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authorBob Beck <beck@cvs.openbsd.org>2023-04-27 16:12:09 +0000
committerBob Beck <beck@cvs.openbsd.org>2023-04-27 16:12:09 +0000
commit4a7964add52517fb3d8cc7ad6a304dff67682e6f (patch)
tree5a2de238897de298c877177795ca99435e17ceb9 /lib/libcrypto/x509
parent0b35180202a4afeb9f73d03c4ca4d91fdb0c6c64 (diff)
Convert size_t's used in conjuction with sk_X509_num back to int.
The lets the regress in x509/policy pass instead of infinite looping. The changes are necessry because our sk_num() returns an int with 0 for empty and -1 for NULL, wheras BoringSSL's returns a size_t with 0 for both an empty stack and a NULL stack. pair work with tb@ ok tb@ jsing@
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libcrypto/x509')
-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c24
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c
index 3a3a7555caf..a1a8e5e60ed 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_policy.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: x509_policy.c,v 1.14 2023/04/27 08:07:26 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: x509_policy.c,v 1.15 2023/04/27 16:12:08 beck Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc.
*
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ x509_policy_level_is_empty(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level)
static void
x509_policy_level_clear(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level)
{
- size_t i;
+ int i;
level->has_any_policy = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static int
x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes)
{
- size_t i;
+ int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
int any_policy_allowed)
{
- size_t i;
+ int i;
int ret = 0;
int critical;
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
int mapping_allowed)
{
- size_t i;
+ int i;
int ok = 0;
int critical;
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL;
@@ -772,13 +772,13 @@ static int
has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies)
{
- size_t i, j, k;
+ int i, j, k;
assert(user_policies == NULL ||
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies));
/* Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty. */
- size_t num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels);
+ int num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels);
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels,
num_levels - 1);
if (x509_policy_level_is_empty(level))
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
* anyPolicy value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy
* explicitly.
*/
- int user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) == 0;
+ int user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) <= 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies); i++) {
if (is_any_policy(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(user_policies, i))) {
user_has_any_policy = 1;
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++)
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->reachable = 1;
- for (i = num_levels - 1; i < num_levels; i--) {
+ for (i = num_levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i);
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes);
j++) {
@@ -882,8 +882,8 @@ X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels = NULL;
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = NULL;
- size_t num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs);
- size_t i;
+ int num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs);
+ int i;
/* Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor. */
if (num_certs <= 1)
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
if (levels == NULL)
goto err;
- for (i = num_certs - 2; i < num_certs; i--) {
+ for (i = num_certs - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert))
goto err;