diff options
| author | Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2017-10-14 09:30:51 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2017-10-14 09:30:51 +0000 |
| commit | ddf3a6111cf80dba42a798331e0e6b5fdf19c6e2 (patch) | |
| tree | 1bf6d7bc0ed928cf64e9fa4eca97e92e40e8a140 /xserver | |
| parent | b4b7583e4192704b1003424d68c1b3bf525b6c2e (diff) | |
MFC: Xi: integer overflow and unvalidated length in
(S)ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer
[jcristau: originally this patch fixed the same issue as commit
211e05ac85 "Xi: Test exact size of XIBarrierReleasePointer", with the
addition of these checks]
This addresses CVE-2017-12179
Diffstat (limited to 'xserver')
| -rw-r--r-- | xserver/Xi/xibarriers.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/xserver/Xi/xibarriers.c b/xserver/Xi/xibarriers.c index 0bc5761f3..b0a4a92a1 100644 --- a/xserver/Xi/xibarriers.c +++ b/xserver/Xi/xibarriers.c @@ -834,6 +834,8 @@ SProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client) REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq); swapl(&stuff->num_barriers); + if (stuff->num_barriers > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo)) + return BadLength; REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq, stuff->num_barriers * sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo)); info = (xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo*) &stuff[1]; @@ -856,6 +858,9 @@ ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client) xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo *info; REQUEST(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq); + if (stuff->num_barriers > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo)) + return BadLength; REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq, stuff->num_barriers * sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo)); info = (xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo*) &stuff[1]; |