Move P_SUGID and P_SUGIDEXEC from struct proc to struct process, so

that you can't evade the checks by doing the dirty work in an rthread

ok blambert@, deraadt@

11 files changed, 56 insertions, 59 deletions

diff --git a/sys/dev/systrace.c b/sys/dev/systrace.c
index ba219bc732b..8c58eaff34f 100644
--- a/sys/dev/systrace.c
+++ b/sys/dev/systrace.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: systrace.c,v 1.53 2010/07/21 18:44:01 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: systrace.c,v 1.54 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -720,13 +720,12 @@ systrace_redirect(int code, struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	 * but we wait until it executes something unprivileged.
 	 * A non-root user may only monitor if the real uid and
 	 * real gid match the monitored process.  Changing the
-	 * uid or gid causes P_SUGID to be set.
+	 * uid or gid causes PS_SUGID to be set.
 	 */
 	if (fst->issuser) {
 		maycontrol = 1;
 		issuser = 1;
-	} else if (!ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) &&
-	    !ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC)) {
+	} else if (!ISSET(p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID | PS_SUGIDEXEC)) {
 		maycontrol = fst->p_ruid == p->p_cred->p_ruid &&
 		    fst->p_rgid == p->p_cred->p_rgid;
 	}
@@ -846,7 +845,7 @@ systrace_redirect(int code, struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 
 	systrace_replacefree(strp);
 
-	if (ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) || ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC)) {
+	if (ISSET(p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID | PS_SUGIDEXEC)) {
 		if ((fst = strp->parent) == NULL || !fst->issuser) {
 			systrace_unlock();
 			return (error);
@@ -914,7 +913,7 @@ systrace_seteuid(struct proc *p,  uid_t euid)
 	 */
 	pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
 	pc->pc_ucred->cr_uid = euid;
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 
 	return (oeuid);
 }
@@ -933,7 +932,7 @@ systrace_setegid(struct proc *p,  gid_t egid)
 	 */
 	pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
 	pc->pc_ucred->cr_gid = egid;
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 
 	return (oegid);
 }
@@ -1252,15 +1251,14 @@ systrace_attach(struct fsystrace *fst, pid_t pid)
 	 *	    gave us setuid/setgid privs (unless
 	 *	    you're root), or...
 	 *
-	 *      [Note: once P_SUGID or P_SUGIDEXEC gets set in execve(),
+	 *      [Note: once PS_SUGID or PS_SUGIDEXEC gets set in execve(),
 	 *      it stays set until the process does another execve(). Hence
 	 *	this prevents a setuid process which revokes its
 	 *	special privileges using setuid() from being
 	 *	traced. This is good security.]
 	 */
 	if ((proc->p_cred->p_ruid != p->p_cred->p_ruid ||
-		ISSET(proc->p_flag, P_SUGID) ||
-		ISSET(proc->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC)) &&
+		ISSET(proc->p_flag, PS_SUGID | PS_SUGIDEXEC)) &&
 	    (error = suser(p, 0)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1478,8 +1476,8 @@ systrace_scriptname(struct proc *p, char *dst)
 	rw_enter_write(&fst->lock);
 	systrace_unlock();
 
-	if (!fst->issuser && (ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) ||
-		ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC) ||
+	if (!fst->issuser &&
+		(ISSET(p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID | PS_SUGIDEXEC) ||
 		fst->p_ruid != p->p_cred->p_ruid ||
 		fst->p_rgid != p->p_cred->p_rgid)) {
 		error = EPERM;
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_descrip.c b/sys/kern/kern_descrip.c
index e669c3e365a..0d3a6d1a627 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_descrip.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_descrip.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kern_descrip.c,v 1.85 2010/07/26 01:56:27 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kern_descrip.c,v 1.86 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: kern_descrip.c,v 1.42 1996/03/30 22:24:38 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ dupfdopen(struct filedesc *fdp, int indx, int dfd, int mode, int error)
 	 * Assume that the filename was user-specified; applications do
 	 * not tend to open /dev/fd/# when they can just call dup()
 	 */
-	if ((curproc->p_flag & (P_SUGIDEXEC | P_SUGID))) {
+	if ((curproc->p_p->ps_flags & (PS_SUGIDEXEC | PS_SUGID))) {
 		if (curproc->p_descfd == 255)
 			return (EPERM);
 		if (curproc->p_descfd != curproc->p_dupfd)
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_event.c b/sys/kern/kern_event.c
index 19c250de2fc..412b9a91c27 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_event.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_event.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kern_event.c,v 1.38 2010/08/02 19:54:07 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kern_event.c,v 1.39 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 1999,2000,2001 Jonathan Lemon <jlemon@FreeBSD.org>
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ filt_procattach(struct knote *kn)
 	 */
 	if (p->p_p != curproc->p_p &&
 	    (p->p_cred->p_ruid != curproc->p_cred->p_ruid ||
-	    (p->p_flag & P_SUGID)) && suser(curproc, 0) != 0)
+	    (p->p_p->ps_flags & PS_SUGID)) && suser(curproc, 0) != 0)
 		return (EACCES);
 
