remove obsolete files

3 files changed, 0 insertions, 813 deletions

diff --git a/usr.sbin/smtpd/cert.c b/usr.sbin/smtpd/cert.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 05aff4181b1..00000000000
--- a/usr.sbin/smtpd/cert.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,414 +0,0 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: cert.c,v 1.2 2018/12/11 07:25:57 eric Exp $	*/
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018 Eric Faurot <eric@openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/tree.h>
-#include <sys/queue.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <imsg.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "smtpd.h"
-#include "ssl.h"
-
-#define p_cert p_lka
-
-struct request {
-	SPLAY_ENTRY(request)	 entry;
-	uint32_t		 id;
-	void			(*cb_get_certificate)(void *, int, const char *,
-				    const void *, size_t);
-	void			(*cb_verify)(void *, int);
-	void			*arg;
-};
-
-#define MAX_CERTS	16
-#define MAX_CERT_LEN	(MAX_IMSGSIZE - (IMSG_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(size_t)))
-
-struct session {
-	SPLAY_ENTRY(session)	 entry;
-	uint32_t		 id;
-	struct mproc		*proc;
-	char			*cert[MAX_CERTS];
-	size_t			 cert_len[MAX_CERTS];
-	int			 cert_count;
-};
-
-SPLAY_HEAD(cert_reqtree, request);
-SPLAY_HEAD(cert_sestree, session);
-
-static int request_cmp(struct request *, struct request *);
-static int session_cmp(struct session *, struct session *);
-SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(cert_reqtree, request, entry, request_cmp);
-SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(cert_sestree, session, entry, session_cmp);
-
-static void cert_do_verify(struct session *, const char *, int);
-static int cert_X509_verify(struct session *, const char *, const char *);
-
-static struct cert_reqtree reqs = SPLAY_INITIALIZER(&reqs);
-static struct cert_sestree sess = SPLAY_INITIALIZER(&sess);
-
-int
-cert_init(const char *name, int fallback, void (*cb)(void *, int,
-    const char *, const void *, size_t), void *arg)
-{
-	struct request *req;
-
-	req = calloc(1, sizeof(*req));
-	if (req ==  NULL) {
-		cb(arg, CA_FAIL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	while (req->id == 0 || SPLAY_FIND(cert_reqtree, &reqs, req))
-		req->id = arc4random();
-	req->cb_get_certificate = cb;
-	req->arg = arg;
-	SPLAY_INSERT(cert_reqtree, &reqs, req);
-
-	m_create(p_cert, IMSG_CERT_INIT, req->id, 0, -1);
-	m_add_string(p_cert, name);
-	m_add_int(p_cert, fallback);
-	m_close(p_cert);
-
-	return 1;
-}
-
-int
-cert_verify(const void *ssl, const char *name, int fallback,
-    void (*cb)(void *, int), void *arg)
-{
-	struct request	       *req;
-	X509		       *x;
-	STACK_OF(X509)	       *xchain;
-	unsigned char	       *cert_der[MAX_CERTS];
-	int			cert_len[MAX_CERTS];
-	int			i, cert_count, ret;
-
-	x = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
-	if (x == NULL) {
-		cb(arg, CERT_NOCERT);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	ret = 0;
-	memset(cert_der, 0, sizeof(cert_der));
-
-	req = calloc(1, sizeof(*req));
-	if (req ==  NULL)
-		goto end;
-	while (req->id == 0 || SPLAY_FIND(cert_reqtree, &reqs, req))
-		req->id = arc4random();
-	req->cb_verify = cb;
-	req->arg = arg;
-	SPLAY_INSERT(cert_reqtree, &reqs, req);
-
-	cert_count = 1;
-	if ((xchain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) {
-		cert_count += sk_X509_num(xchain);
-		if (cert_count > MAX_CERTS) {
-			log_warnx("warn: certificate chain too long");
-			goto end;
-		}
-	}
-
-	for (i = 0; i < cert_count; ++i) {
-		if (i != 0) {
-			if ((x = sk_X509_value(xchain, i - 1)) == NULL) {
-				log_warnx("warn: failed to retrieve certificate");
-				goto end;
-			}
-		}
-
-		cert_len[i] = i2d_X509(x, &cert_der[i]);
-		if (i == 0)
-			X509_free(x);
-
-		if (cert_len[i] < 0) {
-			log_warnx("warn: failed to encode certificate");
