summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDamien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>2006-09-09 00:11:04 +0000
committerDamien Miller <djm@cvs.openbsd.org>2006-09-09 00:11:04 +0000
commit41f9a6aaae65b88dbb2d78d9ae0f206142b34aef (patch)
tree851f297ae7feffa5318ef828a6059d5ca8b36874
parent6d1faef9ccca5d12fdc0989a80526eae133dd637 (diff)
fix RSA signature padding vulnerability in OpenSSL libcrypto CVE-2006-4339;
ok beck@ miod@
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c17
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index cee09eccb1f..db86f1ac581 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -185,6 +185,23 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+ if(p != s+i)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
+ create forgeries */
+ if(sig->algor->parameter
+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);