 	kn->kn_ptr.p_proc = p;
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
index 555e4cf2163..74b5647c3c3 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.114 2010/11/24 21:05:20 miod Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.115 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.75 1996/02/09 18:59:28 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	struct ucred *cred = p->p_ucred;
 	char *argp;
 	char * const *cpp, *dp, *sp;
+	struct process *pr = p->p_p;
 	long argc, envc;
 	size_t len, sgap;
 #ifdef MACHINE_STACK_GROWS_UP
@@ -257,8 +258,7 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	char **tmpfap;
 	extern struct emul emul_native;
 #if NSYSTRACE > 0
-	int wassugid =
-	    ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) || ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC);
+	int wassugid = ISSET(pr->ps_flags, PS_SUGID | PS_SUGIDEXEC);
 	size_t pathbuflen;
 #endif
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
@@ -468,22 +468,22 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	p->p_textvp = pack.ep_vp;
 
 	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_EXEC);
-	if (p->p_p->ps_mainproc->p_flag & P_PPWAIT) {
-		atomic_clearbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_mainproc->p_flag, P_PPWAIT);
-		wakeup(p->p_p->ps_pptr);
+	if (pr->ps_mainproc->p_flag & P_PPWAIT) {
+		atomic_clearbits_int(&pr->ps_mainproc->p_flag, P_PPWAIT);
+		wakeup(pr->ps_pptr);
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If process does execve() while it has a mismatched real,
-	 * effective, or saved uid/gid, we set P_SUGIDEXEC.
+	 * effective, or saved uid/gid, we set PS_SUGIDEXEC.
 	 */
 	if (p->p_ucred->cr_uid != p->p_cred->p_ruid ||
 	    p->p_ucred->cr_uid != p->p_cred->p_svuid ||
 	    p->p_ucred->cr_gid != p->p_cred->p_rgid ||
 	    p->p_ucred->cr_gid != p->p_cred->p_svgid)
-		atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC);
+		atomic_setbits_int(&pr->ps_flags, PS_SUGIDEXEC);
 	else
-		atomic_clearbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC);
+		atomic_clearbits_int(&pr->ps_flags, PS_SUGIDEXEC);
 
 	/*
 	 * deal with set[ug]id.
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	if ((attr.va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID)) && proc_cansugid(p)) {
 		int i;
 
-		atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID|P_SUGIDEXEC);
+		atomic_setbits_int(&pr->ps_flags, PS_SUGID|PS_SUGIDEXEC);
 
 #ifdef KTRACE
 		/*
@@ -573,11 +573,11 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 			}
 		}
 	} else
-		atomic_clearbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+		atomic_clearbits_int(&pr->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	p->p_cred->p_svuid = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
 	p->p_cred->p_svgid = p->p_ucred->cr_gid;
 
-	if (p->p_flag & P_SUGIDEXEC) {
+	if (pr->ps_flags & PS_SUGIDEXEC) {
 		int i, s = splclock();
 
 		timeout_del(&p->p_realit_to);
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	/*
 	 * notify others that we exec'd
 	 */
-	KNOTE(&p->p_p->ps_klist, NOTE_EXEC);
+	KNOTE(&pr->ps_klist, NOTE_EXEC);
 
 	/* setup new registers and do misc. setup. */
 	if (pack.ep_emul->e_fixup != NULL) {
@@ -664,8 +664,7 @@ sys_execve(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 
 #if NSYSTRACE > 0
 	if (ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SYSTRACE) &&
-	    wassugid && !ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGID) &&
-	    !ISSET(p->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC))
+	    wassugid && !ISSET(pr->ps_flags, PS_SUGID | PS_SUGIDEXEC))
 		systrace_execve1(pathbuf, p);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_fork.c b/sys/kern/kern_fork.c
index d3f98721754..8707f472ac1 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_fork.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_fork.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kern_fork.c,v 1.123 2010/10/31 00:03:44 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kern_fork.c,v 1.124 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: kern_fork.c,v 1.29 1996/02/09 18:59:34 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ process_new(struct proc *newproc, struct proc *parentproc)
 	crhold(parent->ps_cred->pc_ucred);
 	pr->ps_limit->p_refcnt++;
 
