summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorArtur Grabowski <art@cvs.openbsd.org>2001-06-22 23:55:25 +0000
committerArtur Grabowski <art@cvs.openbsd.org>2001-06-22 23:55:25 +0000
commitbabb4e45cc2a108ffd44b140418f69a9898a9066 (patch)
treeb9b9f6343580c7e079d0c1fdea70900bfecf9798 /sys/kern/kern_exec.c
parent21e0c0f8e08905682f454d81114b3974e4f78b1d (diff)
Try again. (this time it's tested).
Add proc_cansugid that checks if a process may raise it's privileges. Rework exec to remove the old sugid workaround and check proc_cansugid just before raising privileges.
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/kern_exec.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/kern_exec.c27
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
index 38438d2b027..2194904adeb 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_exec.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.52 2001/06/22 14:14:08 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.53 2001/06/22 23:55:23 art Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: kern_exec.c,v 1.75 1996/02/09 18:59:28 christos Exp $ */
/*-
@@ -129,18 +129,9 @@ check_exec(p, epp)
error = EACCES;
goto bad1;
}
- if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) ||
- (p->p_flag & P_TRACED) || p->p_fd->fd_refcnt > 1)
- epp->ep_vap->va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
- /*
- * Set the P_SUID* flags early so that we won't be fiddled with when
- * we sleep later in this code.
- * XXX - this could give us a few false positives and the caller must
- * make sure to save and restore the flags if exec fails.
- */
- if (epp->ep_vap->va_mode & (VSUID|VSGID))
- p->p_flag |= P_SUGID|P_SUGIDEXEC;
+ if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID))
+ epp->ep_vap->va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
/* check access. for root we have to see if any exec bit on */
if ((error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, p->p_ucred, p)) != 0)
@@ -253,7 +244,6 @@ sys_execve(p, v, retval)
char **tmpfap;
int szsigcode;
extern struct emul emul_native;
- int saved_sugid;
/*
* figure out the maximum size of an exec header, if necessary.
@@ -284,7 +274,6 @@ sys_execve(p, v, retval)
pack.ep_emul = &emul_native;
pack.ep_flags = 0;
- saved_sugid = p->p_flag & (P_SUGID|P_SUGIDEXEC);
/* see if we can run it. */
if ((error = check_exec(p, &pack)) != 0) {
goto freehdr;
@@ -496,11 +485,14 @@ sys_execve(p, v, retval)
/*
* deal with set[ug]id.
- * MNT_NOEXEC and P_TRACED have already been used to disable s[ug]id.
+ * MNT_NOEXEC has already been used to disable s[ug]id.
*/
- if ((attr.va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID))) {
+ if ((attr.va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID)) && proc_cansugid(p)) {
int i;
+ p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
+ p->p_flag |= P_SUGIDEXEC;
+
#ifdef KTRACE
/*
* If process is being ktraced, turn off - unless
@@ -516,8 +508,6 @@ sys_execve(p, v, retval)
p->p_ucred->cr_uid = attr.va_uid;
if (attr.va_mode & VSGID)
p->p_ucred->cr_gid = attr.va_gid;
- p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
- p->p_flag |= P_SUGIDEXEC;
/*
* For set[ug]id processes, a few caveats apply to
@@ -657,7 +647,6 @@ bad:
freehdr:
free(pack.ep_hdr, M_EXEC);
- p->p_flag = (p->p_flag & ~(P_SUGID|P_SUGIDEXEC)) | saved_sugid;
return (error);
exec_abort: