path: root/sbin/ipsecadm/ipsecadm.8

.\" $OpenBSD: ipsecadm.8,v 1.35 2000/11/11 04:52:57 angelos Exp $
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.\" Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
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.\"      This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
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.\" Manual page, using -mandoc macros
.\"
.Dd August 26, 1997
.Dt IPSECADM 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ipsecadm
.Nd interface to setup IPSec
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ipsecadm
.Op command
.Ar modifiers ...
.Sh NOTE
Before
.Xr ipsecadm 8
can be used, IPSec must be enabled by setting one or more of the following
.Xr sysctl 3
variables:
.Bl -tag -width xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
.It net.inet.esp.enable
Enable the ESP IPSec protocol
.It net.inet.ah.enable
Enable the AH IPSec protocol
.El
.Pp
To enable these operations across reboots, see
.Pa /etc/sysctl.conf .
.Pp
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Nm ipsecadm
utility sets up security associations in the kernel
to be used with
.Xr ipsec 4 .
It can be used to specify the encryption and authentication
algorithms and key material for the network layer security
provided by IPSec.
The possible commands are:
.Bl -tag -width new_esp
.It new esp
Setup a Security Association (SA) which uses the new esp transforms.
A SA consists of the destination address,
a Security Parameter Index (SPI) and a security protocol.
Encryption and authentication algorithms can be applied.
This is the default mode.
Allowed
modifiers are:
.Fl dst ,
.Fl src ,
.Fl proxy ,
.Fl spi ,
.Fl enc ,
.Fl auth ,
.Fl authkey ,
.Fl authkeyfile ,
.Fl forcetunnel ,
.Fl key ,
and
.Fl keyfile .
.It old esp
Setup a SA which uses the old esp transforms.
Only encryption algorithms can be applied.
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl dst ,
.Fl src ,
.Fl proxy ,
.Fl spi ,
.Fl enc ,
.Fl halfiv ,
.Fl forcetunnel ,
.Fl key ,
and
.Fl keyfile .
.It new ah
Setup a SA which uses the new ah transforms.
Authentication will be done with HMAC using the specified hash algorithm.
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl dst ,
.Fl src ,
.Fl proxy ,
.Fl spi ,
.Fl forcetunnel ,
.Fl auth ,
.Fl key ,
and
.Fl keyfile .
.It old ah
Setup a SA which uses the old ah transforms.
Simple keyed hashes will be used for authentication.
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl dst ,
.Fl src ,
.Fl proxy ,
.Fl spi ,
.Fl forcetunnel ,
.Fl auth ,
.Fl key ,
and
.Fl keyfile .
.It group
Group two SAs together, such that whenever the first one is applied, the
second one will be applied as well (SA bundle).
Arbitrarily long SA bundles can thus be created.
Note that the last SA in the bundle is the one that is applied last.
Thus, if an ESP and an AH SA are bundled together (in that order), then
the resulting packet will have an AH header, followed by an ESP header,
followed by the encrypted payload.
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl dst ,
.Fl spi ,
.Fl proto ,
.Fl dst2 ,
.Fl spi2 ,
and
.Fl proto2 .
.It ip4
Setup an SA which uses the IP-in-IP encapsulation protocol.
This mode
offers no security services by itself, but can be used to route other
(experimental or otherwise) protocols over an IP network.
The SPI value
is not used for anything other than referencing the information, and
does not appear on the wire.
Unlike other setups, like new esp, there
is no necessary setup in the receiving side.
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl dst ,
.Fl src ,
and
.Fl spi .
.It delspi
The specified SA will be deleted.
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl dst ,
.Fl spi ,
and
.Fl proto .
.It flow
Create a flow determining what security parameters a packet should
have (input or output).
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl src ,
.Fl dst ,
.Fl proto ,
.Fl addr ,
.Fl transport ,
.Fl sport ,
.Fl dport ,
.Fl delete ,
.Fl in ,
.Fl out ,
.Fl deny ,
.Fl srcid ,
.Fl dstid ,
.Fl srcid_type ,
.Fl dstid_type ,
.Fl use ,
.Fl acquire ,
.Fl require ,
.Fl dontacq ,
.Fl permit ,
and
.Fl bypass .
