, &lk)) { case -1: log_warnx("warn: failure during helo lookup %s:%s", tablename, source); return (LKA_TEMPFAIL); case 0: return (LKA_PERMFAIL); default: *res = lk.addrname; return (LKA_OK); } } static int lka_X509_verify(struct ca_vrfy_req_msg *vrfy, const char *CAfile, const char *CRLfile) { X509 *x509; X509 *x509_tmp; STACK_OF(X509) *x509_chain; const unsigned char *d2i; size_t i; int ret = 0; const char *errstr; x509 = NULL; x509_tmp = NULL; x509_chain = NULL; d2i = vrfy->cert; if (d2i_X509(&x509, &d2i, vrfy->cert_len) == NULL) { x509 = NULL; goto end; } if (vrfy->n_chain) { x509_chain = sk_X509_new_null(); for (i = 0; i < vrfy->n_chain; ++i) { d2i = vrfy->chain_cert[i]; if (d2i_X509(&x509_tmp, &d2i, vrfy->chain_cert_len[i]) == NULL) goto end; sk_X509_insert(x509_chain, x509_tmp, i); x509_tmp = NULL; } } if (! ca_X509_verify(x509, x509_chain, CAfile, NULL, &errstr)) log_debug("debug: lka: X509 verify: %s", errstr); else ret = 1; end: if (x509) X509_free(x509); if (x509_tmp) X509_free(x509_tmp); if (x509_chain) sk_X509_pop_free(x509_chain, X509_free); return ret; }