+	pr->ps_flags = parent->ps_flags & (PS_SUGID | PS_SUGIDEXEC);
 	if (parent->ps_session->s_ttyvp != NULL &&
 	    parent->ps_flags & PS_CONTROLT)
 		atomic_setbits_int(&pr->ps_flags, PS_CONTROLT);
@@ -303,7 +304,6 @@ fork1(struct proc *p1, int exitsig, int flags, void *stack, size_t stacksize,
 	 */
 	if (p1->p_flag & P_PROFIL)
 		startprofclock(p2);
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p2->p_flag, p1->p_flag & (P_SUGID | P_SUGIDEXEC));
 	if (flags & FORK_PTRACE)
 		atomic_setbits_int(&p2->p_flag, p1->p_flag & P_TRACED);
 
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c b/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
index a5312566288..cb12ee1bd2b 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_ktrace.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kern_ktrace.c,v 1.49 2010/07/26 01:56:27 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kern_ktrace.c,v 1.50 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: kern_ktrace.c,v 1.23 1996/02/09 18:59:36 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ ktrcanset(struct proc *callp, struct proc *targetp)
 	    caller->p_rgid == target->p_rgid &&	/* XXX */
 	    target->p_rgid == target->p_svgid &&
 	    (targetp->p_traceflag & KTRFAC_ROOT) == 0 &&
-	    !ISSET(targetp->p_flag, P_SUGID)) ||
+	    !ISSET(targetp->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID)) ||
 	    caller->pc_ucred->cr_uid == 0)
 		return (1);
 
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
index a34714c4ba5..5b058ee605b 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.46 2010/07/26 01:56:27 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.47 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.33 1996/02/09 18:59:42 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ sys_geteuid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 int
 sys_issetugid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 {
-	if (p->p_flag & P_SUGIDEXEC)
+	if (p->p_p->ps_flags & PS_SUGIDEXEC)
 		*retval = 1;
 	else
 		*retval = 0;
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ sys_setresuid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	if (suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != pc->p_svuid)
 		pc->p_svuid = suid;
 
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ sys_setresgid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	if (sgid != (gid_t)-1)
 		pc->p_svgid = sgid;
 
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ sys_setuid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	 */
 	pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
 	pc->pc_ucred->cr_uid = uid;
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ sys_seteuid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	 */
 	pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
 	pc->pc_ucred->cr_uid = euid;
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ sys_setgid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	 */
 	pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
 	pc->pc_ucred->cr_gid = gid;
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ sys_setegid(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	 */
 	pc->pc_ucred = crcopy(pc->pc_ucred);
 	pc->pc_ucred->cr_gid = egid;
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ sys_setgroups(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	pc->pc_ucred->cr_ngroups = ngrp;
-	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_flag, P_SUGID);
+	atomic_setbits_int(&p->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGID);
 	return (0);
 }
 
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_sig.c b/sys/kern/kern_sig.c
index 3d900be04b4..39bf31572e7 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_sig.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_sig.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kern_sig.c,v 1.117 2011/03/07 07:07:13 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: kern_sig.c,v 1.118 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: kern_sig.c,v 1.54 1996/04/22 01:38:32 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ cansignal(struct proc *p, struct pcred *pc, struct proc *q, int signum)
 	 * Using kill(), only certain signals can be sent to setugid
 	 * child processes
 	 */
-	if (q->p_flag & P_SUGID) {
+	if (q->p_p->ps_flags & PS_SUGID) {
 		switch (signum) {
 		case 0:
 		case SIGKILL:
@@ -1395,8 +1395,8 @@ coredump(struct proc *p)
 	 * group privileges, unless the nosuidcoredump sysctl is set to 2,
 	 * in which case dumps are put into /var/crash/.
 	 */
-	if (((p->p_flag & P_SUGID) && (error = suser(p, 0))) ||
-	   ((p->p_flag & P_SUGID) && nosuidcoredump)) {
+	if (((p->p_p->ps_flags & PS_SUGID) && (error = suser(p, 0))) ||
+	   ((p->p_p->ps_flags & PS_SUGID) && nosuidcoredump)) {
 		if (nosuidcoredump == 2)
 			dir = "/var/crash/";
 		else
diff --git a/sys/kern/sys_process.c b/sys/kern/sys_process.c
index e38e673e7e5..cfc19e44305 100644
--- a/sys/kern/sys_process.c
+++ b/sys/kern/sys_process.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sys_process.c,v 1.47 2010/07/26 01:56:27 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: sys_process.c,v 1.48 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: sys_process.c,v 1.55 1996/05/15 06:17:47 tls Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
@@ -146,15 +146,14 @@ sys_ptrace(struct proc *p, void *v, register_t *retval)
 		 *	    gave us setuid/setgid privs (unless
 		 *	    you're root), or...
 		 * 
-		 *      [Note: once P_SUGID or P_SUGIDEXEC gets set in
+		 *      [Note: once PS_SUGID or PS_SUGIDEXEC gets set in
 		 *	execve(), they stay set until the process does
 		 *	another execve().  Hence this prevents a setuid
 		 *	process which revokes its special privileges using
 		 *	setuid() from being traced.  This is good security.]
 		 */
 		if ((t->p_cred->p_ruid != p->p_cred->p_ruid ||
-		    ISSET(t->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC) ||
-		    ISSET(t->p_flag, P_SUGID)) &&
+		    ISSET(t->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGIDEXEC | PS_SUGID)) &&
 		    (error = suser(p, 0)) != 0)
 			return (error);
 