The
.Xr netstat 1
command shows all specified flows.
Flows are directional, and the
.Fl in
and
.Fl out
modifiers are used to specify the direction.
By default, flows are assumed to apply to outgoing packets.
The kernel will attempt to find an appropriate
Security Association from those already present (an SA that matches
the destination address, if set, and the security protocol).
If the destination address is set to all zeroes (0.0.0.0) or left
unspecified, the destination address from the packet will be used
to locate an SA (the source address is used for incoming flows).
For incoming flows, the destination address (if specified) should
point to the expected source of the SA (the remote SA peer). 
If no such SA exists, key management daemons will be used to generate
them if
.Fl acquire
or
.Fl require
were used.
If
.Fl acquire
was used, traffic will be allowed out (or in) and IPsec will be used
when the relevant SAs have been established.
If
.Fl require
was used, traffic will not be allowed in or out until it is protected
by IPsec.
If
.Fl dontacq
was used, traffic will not be allowed in or out until it is protected
by IPsec, but key management will not be asked to provide such an SA.
The
.Fl proto
argument (by default set to
.Nm esp )
will be used to determine what type of SA should be established.
A
.Nm bypass
or
.Nm permit
flow is used to specify a flow for which IPSec processing will be
bypassed, i.e packets will/need not be processed by any SAs.
For
.Nm permit
flows, additional modifiers are restricted to:
.Fl addr ,
.Fl transport ,
.Fl sport ,
.Fl dport ,
.Fl in ,
.Fl out ,
and
.Fl delete .
A
.Nm deny
flow is used to specify classes of packets that must be dropped
(either on output or input) without further processing.
.Nm deny
takes the same additional modifiers as
.Nm bypass .
.It flush
Flush SAs from from kernel.
This includes flushing any flows and
routing entries associated with the SAs.
Allowed modifiers are:
.Fl ah ,
.Fl esp ,
.Fl oldah ,
.Fl oldesp ,
and
.Fl ip4 .
Default action is to flush all types of security associations
from the kernel.
.El
.Pp
If no command is given
.Xr ipsecadm 1
defaults to new esp mode.
.Pp
The modifiers have the following meanings:
.Bl -tag -width xxxx -offset indent
.It Fl src
The source IP address for the SA.
This is necessary for incoming
SAs to avoid source address spoofing between mutually
suspicious hosts that have established SAs with us.
For outgoing SAs,
this field is used to fill in the source address when doing tunneling.
.It Fl dst
The destination IP address for the SA.
.It Fl dst2
The second IP address used by
.Nm group .
.It Fl proxy
This IP address, if provided, is checked against the inner IP address when
doing tunneling to a firewall, to prevent source spoofing attacks.
It is
strongly recommended that this option is provided when applicable.
It is
applicable in a scenario when host A is using IPsec to communicate with
firewall B, and through that to host C.
In that case, the proxy address for
the incoming SA should be C.
This option is not necessary for outgoing SAs.
.It Fl spi
The Security Parameter Index (SPI).
.It Fl spi2
The second SPI used by
.Nm group .
.It Fl tunnel
This option has been deprecated.
The arguments are ignored, and it otherwise has the same effect as the
.Nm forcetunnel
option.
.It Fl newpadding
This option has been deprecated.
.It Fl forcetunnel
Force IP-inside-IP encapsulation before ESP or AH processing is performed for
outgoing packets.
The source/destination addresses of the outgoing IP packet
will be those provided in the
.Nm src
and
.Nm dst
options.
Notice that the IPsec stack will perform IP-inside-IP encapsulation
when deemed necessary, even if this flag has not been set.
.It Fl enc
The encryption algorithm to be used with the SA.
Possible values are:
.Bl -tag -width skipjack
.It Nm des
This is available for both old and new esp.
Notice that hardware crackers for DES can be (and have been) built for
US$250,000 (in 1998).
Use DES for encryption of critical information at your own risk.
We suggest using 3DES or AES instead.
DES support is kept for interoperability
(with old implementations) purposes only.
See
.Xr des_cipher 3 .
.It Nm 3des
This is available for both old and new esp.
It is considered more secure than straight DES, since it uses larger
keys.
