path: root/share/man/man8/vpn.8

.\" $OpenBSD: vpn.8,v 1.76 2004/11/12 10:51:09 jmc Exp $
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.\" Copyright 1998 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
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.\" Manual page, using -mandoc macros
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.Dd February 9, 1999
.Dt VPN 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm vpn
.Nd configuring the system for virtual private networks
.Sh DESCRIPTION
A virtual private network is used to securely connect two or more subnets
over the internet.
For each subnet there is a security gateway which is
linked via a cryptographically secured tunnel to the security gateway of
the other subnet.
.Xr ipsec 4
is used to provide the necessary network-layer cryptographic services.
This document describes the configuration process for setting up a
.Nm VPN .
.Pp
Briefly, creating a VPN consists of the following steps:
.Pp
.Bl -enum -compact
.It
Choose a key exchange method: manual keyed, or automated via
.Xr isakmpd 8 .
.It
For manual keying, create the Security Associations (SA), one for
each endpoint.
.It
For manual keying, create the appropriate IPsec flows.
.It
For automated keying, create a configuration file for the keying
daemon.
.It
Configure your firewall rules appropriately.
.El
.Ss Choosing a key exchange method
There are currently two key exchange methods available:
.Pp
.Bl -bullet -compact
.It
manual (symmetric shared secret)
.It
.Xr isakmpd 8
.El
.Ss Enabling Packet Forwarding
For security gateways, proper operation often requires packet
forwarding to be enabled using
.Xr sysctl 8 :
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# sysctl net.inet.ip.forwarding=1
# sysctl net.inet6.ip6.forwarding=1
.Ed
.Pp
Packet forwarding defaults to 'off'.
.Pp
For more permanent operation,
the appropriate option(s) should be enabled in your
.Xr sysctl.conf 5 .
.Ss Generating Manual Keys [manual keying]
The shared secret symmetric keys used to create a VPN can
be any hexadecimal value, so long as both sides of the connection use
the same values.
Since the security of the VPN is based on these keys
being unguessable, it is very important that the keys be chosen using a
strong random source.
One practical method of generating them is by using the
.Xr random 4
device.
To produce 160 bits (20 bytes) of randomness, for example, do:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# openssl rand 20 | hexdump -e '20/1 "%02x"'
.Ed
.Pp
or:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# openssl rand 20 | perl -pe 's/./unpack("H2",$&)/ges'
.Ed
.Pp
Different cipher types may require different sized keys.
.Pp
.Bl -column "Cipher" "Key Length" -offset indent -compact
.It Em Cipher	Key Length
.It Li DES Ta "56 bits"
.It Li 3DES Ta "168 bits"
.It Li AES Ta "Variable (128 bits recommended)"
.It Li BLF Ta "Variable (160 bits recommended)"
.It Li CAST Ta "Variable (128 bits maximum and recommended)"
.It Li SKIPJACK Ta "80 bits"
.El
.Pp
Use of DES or SKIPJACK as an encryption algorithm is not recommended
(except for backwards compatibility) due to their short key length.
Furthermore, recent attacks on SKIPJACK have shown severe weaknesses
in its structure.
.Pp
Note that DES requires 8 bytes to form a 56-bit key and 3DES requires 24 bytes
to form its 168-bit key.
This is because the most significant bit of each byte is ignored by both
algorithms.
.Ss Creating Security Associations [manual keying]
Before the IPsec flows can be defined, two Security Associations (SAs)
must be defined on each end of the VPN, e.g.:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ipsecadm new esp -spi $SPI_AB -src $GATEWAY_A \e
    -dst $GATEWAY_B -forcetunnel -enc 3des -auth sha1 \e
    -keyfile $ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE \e
    -authkeyfile $AUTHENTICATION_KEY_FILE
# ipsecadm new esp -spi $SPI_BA -src $GATEWAY_B \e
    -dst $GATEWAY_A -forcetunnel -enc 3des -auth sha1 \e
    -keyfile $ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE \e
    -authkeyfile $AUTHENTICATION_KEY_FILE
.Ed
.Pp
Note that the
.Fl key
and
.Fl authkey
options may be used to specify the keys directly in the
.Xr ipsecadm 8
command line.
However, another user could view the keys by using the
.Xr ps 1
command at the appropriate time (or use a program for doing so).
.Ss Creating IPsec Flows [manual keying]
Both IPsec gateways need to configure
.Xr ipsec 4
routes with the
.Xr ipsecadm 8
tool:
.Pp
On the security gateway of subnet A:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ipsecadm flow -out -require -proto esp \e
    -src $GATEWAY_A -dst $GATEWAY_B \e
    -addr $NETWORK_A $NETWORK_B
# ipsecadm flow -in -require -proto esp \e
    -src $GATEWAY_A -dst $GATEWAY_B \e
    -addr $NETWORK_B $NETWORK_A
.Ed
.Pp
and on the security gateway of subnet B:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ipsecadm flow -out -require -proto esp \e
    -src $GATEWAY_B -dst $GATEWAY_A \e
    -addr $NETWORK_B $NETWORK_A
# ipsecadm flow -in -require -proto esp \e
    -src $GATEWAY_B -dst $GATEWAY_A \e
    -addr $NETWORK_A $NETWORK_B
.Ed
.Ss Configure and run the keying daemon [automated keying]
Unless manual keying is used, both security gateways need to start
the
.Xr isakmpd 8
key management daemon.
To make sure the daemon is properly configured
to provide the required security services (typically, encryption and
authentication) start the daemon with debugging or verbose output.
.Pp
.Xr isakmpd 8
implements security policy using the
.Em KeyNote
trust management system.
.Ss Configuring Firewall Rules
.Xr pf 4
needs to be configured such that all packets from the outside are blocked
by default.
Only successfully IPsec-processed packets (from the
.Xr enc 4
interface), or key management packets (for
.Xr isakmpd 8 ,
.Tn UDP
packets with source and destination ports of 500) should be allowed to pass.
.Pp
The
.Xr pf.conf 5
rules for a tunnel which uses encryption (the ESP IPsec protocol) and
.Xr isakmpd 8
on security gateway A might look like this:
.Bd -literal
GATEWAY_A = "192.168.1.254/32"
GATEWAY_B = "192.168.2.1/32"
NETWORK_A = "10.0.50.0/24"
NETWORK_B = "10.0.99.0/24"

# default deny
# ne0 is the only interface going to the outside.
block in log on { enc0, ne0 } all
block out log on { enc0, ne0 } all

# Passing in encrypted traffic from security gateways
pass in proto esp from $GATEWAY_B to $GATEWAY_A
pass out proto esp from $GATEWAY_A to $GATEWAY_B

# Need to allow ipencap traffic on enc0.
pass in on enc0 proto ipencap all

# Passing in traffic from the designated subnets.
pass in on enc0 from $NETWORK_B to $NETWORK_A
pass out on enc0 from $NETWORK_A to $NETWORK_B

# Passing in isakmpd(8) traffic from the security gateways
pass in on ne0 proto udp from $GATEWAY_B port = 500 to $GATEWAY_A port = 500
pass out on ne0 proto udp from $GATEWAY_A port = 500 to $GATEWAY_B port = 500
.Ed
.Pp
If there are no other
.Xr pf.conf 5
rules, the "quick" clause can be added to the last four rules.
NAT rules can also be used on the
.Xr enc 4
interface.
Note that it is strongly encouraged that instead of detailed PF
rules, the SPD (IPsec flow database) be utilized to specify security
policy, if only to avoid filtering conflicts.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf -compact
.It Pa /usr/share/ipsec/rc.vpn
Sample VPN configuration file
.It Pa /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf
.Xr isakmpd 8
configuration file
.It Pa /etc/pf.conf
Firewall configuration file
.El
.Sh EXAMPLES
.Ss Manual keying
To create a manual keyed VPN between two class C networks using
3DES encryption and the following IP addresses:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
 GATEWAY_A  = 192.168.1.254
 NETWORK_A = 10.0.50.0/24
 GATEWAY_B  = 192.168.2.1
 NETWORK_B = 10.0.99.0/24
.Ed
.Bl -enum
.It
Choose the shared secrets using a suitably random method.
The 3DES encryption key needs 192 bits (3x64), or 24 bytes.
The SHA-1 authentication key for needs 160 bits, or 20 bytes.
.Bd -literal
# openssl rand 24 | hexdump -e '24/1 "%02x"' > enc_key
# openssl rand 20 | hexdump -e '20/1 "%02x"' > auth_key
.Ed
.It
Create the Security Associations (on both endpoints):
.Bd -literal
# /sbin/ipsecadm new esp -src 192.168.2.1 -dst 192.168.1.254 \e
   -forcetunnel -spi 1000 -enc 3des -auth sha1 \e
   -keyfile enc_key -authkeyfile auth_key

# /sbin/ipsecadm new esp -src 192.168.1.254 -dst 192.168.2.1 \e
   -forcetunnel -spi 1001 -enc 3des -auth sha1 \e
   -keyfile enc_key -authkeyfile auth_key
.Ed
.It
Create the IPsec flows on machine A (the first is for
outbound flows, the latter is the ingress filter for the
incoming security association):
.Bd -literal
# ipsecadm flow -out -require -proto esp \e
    -src 192.168.1.254 -dst 192.168.2.1 \e
    -addr 10.0.50.0/24 10.0.99.0/24
# ipsecadm flow -in -require -proto esp \e
    -src 192.168.1.254 -dst 192.168.2.1 \e
    -addr 10.0.99.0/24 10.0.50.0/24
.Ed
.It
Create the matching IPsec flows on machine B:
.Bd -literal
# ipsecadm flow -out -require -proto esp \e
    -src 192.168.1.254 -dst 192.168.2.1 \e
    -addr 10.0.50.0/24 10.0.99.0/24
# ipsecadm flow -in -require -proto esp \e
    -src 192.168.1.254 -dst 192.168.2.1 \e
    -addr 10.0.99.0/24 10.0.50.0/24
.Ed
.It
Configure the firewall rules on machine A
using the previously defined ruleset:
.Bd -literal
GATEWAY_A = "192.168.1.254/32"
GATEWAY_B = "192.168.2.1/32"
NETWORK_A = "10.0.50.0/24"
NETWORK_B = "10.0.99.0/24"

(rest of ruleset)
.Ed
.It
Configure the firewall rules on machine B, modifying the
definitions as appropriate:
.Bd -literal
GATEWAY_B = "192.168.1.254/32"
GATEWAY_A = "192.168.2.1/32"
NETWORK_B = "10.0.50.0/24"
NETWORK_A = "10.0.99.0/24"

(rest of ruleset)
.Ed
.El
.Ss Automated keying
To create a VPN between the same two C class networks as the example
above, using
.Xr isakmpd 8 :
.Bl -enum
.It
Create
.Pa /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf
for machine A:
.Bd -literal

# Incoming phase 1 negotiations are multiplexed on the source IP
# address. Phase 1 is used to set up a protected channel just
# between the two gateway machines. This channel is then used for
# the phase 2 negotiation traffic (i.e. encrypted & authenticated).

[Phase 1]
192.168.2.1=		peer-machineB

# 'Phase 2' defines which connections the daemon should establish.
# These connections contain the actual "IPsec VPN" information.

[Phase 2]
Connections=		VPN-A-B

# ISAKMP phase 1 peers (from [Phase 1])

[peer-machineB]
Phase=			1
Transport=		udp
Address=		192.168.2.1
Configuration=		Default-main-mode
Authentication=		yoursharedsecret

# IPSEC phase 2 connections (from [Phase 2])

[VPN-A-B]
Phase=			2
ISAKMP-peer=		peer-machineB
Configuration=		Default-quick-mode
Local-ID=		machineA-internal-network
Remote-ID=		machineB-internal-network

# ID sections (as used in [VPN-A-B])

[machineA-internal-network]
ID-type=		IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET
Network=		10.0.50.0
Netmask=		255.255.255.0

[machineB-internal-network]
ID-type=		IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET
Network=		10.0.99.0
Netmask=		255.255.255.0

# Main and Quick Mode descriptions (as used by peers and connections)

[Default-main-mode]
DOI=			IPSEC
EXCHANGE_TYPE=		ID_PROT
Transforms=		3DES-SHA,BLF-SHA

[Default-quick-mode]
DOI=			IPSEC
EXCHANGE_TYPE=		QUICK_MODE
Suites=			QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-SUITE
.Ed
.Pp
.It
Create
.Pa /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf
for machine B:
.Bd -literal

# Incoming phase 1 negotiations are multiplexed on the source IP
# address. Phase 1 is used to set up a protected channel just
# between the two gateway machines. This channel is then used for
# the phase 2 negotiation traffic (i.e. encrypted & authenticated).