-			goto end;
-		}
-
-		log_debug("debug: certificate %i: len=%d", i, cert_len[i]);
-		if (cert_len[i] > (int)MAX_CERT_LEN) {
-			log_warnx("warn: certificate too long");
-			goto end;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* Send the cert chain, one cert at a time */
-	for (i = 0; i < cert_count; ++i) {
-		m_create(p_cert, IMSG_CERT_CERTIFICATE, req->id, 0, -1);
-		m_add_data(p_cert, cert_der[i], cert_len[i]);
-		m_close(p_cert);
-	}
-
-	/* Tell lookup process that it can start verifying, we're done */
-	m_create(p_cert, IMSG_CERT_VERIFY, req->id, 0, -1);
-	m_add_string(p_cert, name);
-	m_add_int(p_cert, fallback);
-	m_close(p_cert);
-
-	ret = 1;
-
-    end:
-	for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERTS; ++i)
-		free(cert_der[i]);
-
-	if (ret == 0) {
-		if (req)
-			SPLAY_REMOVE(cert_reqtree, &reqs, req);
-		free(req);
-		cb(arg, CERT_ERROR);
-	}
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-
-void
-cert_dispatch_request(struct mproc *proc, struct imsg *imsg)
-{
-	struct pki *pki;
-	struct session key, *s;
-	const char *name;
-	const void *data;
-	size_t datalen;
-	struct msg m;
-	uint32_t reqid;
-	char buf[LINE_MAX];
-	int fallback;
-
-	reqid = imsg->hdr.peerid;
-	m_msg(&m, imsg);
-
-	switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
-
-	case IMSG_CERT_INIT:
-		m_get_string(&m, &name);
-		m_get_int(&m, &fallback);
-		m_end(&m);
-
-		xlowercase(buf, name, sizeof(buf));
-		log_debug("debug: looking up pki \"%s\"", buf);
-		pki = dict_get(env->sc_pki_dict, buf);
-		if (pki == NULL && fallback)
-			pki = dict_get(env->sc_pki_dict, "*");
-
-		m_create(proc, IMSG_CERT_INIT, reqid, 0, -1);
-		if (pki) {
-			m_add_int(proc, CA_OK);
-			m_add_string(proc, pki->pki_name);
-			m_add_data(proc, pki->pki_cert, pki->pki_cert_len);
-		} else {
-			m_add_int(proc, CA_FAIL);
-			m_add_string(proc, NULL);
-			m_add_data(proc, NULL, 0);
-		}
-		m_close(proc);
-		return;
-
-	case IMSG_CERT_CERTIFICATE:
-		m_get_data(&m, &data, &datalen);
-		m_end(&m);
-
-		key.id = reqid;
-		key.proc = proc;
-		s = SPLAY_FIND(cert_sestree, &sess, &key);
-		if (s == NULL) {
-			s = calloc(1, sizeof(*s));
-			s->proc = proc;
-			s->id = reqid;
-			SPLAY_INSERT(cert_sestree, &sess, s);
-		}
-
-		if (s->cert_count == MAX_CERTS)
-			fatalx("%s: certificate chain too long", __func__);
-
-		s->cert[s->cert_count] = xmemdup(data, datalen);
-		s->cert_len[s->cert_count] = datalen;
-		s->cert_count++;
-		return;
-
-	case IMSG_CERT_VERIFY:
-		m_get_string(&m, &name);
-		m_get_int(&m, &fallback);
-		m_end(&m);
-
-		key.id = reqid;
-		key.proc = proc;
-		s = SPLAY_FIND(cert_sestree, &sess, &key);
-		if (s == NULL)
-			fatalx("%s: no certificate", __func__);
-
-		SPLAY_REMOVE(cert_sestree, &sess, s);
-		cert_do_verify(s, name, fallback);
-		return;
-
-	default:
-		fatalx("%s: %s", __func__, imsg_to_str(imsg->hdr.type));
-	}
-}
-
-void
-cert_dispatch_result(struct mproc *proc, struct imsg *imsg)
-{
-	struct request key, *req;
-	struct msg m;
-	const void *cert;
-	const char *name;
-	size_t cert_len;
-	int res;
-
-	key.id = imsg->hdr.peerid;
-	req = SPLAY_FIND(cert_reqtree, &reqs, &key);
-	if (req == NULL)
-		fatalx("%s: unknown request %08x", __func__, imsg->hdr.peerid);
-
-	m_msg(&m, imsg);
-
-	switch (imsg->hdr.type) {
-
-	case IMSG_CERT_INIT:
-		m_get_int(&m, &res);
-		m_get_string(&m, &name);
-		m_get_data(&m, &cert, &cert_len);
-		m_end(&m);
-		SPLAY_REMOVE(cert_reqtree, &reqs, req);
-		req->cb_get_certificate(req->arg, res, name, cert, cert_len);
-		free(req);
-		break;
-
-	case IMSG_CERT_VERIFY:
-		m_get_int(&m, &res);
-		m_end(&m);
-		SPLAY_REMOVE(cert_reqtree, &reqs, req);
-		req->cb_verify(req->arg, res);
-		free(req);
-		break;
-	}
-}
-
-static void
-cert_do_verify(struct session *s, const char *name, int fallback)
-{
-	struct ca *ca;
-	const char *cafile;