.It Nm aes
Rijndael encryption is available only in new esp.
.It Nm blf
Blowfish encryption is available only in new esp.
See
.Xr blf_key 3 .
.It Nm cast
CAST encryption is available only in new esp.
.It Nm skipjack
SKIPJACK encryption is available only in new esp.
This algorithm designed by the NSA and is faster than 3DES.
However, since it was designed by the NSA
it is a poor choice.
.El
.Pp
.It Fl auth
The authentication algorithm to be used with the SA.
Possible values are:
.Nm md5
and
.Nm sha1
for both old and new ah and also new esp.
Also
.Nm rmd160
for both new ah and esp.
.It Fl key
The secret symmetric key used for encryption and authentication.
The size for
.Nm des
and
.Nm 3des
is fixed to 8 and 24 respectively.
For other ciphers like
.Nm cast ,
.Nm aes ,
or
.Nm blf
the key length can vary (depending on the algorithm).
The
.Nm key
should be given in hexadecimal digits.
The
.Nm key
should be chosen in random (ideally, using some true-random source like
coin flipping).
It is very important that the key is not guessable.
One practical way of generating keys is by using the
.Xr random 4
device (e.g., dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1024 count=1 | sha1)
.It Fl keyfile
Read the key from a file.  May be used instead of the
.Fl key
flag, and has the same syntax considerations.
.It Fl authkey
The secret key material used for authentication
if additional authentication in new esp mode is required.
For old or new ah the key material for authentication is passed with the
.Nm key
option.
The
.Nm key
should be given in hexadecimal digits.
The
.Nm key
should be chosen in random (ideally, using some true-random source like
coin flipping).
It is very important that the key is not guessable.
One practical way of generating keys is by using the
.Xr random 4
device (e.g., dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1024 count=1 | sha1)
.It Fl authkeyfile
Read the authkey from a file.  May be used instead of the
.Fl authkey
flag, and has the same syntax considerations.
.It Fl iv
This option has been deprecated.
The argument is ignored.
When applicable, it has the same behaviour as the
.Nm halfiv
option.
.It Fl halfiv
This option causes use of a 4 byte IV in old ESP (as opposed to 8 bytes).
It may only be used with old ESP.
.It Fl proto
The security protocol needed by
.Nm delspi
or
.Nm flow ,
to uniquely specify the SA.
The default value is 50 which means
.Nm IPPROTO_ESP .
Other accepted values are 51
.Nm ( IPPROTO_AH ) ,
and 4
.Nm ( IPPROTO_IP ) .
One can also specify the symbolic names "esp", "ah", and "ip4",
case insensitive.
.It Fl proto2
The second security protocol used by
.Nm group .
It defaults to
.Nm IPPROTO_AH ,
otherwise takes the same values as
.Fl proto .
.It Fl addr
The source address, source network mask, destination address and destination
network mask against which packets need to match to use the specified
Security Association.
All addresses must be of the same address family
(IPv4 or IPv6).
.It Fl transport
The protocol number which packets need to match to use the specified
Security Association.
By default the protocol number is not used for matching.
Instead of a number, a valid protocol name that appears in
.Xr protocols 5
can be used.
.It Fl sport
The source port which packets have to match for the flow.
By default the source port is not used for matching.
Instead of a number, a valid service name that appears in
.Xr services 5
can be used.
.It Fl dport
The destination port which packets have to match for the flow.
By default the source port is not used for matching.
Instead of a number, a valid service name that appears in
.Xr services 5
can be used.
.It Fl srcid
For flow, used to specify what local identity key management
should use when negotiating the SAs.
If left unspecified, the source address of the flow is used
(see the discussion on
.Nm flow
above, with regard to source address).
.It Fl dstid
For flow, used to specify what the remote identity key management
should expect is.
If left unspecified, the destination address of the flow is used
(see the discussion on
.Nm flow
above, with regard to destination address).
.It Fl srcid_type
For flow, used to specify the type of identity given by
.Fl srcid .
Valid values are
.Nm prefix ,
.Nm fqdn ,
and
.Nm ufqdn .
