diff options
author | Theo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2014-07-12 13:24:55 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Theo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2014-07-12 13:24:55 +0000 |
commit | 91be2612443e32c0beb5e1c3185323b50ac7b63c (patch) | |
tree | 66e17e6ba7d6ffc2e7257bfddd6a800431684e1c /lib/libc/crypt | |
parent | aa0d130fe49b140bfc8c8c86136445ebc5c55e54 (diff) |
Split arc4random_uniform into it's own file, to assist other projects
now using this as upstream code. The particular problem is systems
that contain older arc4random derivations lacking arc4random_uniform().
ok tedu miod
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libc/crypt')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c | 56 |
3 files changed, 60 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc b/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc index 2ade0951624..b4f25648e30 100644 --- a/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc +++ b/lib/libc/crypt/Makefile.inc @@ -1,8 +1,9 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.21 2014/05/16 22:11:00 jmc Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.22 2014/07/12 13:24:54 deraadt Exp $ .PATH: ${LIBCSRCDIR}/arch/${MACHINE_CPU}/crypt ${LIBCSRCDIR}/crypt -SRCS+= crypt.c crypt2.c cryptutil.c arc4random.c blowfish.c bcrypt.c +SRCS+= crypt.c crypt2.c cryptutil.c arc4random.c arc4random_uniform.c \ + blowfish.c bcrypt.c MAN+= crypt.3 blowfish.3 arc4random.3 MLINKS+=crypt.3 setkey.3 crypt.3 crypt_checkpass.3 crypt.3 encrypt.3 diff --git a/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c index 13b94ed111e..9460af1e542 100644 --- a/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c +++ b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.40 2014/07/09 16:52:09 bcook Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.41 2014/07/12 13:24:54 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org> @@ -211,39 +211,3 @@ arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n) _rs_random_buf(buf, n); _ARC4_UNLOCK(); } - -/* - * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound - * avoiding "modulo bias". - * - * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one - * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This - * guarantees the selected random number will be inside - * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound) - * after reduction modulo upper_bound. - */ -uint32_t -arc4random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound) -{ - uint32_t r, min; - - if (upper_bound < 2) - return 0; - - /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */ - min = -upper_bound % upper_bound; - - /* - * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has - * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a - * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need - * to re-roll. - */ - for (;;) { - r = arc4random(); - if (r >= min) - break; - } - - return r % upper_bound; -} diff --git a/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1aa9a622f1d --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: arc4random_uniform.c,v 1.1 2014/07/12 13:24:54 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + +/* + * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound + * avoiding "modulo bias". + * + * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one + * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This + * guarantees the selected random number will be inside + * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound) + * after reduction modulo upper_bound. + */ +uint32_t +arc4random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound) +{ + uint32_t r, min; + + if (upper_bound < 2) + return 0; + + /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */ + min = -upper_bound % upper_bound; + + /* + * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has + * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a + * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need + * to re-roll. + */ + for (;;) { + r = arc4random(); + if (r >= min) + break; + } + + return r % upper_bound; +} |