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authorTheo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org>2014-07-12 13:24:55 +0000
committerTheo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org>2014-07-12 13:24:55 +0000
commit91be2612443e32c0beb5e1c3185323b50ac7b63c (patch)
tree66e17e6ba7d6ffc2e7257bfddd6a800431684e1c /lib/libc/crypt
parentaa0d130fe49b140bfc8c8c86136445ebc5c55e54 (diff)
Split arc4random_uniform into it's own file, to assist other projects
now using this as upstream code. The particular problem is systems that contain older arc4random derivations lacking arc4random_uniform(). ok tedu miod
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libc/crypt')
-rw-r--r--lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc5
-rw-r--r--lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c38
-rw-r--r--lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c56
3 files changed, 60 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc b/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc
index 2ade0951624..b4f25648e30 100644
--- a/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc
+++ b/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.21 2014/05/16 22:11:00 jmc Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.22 2014/07/12 13:24:54 deraadt Exp $
.PATH: ${LIBCSRCDIR}/arch/${MACHINE_CPU}/crypt ${LIBCSRCDIR}/crypt
-SRCS+= crypt.c crypt2.c cryptutil.c arc4random.c blowfish.c bcrypt.c
+SRCS+= crypt.c crypt2.c cryptutil.c arc4random.c arc4random_uniform.c \
+ blowfish.c bcrypt.c
MAN+= crypt.3 blowfish.3 arc4random.3
MLINKS+=crypt.3 setkey.3 crypt.3 crypt_checkpass.3 crypt.3 encrypt.3
diff --git a/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c
index 13b94ed111e..9460af1e542 100644
--- a/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c
+++ b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.40 2014/07/09 16:52:09 bcook Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.41 2014/07/12 13:24:54 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
@@ -211,39 +211,3 @@ arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
_rs_random_buf(buf, n);
_ARC4_UNLOCK();
}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
- * avoiding "modulo bias".
- *
- * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
- * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
- * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
- * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
- * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
- */
-uint32_t
-arc4random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound)
-{
- uint32_t r, min;
-
- if (upper_bound < 2)
- return 0;
-
- /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
- min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
-
- /*
- * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
- * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
- * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
- * to re-roll.
- */
- for (;;) {
- r = arc4random();
- if (r >= min)
- break;
- }
-
- return r % upper_bound;
-}
diff --git a/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1aa9a622f1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: arc4random_uniform.c,v 1.1 2014/07/12 13:24:54 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
+ * avoiding "modulo bias".
+ *
+ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
+ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
+ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
+ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
+ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
+ */
+uint32_t
+arc4random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound)
+{
+ uint32_t r, min;
+
+ if (upper_bound < 2)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
+ min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
+
+ /*
+ * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
+ * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
+ * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
+ * to re-roll.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ r = arc4random();
+ if (r >= min)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return r % upper_bound;
+}