Repair NAT-T using Aggressive mode, NAT-D checks were in the wrong place.

Noted by Yvan VANHULLEBUS.

3 files changed, 44 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/sbin/isakmpd/ike_aggressive.c b/sbin/isakmpd/ike_aggressive.c
index 6ff93cd72f7..48ec10f6f25 100644
--- a/sbin/isakmpd/ike_aggressive.c
+++ b/sbin/isakmpd/ike_aggressive.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.7 2004/05/23 18:17:55 hshoexer Exp $	 */
+/* $OpenBSD: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.8 2004/07/29 08:54:08 ho Exp $	 */
 /* $EOM: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.4 2000/01/31 22:33:45 niklas Exp $	 */
 
 /*
@@ -54,16 +54,20 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "math_group.h"
 #include "message.h"
+#if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL)
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#endif
 #include "prf.h"
 #include "sa.h"
 #include "transport.h"
 #include "util.h"
 
-static int      initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
-static int      initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
-static int      initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *);
-static int      responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
-static int      responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
+static int	initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
+static int	initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
+static int	initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *);
+static int	responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
+static int	responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
+static int	responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *);
 
 int (*ike_aggressive_initiator[])(struct message *) = {
 	initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
@@ -74,7 +78,7 @@ int (*ike_aggressive_initiator[])(struct message *) = {
 int (*ike_aggressive_responder[])(struct message *) = {
 	responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
 	responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH,
-	ike_phase_1_recv_AUTH
+	responder_recv_AUTH
 };
 
 /* Offer a set of transforms to the responder in the MSG message.  */
@@ -159,5 +163,22 @@ responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg)
 		return -1;
 
 	return ike_phase_1_responder_send_ID_AUTH(msg);
-	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reply with the transform we chose.  Send our public DH value and a nonce
+ * to the initiator.
+ */
+static int
+responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *msg)
+{
+	if (ike_phase_1_recv_AUTH(msg))
+		return -1;
+
+#if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL)
+	/* Aggressive: Check for NAT-D payloads and contents.  */
+	if (msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_NAT_T_CAP_PEER)
+		(void)nat_t_exchange_check_nat_d(msg);
+#endif
+	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/sbin/isakmpd/ike_phase_1.c b/sbin/isakmpd/ike_phase_1.c
index 3f84e7151a3..2caac756285 100644
--- a/sbin/isakmpd/ike_phase_1.c
+++ b/sbin/isakmpd/ike_phase_1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ike_phase_1.c,v 1.54 2004/07/05 17:33:35 pvalchev Exp $	 */
+/* $OpenBSD: ike_phase_1.c,v 1.55 2004/07/29 08:54:08 ho Exp $	 */
 /* $EOM: ike_phase_1.c,v 1.31 2000/12/11 23:47:56 niklas Exp $	 */
 
 /*
@@ -592,8 +592,9 @@ ike_phase_1_recv_KE_NONCE(struct message *msg)
 		return -1;
 	}
 #if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL)
-	/* Check NAT-D payloads and contents.  */
-	if (msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_NAT_T_CAP_PEER)
+	/* MainMode: Check for NAT-D payloads and contents.  */
+	if (msg->exchange->type == ISAKMP_EXCH_ID_PROT &&
+	    msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_NAT_T_CAP_PEER)
 		(void)nat_t_exchange_check_nat_d(msg);
 #endif
 	return 0;
diff --git a/sbin/isakmpd/nat_traversal.c b/sbin/isakmpd/nat_traversal.c
index 13553379a5e..a358178b0ee 100644
--- a/sbin/isakmpd/nat_traversal.c
+++ b/sbin/isakmpd/nat_traversal.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: nat_traversal.c,v 1.4 2004/06/30 10:07:13 hshoexer Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: nat_traversal.c,v 1.5 2004/07/29 08:54:08 ho Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004 Håkan Olsson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -332,12 +332,19 @@ nat_t_match_nat_d_payload(struct message *msg, struct sockaddr *sa)
 	size_t	 hbuflen;
 	int	 found = 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * If there are no NAT-D payloads in the message, return "found"
+	 * as this will avoid NAT-T (see nat_t_exchange_check_nat_d()).
+	 */
+	p = payload_first(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_NAT_D);
+	if (!p)
+		return 1;
+
 	hbuf = nat_t_generate_nat_d_hash(msg, sa, &hbuflen);
 	if (!hbuf)
 		return 0;
 
-	for (p = payload_first(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_NAT_D); p;
-	     p = TAILQ_NEXT(p, link)) {
+	while (p) {
 		if (GET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH (p->p) !=
 		    hbuflen + ISAKMP_NAT_D_DATA_OFF)
 			continue;
@@ -346,6 +353,7 @@ nat_t_match_nat_d_payload(struct message *msg, struct sockaddr *sa)
 			found++;
 			break;
 		}
+		p = TAILQ_NEXT(p, link);
 	}
 	free(hbuf);
 	return found;