-	int i, res;
-
-	ca = dict_get(env->sc_ca_dict, name);
-	if (ca == NULL)
-		if (fallback)
-			ca = dict_get(env->sc_ca_dict, "*");
-	cafile = ca ? ca->ca_cert_file : CA_FILE;
-
-	if (ca == NULL && !fallback)
-		res = CERT_NOCA;
-	else if (!cert_X509_verify(s, cafile, NULL))
-		res = CERT_INVALID;
-	else
-		res = CERT_OK;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < s->cert_count; ++i)
-		free(s->cert[i]);
-
-	m_create(s->proc, IMSG_CERT_VERIFY, s->id, 0, -1);
-	m_add_int(s->proc, res);
-	m_close(s->proc);
-
-	free(s);
-}
-
-static int
-cert_X509_verify(struct session *s, const char *CAfile,
-    const char *CRLfile)
-{
-	X509			*x509;
-	X509			*x509_tmp;
-	STACK_OF(X509)		*x509_chain;
-	const unsigned char    	*d2i;
-	int			i, ret = 0;
-	const char		*errstr;
-
-	x509 = NULL;
-	x509_tmp = NULL;
-	x509_chain = NULL;
-
-	d2i = s->cert[0];
-	if (d2i_X509(&x509, &d2i, s->cert_len[0]) == NULL) {
-		x509 = NULL;
-		goto end;
-	}
-
-	if (s->cert_count > 1) {
-		x509_chain = sk_X509_new_null();
-		for (i = 1; i < s->cert_count; ++i) {
-			d2i = s->cert[i];
-			if (d2i_X509(&x509_tmp, &d2i, s->cert_len[i]) == NULL)
-				goto end;
-			sk_X509_insert(x509_chain, x509_tmp, i);
-			x509_tmp = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-	if (!ca_X509_verify(x509, x509_chain, CAfile, NULL, &errstr))
-		log_debug("debug: X509 verify: %s", errstr);
-	else
-		ret = 1;
-
-end:
-	X509_free(x509);
-	X509_free(x509_tmp);
-	if (x509_chain)
-		sk_X509_pop_free(x509_chain, X509_free);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-request_cmp(struct request *a, struct request *b)
-{
-	if (a->id < b->id)
-		return -1;
-	if (a->id > b->id)
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-SPLAY_GENERATE(cert_reqtree, request, entry, request_cmp);
-
-static int
-session_cmp(struct session *a, struct session *b)
-{
-	if (a->id < b->id)
-		return -1;
-	if (a->id > b->id)
-		return 1;
-	if (a->proc < b->proc)
-		return -1;
-	if (a->proc > b->proc)
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-SPLAY_GENERATE(cert_sestree, session, entry, session_cmp);
diff --git a/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl_smtpd.c b/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl_smtpd.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f1e62d27c1..00000000000
--- a/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl_smtpd.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssl_smtpd.c,v 1.13 2015/12/30 16:02:08 benno Exp $	*/
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Pierre-Yves Ritschard <pyr@openbsd.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Gilles Chehade <gilles@poolp.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/queue.h>
-#include <sys/tree.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <event.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <imsg.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "smtpd.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssl.h"
-
-
-void *
-ssl_mta_init(void *pkiname, char *cert, off_t cert_len, const char *ciphers)
-{
-	SSL_CTX	*ctx = NULL;
-	SSL	*ssl = NULL;
-
-	ctx = ssl_ctx_create(pkiname, cert, cert_len, ciphers);
-
-	if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ssl, SSLv23_client_method()))
-		goto err;
-
-	SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
-	return (void *)(ssl);
-
-err:
-	SSL_free(ssl);
-	SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
-	ssl_error("ssl_mta_init");
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-/* dummy_verify */
-static int
-dummy_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store)
-{
-	/*
-	 * We *want* SMTP to request an optional client certificate, however we don't want the
-	 * verification to take place in the SMTP process. This dummy verify will allow us to
-	 * asynchronously verify in the lookup process.
