Enable -Wshadow in openssl(1) and fix a few shadow warnings.

ok jsing@

5 files changed, 21 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/usr.bin/openssl/Makefile b/usr.bin/openssl/Makefile
index f4c9ed4f2b2..88b9511edfa 100644
--- a/usr.bin/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/usr.bin/openssl/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2014/08/26 17:47:24 jsing Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2014/09/01 20:54:37 doug Exp $
 
 PROG=	openssl
 LDADD=	-lssl -lcrypto
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ CFLAGS+= -Wformat
 CFLAGS+= -Wformat-security
 CFLAGS+= -Wimplicit
 CFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type
-#CFLAGS+= -Wshadow
+CFLAGS+= -Wshadow
 CFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs
 CFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized
 CFLAGS+= -Wunused
diff --git a/usr.bin/openssl/ca.c b/usr.bin/openssl/ca.c
index e895eab9e09..0e2e1c64505 100644
--- a/usr.bin/openssl/ca.c
+++ b/usr.bin/openssl/ca.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ca.c,v 1.2 2014/08/28 14:23:52 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ca.c,v 1.3 2014/09/01 20:54:37 doug Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new certificates\n");
 		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cert_sk); i++) {
 			int k;
-			char *serial;
+			char *serialstr;
 			unsigned char *data;
 
 			x = sk_X509_value(cert_sk, i);
@@ -1133,13 +1133,13 @@ bad:
 			j = x->cert_info->serialNumber->length;
 			data = (unsigned char *)x->cert_info->serialNumber->data;
 			if (j > 0)
-				serial = bin2hex(data, j);
+				serialstr = bin2hex(data, j);
 			else
-				serial = strdup("00");
-			if (serial) {
+				serialstr = strdup("00");
+			if (serialstr) {
 				k = snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]),
-				    "%s/%s.pem", outdir, serial);
-				free(serial);
+				    "%s/%s.pem", outdir, serialstr);
+				free(serialstr);
 				if (k == -1 || k >= sizeof(buf[2])) {
 					BIO_printf(bio_err,
 					    "certificate file name too long\n");
diff --git a/usr.bin/openssl/enc.c b/usr.bin/openssl/enc.c
index eff49818f9a..1a3b8f21b33 100644
--- a/usr.bin/openssl/enc.c
+++ b/usr.bin/openssl/enc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: enc.c,v 1.1 2014/08/26 17:47:24 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: enc.c,v 1.2 2014/09/01 20:54:37 doug Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -374,12 +374,12 @@ enc_main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if ((str == NULL) && (cipher != NULL) && (hkey == NULL)) {
 		for (;;) {
 			char buf[200];
-			int ret;
+			int retval;
 
-			ret = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "enter %s %s password:",
+			retval = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "enter %s %s password:",
 			    OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher)),
 			    (enc) ? "encryption" : "decryption");
-			if (ret == -1 || ret >= sizeof buf) {
+			if ((size_t)retval >= sizeof buf) {
 				BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password prompt too long\n");
 				goto end;
 			}
diff --git a/usr.bin/openssl/s_client.c b/usr.bin/openssl/s_client.c
index f35624bacac..1ba399a4ae3 100644
--- a/usr.bin/openssl/s_client.c
+++ b/usr.bin/openssl/s_client.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: s_client.c,v 1.1 2014/08/26 17:47:25 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: s_client.c,v 1.2 2014/09/01 20:54:37 doug Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -632,8 +632,6 @@ s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
 				goto bad;
 			keymatexportlabel = *(++argv);
 		} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexportlen") == 0) {
-			const char *errstr;
-
 			if (--argc < 1)
 				goto bad;
 			keymatexportlen = strtonum(*(++argv), 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
diff --git a/usr.bin/openssl/s_time.c b/usr.bin/openssl/s_time.c
index f8c104b7d7d..7279883c870 100644
--- a/usr.bin/openssl/s_time.c
+++ b/usr.bin/openssl/s_time.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: s_time.c,v 1.1 2014/08/26 17:47:25 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: s_time.c,v 1.2 2014/09/01 20:54:37 doug Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -213,8 +213,6 @@ parseArgs(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-new") == 0)
 			perform = 1;
 		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) {
-			const char *errstr;
-
 			tm_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
 			if (--argc < 1)
 				goto bad;
@@ -375,9 +373,9 @@ s_time_main(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto end;
 
 		if (s_www_path != NULL) {
-			int ret = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+			int retval = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
 			    "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", s_www_path);
-			if (ret == -1 || ret >= sizeof buf) {
+			if ((size_t)retval >= sizeof buf) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "URL too long\n");
 				goto end;
 			}
@@ -435,9 +433,9 @@ next:
 		goto end;
 	}
 	if (s_www_path != NULL) {
-		int ret = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+		int retval = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
 		    "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", s_www_path);
-		if (ret == -1 || ret >= sizeof buf) {
+		if ((size_t)retval >= sizeof buf) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "URL too long\n");
 			goto end;
 		}
@@ -468,9 +466,9 @@ next:
 			goto end;
 
 		if (s_www_path) {
-			int ret = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+			int retval = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
 			    "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", s_www_path);
-			if (ret == -1 || ret >= sizeof buf) {
+			if ((size_t)retval >= sizeof buf) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "URL too long\n");
 				goto end;
 			}