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authorMarkus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org>2001-03-05 17:17:22 +0000
committerMarkus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org>2001-03-05 17:17:22 +0000
commit7218d19a71f7c2a4ddc25c5a53094118396c1552 (patch)
tree540863db6e928cc4d51d1802d21cc44a11e08488
parentb5b298c7f02515dc226161e6ef5d3375180b8b2b (diff)
generate a 2*need size (~300 instead of 1024/2048) random private
exponent during the DH key agreement. according to Niels (the great german advisor) this is safe since /etc/primes contains strong primes only. References: P. C. van Oorschot and M. J. Wiener, On Diffie-Hellman key agreement with short exponents, In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'96, LNCS 1070, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp.332-343.
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/kex.c26
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/kex.h4
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c8
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c6
4 files changed, 31 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/kex.c b/usr.bin/ssh/kex.c
index 1038546cadf..308ffb1b66f 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/kex.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/kex.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.21 2001/02/11 12:59:24 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.22 2001/03/05 17:17:20 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
@@ -138,15 +138,33 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
}
void
-dh_gen_key(DH *dh)
+dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
{
- int tries = 0;
+ int i, bits_set = 0, tries = 0;
+ if (dh->p == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: dh->p == NULL");
+ if (2*need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p))
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: group too small: %d (2*need %d)",
+ BN_num_bits(dh->p), 2*need);
do {
+ if (dh->priv_key != NULL)
+ BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+ dh->priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_new failed");
+ /* generate a 2*need bits random private exponent */
+ if (!BN_rand(dh->priv_key, 2*need, 0, 0))
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_rand failed");
if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
fatal("DH_generate_key");
+ for (i = 0; i <= BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key); i++)
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(dh->priv_key, i))
+ bits_set++;
+ debug("dh_gen_key: priv key bits set: %d/%d",
+ bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key));
if (tries++ > 10)
- fatal("dh_new_group1: too many bad keys: giving up");
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: too many bad keys: giving up");
} while (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key));
}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/kex.h b/usr.bin/ssh/kex.h
index 90496fbdf46..5004699d9c3 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/kex.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.14 2001/02/11 12:59:24 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.15 2001/03/05 17:17:20 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void packet_set_kex(Kex *k);
int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub);
DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
-void dh_gen_key(DH *);
+void dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
DH *dh_new_group1(void);
u_char *
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c
index 8b523232f0c..0baecf0a55d 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.49 2001/02/28 09:57:07 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.50 2001/03/05 17:17:21 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ ssh_dh1_client(Kex *kex, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT.");
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
dh = dh_new_group1();
- dh_gen_key(dh);
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
packet_send();
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ ssh_dhgex_client(Kex *kex, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
u_char *kbuf;
u_char *hash;
- nbits = dh_estimate(kex->enc[MODE_OUT].cipher->key_len * 8);
+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST.");
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ ssh_dhgex_client(Kex *kex, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
packet_get_bignum2(g, &dlen);
dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
- dh_gen_key(dh);
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "\np= ");
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
index 3c51916a346..57b7d70a791 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.172 2001/03/04 17:42:28 millert Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.173 2001/03/05 17:17:21 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ ssh_dh1_server(Kex *kex, Buffer *client_kexinit, Buffer *server_kexinit)
/* KEXDH */
/* generate DH key */
dh = dh_new_group1(); /* XXX depends on 'kex' */
- dh_gen_key(dh);
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT.");
packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
@@ -1638,7 +1638,7 @@ ssh_dhgex_server(Kex *kex, Buffer *client_kexinit, Buffer *server_kexinit)
/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
- dh_gen_key(dh);
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT.");
packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);