-	 */
-	return 1;
-}
-
-void *
-ssl_smtp_init(void *ssl_ctx, int verify)
-{
-	SSL	*ssl = NULL;
-
-	log_debug("debug: session_start_ssl: switching to SSL");
-
-	if (verify)
-		SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, dummy_verify);
-
-	if ((ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ssl, SSLv23_server_method()))
-		goto err;
-
-	return (void *)(ssl);
-
-err:
-	SSL_free(ssl);
-	ssl_error("ssl_smtp_init");
-	return (NULL);
-}
diff --git a/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl_verify.c b/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl_verify.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 02148862f70..00000000000
--- a/usr.sbin/smtpd/ssl_verify.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_verify.c,v 1.2 2019/11/02 03:16:45 gilles Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2014 Jeremie Courreges-Anglas <jca@openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/* Adapted from lib/libtls/tls_verify.c */
-
-
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#if 0
-#include <tls.h>
-#include "tls_internal.h"
-#endif
-
-#include "ssl.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-struct tls;
-#define tls_set_errorx(ctx, ...) log_warnx(__VA_ARGS__)
-union tls_addr {
-	struct in_addr in;
-	struct in6_addr in6;
-};
-
-static int
-tls_match_name(const char *cert_name, const char *name)
-{
-	const char *cert_domain, *domain, *next_dot;
-
-	if (strcasecmp(cert_name, name) == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Wildcard match? */
-	if (cert_name[0] == '*') {
-		/*
-		 * Valid wildcards:
-		 * - "*.domain.tld"
-		 * - "*.sub.domain.tld"
-		 * - etc.
-		 * Reject "*.tld".
-		 * No attempt to prevent the use of eg. "*.co.uk".
-		 */
-		cert_domain = &cert_name[1];
-		/* Disallow "*"  */
-		if (cert_domain[0] == '\0')
-			return -1;
-		/* Disallow "*foo" */
-		if (cert_domain[0] != '.')
-			return -1;
-		/* Disallow "*.." */
-		if (cert_domain[1] == '.')
-			return -1;
-		next_dot = strchr(&cert_domain[1], '.');
-		/* Disallow "*.bar" */
-		if (next_dot == NULL)
-			return -1;
-		/* Disallow "*.bar.." */
-		if (next_dot[1] == '.')
-			return -1;
-
-		domain = strchr(name, '.');
-
-		/* No wildcard match against a name with no host part. */
-		if (name[0] == '.')
-			return -1;
-		/* No wildcard match against a name with no domain part. */
-		if (domain == NULL || strlen(domain) == 1)
-			return -1;
-
-		if (strcasecmp(cert_domain, domain) == 0)
-			return 0;
-	}
-
-	return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * See RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 for SubjectAltName details.
- * alt_match is set to 1 if a matching alternate name is found.
- * alt_exists is set to 1 if any known alternate name exists in the certificate.
- */
-static int
-tls_check_subject_altname(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *name,
-    int *alt_match, int *alt_exists)
-{
-	STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altname_stack = NULL;
-	union tls_addr addrbuf;
-	int addrlen, type;
-	int count, i;
-	int rv = 0;
-
-	*alt_match = 0;
-	*alt_exists = 0;
-
-	altname_stack = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
-	    NULL, NULL);
-	if (altname_stack == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (inet_pton(AF_INET, name, &addrbuf) == 1) {
-		type = GEN_IPADD;
-		addrlen = 4;
-	} else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, name, &addrbuf) == 1) {
-		type = GEN_IPADD;
-		addrlen = 16;
-	} else {
-		type = GEN_DNS;
-		addrlen = 0;
-	}
-
-	count = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altname_stack);
-	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-		GENERAL_NAME	*altname;
-
-		altname = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altname_stack, i);
-
-		if (altname->type == GEN_DNS || altname->type == GEN_IPADD)
-			*alt_exists = 1;
-
-		if (altname->type != type)
-			continue;
-
-		if (type == GEN_DNS) {
-			const unsigned char	*data;
-			int		 format, len;
-
-			format = ASN1_STRING_type(altname->d.dNSName);
-			if (format == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
-				data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(altname->d.dNSName);
-				len = ASN1_STRING_length(altname->d.dNSName);
-
-				if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != strlen(data)) {
-					tls_set_errorx(ctx,
-					    "error verifying name '%s': "
-					    "NUL byte in subjectAltName, "
-					    "probably a malicious certificate",
-					    name);
-					rv = -1;
-					break;
-				}
-
-				/*
-				 * Per RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
-				 * " " is a legal domain name, but that
-				 * dNSName must be rejected.