@@ -579,8 +578,7 @@ process_checkioperm(struct proc *p, struct proc *t)
 	int error;
 
 	if ((t->p_cred->p_ruid != p->p_cred->p_ruid ||
-	    ISSET(t->p_flag, P_SUGIDEXEC) ||
-	    ISSET(t->p_flag, P_SUGID)) &&
+	    ISSET(t->p_p->ps_flags, PS_SUGIDEXEC | PS_SUGID)) &&
 	    (error = suser(p, 0)) != 0)
 		return (error);
 
diff --git a/sys/miscfs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c b/sys/miscfs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c
index da9edb7c185..5ef2fb8bae9 100644
--- a/sys/miscfs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c
+++ b/sys/miscfs/procfs/procfs_vnops.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: procfs_vnops.c,v 1.50 2010/12/21 20:14:43 thib Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: procfs_vnops.c,v 1.51 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: procfs_vnops.c,v 1.40 1996/03/16 23:52:55 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ procfs_getattr(void *v)
 		 * privilege, then rip away read/write permission so
 		 * that only root can gain access.
 		 */
-		if (procp->p_flag & P_SUGID)
+		if (procp->p_p->ps_flags & PS_SUGID)
 			vap->va_mode &= ~(S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	case Pctl:
diff --git a/sys/sys/proc.h b/sys/sys/proc.h
index 4c5b8fb4164..b27ed7c0915 100644
--- a/sys/sys/proc.h
+++ b/sys/sys/proc.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: proc.h,v 1.133 2011/03/07 07:07:13 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: proc.h,v 1.134 2011/04/02 17:04:35 guenther Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: proc.h,v 1.44 1996/04/22 01:23:21 christos Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ struct proc {
 #define	P_PROFIL	0x000020	/* Has started profiling. */
 #define	P_SELECT	0x000040	/* Selecting; wakeup/waiting danger. */
 #define	P_SINTR		0x000080	/* Sleep is interruptible. */
-#define	P_SUGID		0x000100	/* Had set id privs since last exec. */
+#define	_P_SUGID	0x000100	/* Had set id privs since last exec. */
 #define	P_SYSTEM	0x000200	/* No sigs, stats or swapping. */
 #define	P_TIMEOUT	0x000400	/* Timing out during sleep. */
 #define	P_TRACED	0x000800	/* Debugged process being traced. */
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ struct proc {
 
 /* XXX Not sure what to do with these, yet. */
 #define	P_SSTEP		0x020000	/* proc needs single-step fixup ??? */
-#define	P_SUGIDEXEC	0x040000	/* last execve() was set[ug]id */
+#define	_P_SUGIDEXEC	0x040000	/* last execve() was set[ug]id */
 
 #define	P_NOCLDWAIT	0x080000	/* Let pid 1 wait for my children */
 #define	P_NOZOMBIE	0x100000	/* Pid 1 waits for me instead of dad */
@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ struct proc {
 
 #ifndef _KERNEL
 #define	P_CONTROLT	_P_CONTROLT
+#define	P_SUGID		_P_SUGID
+#define	P_SUGIDEXEC	_P_SUGIDEXEC
 #endif
 
 #define	P_BITS \