The
.Nm prefix
type implies an IPv4 or IPv6 address followed by a forward slash
character and a decimal number indicating the number of important bits
in the address (equivalent to a netmask, in IPv4 terms).
Key management then has to pick a local identity that falls within the
address space indicated.
The
.Nm fqdn
and
.Nm ufqdn
types are DNS-style host names and mailbox-format user
addresses, respectively, and are especially useful for mobile user
scenarios.
Note that no validity checking on the identities is done.
.It Fl dstid_type
See
.Fl srcid_type .
.It Fl delete
Instead of creating a flow, an existing flow is deleted.
.It Fl bypass
For
.Nm flow ,
create or delete a
.Nm bypass
flow.
Packets matching this flow will not be processed by IPSec.
.It Fl deny
For
.Nm flow ,
create or delete a
.Nm deny
flow.
Packets matching this flow will be dropped.
.It Fl use
For
.Nm flow ,
specify that packets matching this flow should try to use IPsec if
possible.
.It Fl acquire
For
.Nm flow ,
specify that packets matching this flow should try to use IPsec and
establish SAs dynamically if possible, but permit unencrypted
traffic.
.It Fl require
For
.Nm flow ,
specify that packets matching this flow must use IPsec, and establish
SAs dynamically as needed. If no SAs are established, traffic is not
allowed through.
.It Fl dontacq
For
.Nm flow ,
specify that packets matching this flow must use IPsec.
If such SAs are not present, simply drop the packets.
Such a policy may be used to demand peers to establish SAs before they
can communicate with us, without going through the burden of
initiating the SA ourselves (thus allowing for some denial of service
attacks).
This flow type is particularly suitable for security gateways.
.It Fl in
For
.Nm flow ,
specify that it should be used to match incoming packets only.
.It Fl out
For
.Nm flow ,
specify that it should be used to match outgoing packets only.
.It Fl ah
For
.Nm flush ,
only flush SAs of type ah.
.It Fl esp
For
.Nm flush ,
only flush SAs of type esp.
.It Fl oldah
For
.Nm flush ,
only flush SAs of type old ah.
.It Fl oldesp
For
.Nm flush ,
only flush SAs of type old esp.
.It Fl ip4
For
.Nm flush ,
only flush SAs of type ip4.
.El
.Sh EXAMPLES
Setup a SA which uses new esp with 3des encryption and HMAC-SHA1
authentication:
.Bd -literal
ipsecadm new esp -enc 3des -auth sha1 -spi 1001 -dst 169.20.12.2 \e\ 
	-src 169.20.12.3 \e\ 
	-key 638063806380638063806380638063806380638063806380 \e\ 
	-authkey 1234123412341234123412341234123412341234
.Ed
.Pp
Setup a SA for authentication with old ah only:
.Bd -literal
ipsecadm old ah -auth md5 -spi 1001 -dst 169.20.12.2 -src 169.20.12.3 \e\ 
	-key 12341234deadbeef
.Ed
.Pp
Setup a flow using the above SA:
.Bd -literal
ipsecadm flow -dst 169.20.12.2 -proto ah \e\ 
	-addr 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 -out -require
.Ed
.Pp
Setup an inbound SA:
.Bd -literal
ipsecadm new esp -enc blf -auth md5 -spi 1002 -dst 169.20.12.3 \e\ 
	-src 169.20.12.2 \e\ 
	-key abadbeef15deadbeefabadbeef15deadbeefabadbeef15deadbeef \e\ 
	-authkey 12349876432167890192837465098273
.Ed
.Pp
Setup an ingress flow on for the inbound SA:
.Bd -literal
ipsecadm flow -addr 10.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0 \e\ 
	-dst 169.20.12.2 -proto esp -in -require
.Ed
.Pp
Setup a bypass flow:
.Bd -literal
ipsecadm flow -bypass -out \e\ 
	-addr 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0
.Ed
.Pp
Delete all esp SAs and their flows and routing information:
.Bd -literal
ipsecadm flush -esp
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr netstat 1 ,
.Xr enc 4 ,
.Xr ipsec 4 ,
.Xr protocols 5 ,
.Xr services 5 ,
.Xr isakmpd 8 ,
.Xr photurisd 8 ,
.Xr vpn 8