-				 */
-				if (strcmp(data, " ") == 0) {
-					tls_set_errorx(ctx,
-					    "error verifying name '%s': "
-					    "a dNSName of \" \" must not be "
-					    "used", name);
-					rv = -1;
-					break;
-				}
-
-				if (tls_match_name(data, name) == 0) {
-					*alt_match = 1;
-					break;
-				}
-			} else {
-#ifdef DEBUG
-				fprintf(stdout, "%s: unhandled subjectAltName "
-				    "dNSName encoding (%d)\n", getprogname(),
-				    format);
-#endif
-			}
-
-		} else if (type == GEN_IPADD) {
-			const unsigned char	*data;
-			int		 datalen;
-
-			datalen = ASN1_STRING_length(altname->d.iPAddress);
-			data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(altname->d.iPAddress);
-
-			if (datalen < 0) {
-				tls_set_errorx(ctx,
-				    "Unexpected negative length for an "
-				    "IP address: %d", datalen);
-				rv = -1;
-				break;
-			}
-
-			/*
-			 * Per RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
-			 * IPv4 must use 4 octets and IPv6 must use 16 octets.
-			 */
-			if (datalen == addrlen &&
-			    memcmp(data, &addrbuf, addrlen) == 0) {
-				*alt_match = 1;
-				break;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(altname_stack, GENERAL_NAME_free);
-	return rv;
-}
-
-static int
-tls_check_common_name(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *name,
-    int *cn_match)
-{
-	X509_NAME *subject_name;
-	char *common_name = NULL;
-	union tls_addr addrbuf;
-	int common_name_len;
-	int rv = 0;
-
-	*cn_match = 0;
-
-	subject_name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
-	if (subject_name == NULL)
-		goto done;
-
-	common_name_len = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject_name,
-	    NID_commonName, NULL, 0);
-	if (common_name_len < 0)
-		goto done;
-
-	common_name = calloc(common_name_len + 1, 1);
-	if (common_name == NULL)
-		goto done;
-
-	X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject_name, NID_commonName, common_name,
-	    common_name_len + 1);
-
-	/* NUL bytes in CN? */
-	if (common_name_len < 0 ||
-	    (size_t)common_name_len != strlen(common_name)) {
-		tls_set_errorx(ctx, "error verifying name '%s': "
-		    "NUL byte in Common Name field, "
-		    "probably a malicious certificate", name);
-		rv = -1;
-		goto done;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * We don't want to attempt wildcard matching against IP addresses,
-	 * so perform a simple comparison here.
-	 */
-	if (inet_pton(AF_INET,  name, &addrbuf) == 1 ||
-	    inet_pton(AF_INET6, name, &addrbuf) == 1) {
-		if (strcmp(common_name, name) == 0)
-			*cn_match = 1;
-		goto done;
-	}
-
-	if (tls_match_name(common_name, name) == 0)
-		*cn_match = 1;
-
- done:
-	free(common_name);
-	return rv;
-}
-
-int
-ssl_check_name(X509 *cert, const char *name, int *match)
-{
-	int alt_exists;
-
-	*match = 0;
-
-	if (tls_check_subject_altname(NULL, cert, name, match,
-	    &alt_exists) == -1)
-		return -1;
-
-	/*
-	 * As per RFC 6125 section 6.4.4, if any known alternate name existed
-	 * in the certificate, we do not attempt to match on the CN.
-	 */
-	if (*match || alt_exists)
-		return 0;
-
-	return tls_check_common_name(NULL, cert, name, match);
-}