[Phase 1]
192.168.1.254=		peer-machineA

# 'Phase 2' defines which connections the daemon should establish.
# These connections contain the actual "IPsec VPN" information.

[Phase 2]
Connections=		VPN-B-A

# ISAKMP phase 1 peers (from [Phase 1])

[peer-machineA]
Phase=			1
Transport=		udp
Address=		192.168.1.254
Configuration=		Default-main-mode
Authentication=		yoursharedsecret

# IPSEC phase 2 connections (from [Phase 2])

[VPN-B-A]
Phase=			2
ISAKMP-peer=		peer-machineA
Configuration=		Default-quick-mode
Local-ID=		machineB-internal-network
Remote-ID=		machineA-internal-network

# ID sections (as used in [VPN-A-B])

[machineA-internal-network]
ID-type=		IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET
Network=		10.0.50.0
Netmask=		255.255.255.0

[machineB-internal-network]
ID-type=		IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET
Network=		10.0.99.0
Netmask=		255.255.255.0

# Main and Quick Mode descriptions (as used by peers and connections)

[Default-main-mode]
DOI=			IPSEC
EXCHANGE_TYPE=		ID_PROT
Transforms=		3DES-SHA,BLF-SHA

[Default-quick-mode]
DOI=			IPSEC
EXCHANGE_TYPE=		QUICK_MODE
Suites=			QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-SUITE
.Ed
.It
Read through the configuration one more time.
The only real differences between the two files in this example are
the IP-addresses, and ordering of Local- and Remote-ID for the VPN
itself.
Note that the shared secret (the
.Em Authentication
tag) must match between machineA and machineB.
.Pp
Due to the shared secret information in the configuration file, it must
be installed without any permissions for "group" or "other".
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# chmod og-rwx /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf
.Ed
.Pp
.It
Create a simple
.Pa /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy
file for machineA:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
Keynote-version: 2
Authorizer: "POLICY"
Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" &&
            esp_present == "yes" &&
            esp_enc_alg != "null" -> "true";
.Ed
.It
Create a simple
.Pa /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy
file for machineB:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
Keynote-version: 2
Authorizer: "POLICY"
Conditions: app_domain == "IPsec policy" &&
            esp_present == "yes" &&
            esp_enc_alg != "null" -> "true";
.Ed
.It
Configure the firewall rules on machines A and B:
.Pp
Use the same ruleset as the manual keying example, but add permission
for the
.Xr isakmpd 8
control traffic, on
.Tn UDP
port 500.
.Pp
For machineA, add:
.Bd -literal
# Permit ISAKMPD control traffic between A and B
pass in proto udp from 192.168.2.1/32 to 192.168.1.254/32 port = 500
pass out proto udp from 192.168.1.254/32 to 192.168.2.1/32 port = 500
.Ed
.Pp
For machineB, add:
.Bd -literal
# Permit ISAKMPD control traffic between A and B
pass in proto udp from 192.168.1.254/32 to 192.168.2.1/32 port = 500
pass out proto udp from 192.168.2.1/32 to 192.168.1.254/32 port = 500
.Ed
.It
Start
.Xr isakmpd 8
.Pp
On both machines, run:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# /sbin/isakmpd
.Ed
.Pp
To run with verbose debugging enabled, instead start with:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# /sbin/isakmpd -d -DA=99
.Ed
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr openssl 1 ,
.Xr enc 4 ,
.Xr ipsec 4 ,
.Xr keynote 4 ,
.Xr options 4 ,
.Xr isakmpd.conf 5 ,
.Xr isakmpd.policy 5 ,
.Xr pf.conf 5 ,
.Xr ipsecadm 8 ,
.Xr isakmpd 8 ,
.Xr pfctl 8 ,
.Xr sysctl 8
.Sh BUGS
In situations where the gateway IPs are outside the tunnelled network
range, such as when tunnelling private (RFC 1918) networks over the Internet,
.Xr isakmpd 8
or manual keying must be used.