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authorMarkus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org>2004-04-25 18:57:52 +0000
committerMarkus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org>2004-04-25 18:57:52 +0000
commit840af56478d680c6217cd84de9404db219ea196f (patch)
tree1204d90b331b5500f12f3e44a0c2fa4f5659fd8a
parent6eb107b71f410fa9f4b7e3d5027ec786c8f7921f (diff)
update missing pieces from 0.9.7d; ok henning
crank minor for API extensions
-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/evp/digest.c15
-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_txt.c8
-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c55
3 files changed, 67 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/evp/digest.c b/lib/libcrypto/evp/digest.c
index b22eed44211..0623ddf1f05 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
{
+ unsigned char *tmp_buf;
if ((in == NULL) || (in->digest == NULL))
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY,EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED);
@@ -262,15 +263,22 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
}
#endif
+ if (out->digest == in->digest)
+ {
+ tmp_buf = out->md_data;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(out,EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE);
+ }
+ else tmp_buf = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
memcpy(out,in,sizeof *out);
if (out->digest->ctx_size)
{
- out->md_data=OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size);
+ if (tmp_buf) out->md_data = tmp_buf;
+ else out->md_data=OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size);
memcpy(out->md_data,in->md_data,out->digest->ctx_size);
}
-
+
if (out->digest->copy)
return out->digest->copy(out,in);
@@ -308,7 +316,8 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx,EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED))
ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
- if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data)
+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE))
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data,ctx->digest->ctx_size);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data);
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index 9d09ae17e82..e31ebc6741a 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -147,8 +147,14 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
return("unhandled critical extension");
+ case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN:
+ return("key usage does not include CRL signing");
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION:
+ return("unhandled critical CRL extension");
+
default:
- snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"error number %ld",n);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"error number %ld",n);
return(buf);
}
}
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 2bb21b443ec..2e4d0b823ab 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
{
+ int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
@@ -393,7 +394,10 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
- if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
+ ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i);
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1)))
{
if (i)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
@@ -537,6 +541,14 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
if(issuer)
{
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
@@ -611,17 +623,46 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int idx, ok;
X509_REVOKED rtmp;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
- /* Not found: OK */
- if(idx == -1) return 1;
- /* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than
+ /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
* this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
*/
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- return ok;
+ if(idx >= 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
+ * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
+ * rejected.
+ * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
+ * shouldn't do this.
+ */
+
+ exts = crl->crl->extensions;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
+ {
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
+ if (ext->critical > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error =
+ X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
}
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)