diff options
author | Damien Bergamini <damien@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2007-08-29 19:54:47 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Damien Bergamini <damien@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2007-08-29 19:54:47 +0000 |
commit | 08aa8be7ff220d0c9410026ffdf71ca2af94465a (patch) | |
tree | 7689f826bd6da6096228ef09aae788d44bac532a /sys/net80211 | |
parent | 7f1d21ca6829268a5ae3241f3a9121a88d01198f (diff) |
- use ieee80211_get_hdrlen() where appropriate.
- discard all EAPOL-Key frames with an unknown descriptor version.
- when receiving message 3/4 of the 4-way handshake, do not install
the PTK if the INSTALL bit is not set. this fixes 4-way handshake
with APs using group keys only.
- similarly, do not mark the 802.1X port as valid if the SECURE bit
is not set (it will be marked as valid after group key handshake).
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/net80211')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/net80211/ieee80211_crypto.c | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c | 78 |
2 files changed, 59 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/sys/net80211/ieee80211_crypto.c b/sys/net80211/ieee80211_crypto.c index 34791f3bf23..4f18d2b1a52 100644 --- a/sys/net80211/ieee80211_crypto.c +++ b/sys/net80211/ieee80211_crypto.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ieee80211_crypto.c,v 1.34 2007/08/23 16:49:57 damien Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ieee80211_crypto.c,v 1.35 2007/08/29 19:54:46 damien Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: ieee80211_crypto.c,v 1.5 2003/12/14 09:56:53 dyoung Exp $ */ /*- @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ ieee80211_decrypt(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct mbuf *m0, wh = mtod(m0, struct ieee80211_frame *); if (IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1) || ni->ni_pairwise_cipher == IEEE80211_CIPHER_USEGROUP) { - size_t hdrlen = sizeof(*wh); /* XXX QoS */ + int hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(wh); u_int8_t *ivp = (u_int8_t *)wh + hdrlen; /* key identifier is always located at the same index */ int kid = ivp[IEEE80211_WEP_IVLEN] >> 6; @@ -199,9 +199,11 @@ ieee80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct mbuf *m0, struct ieee80211_key *k) { struct ieee80211_frame *wh; - size_t hdrlen = sizeof(*wh); /* XXX QoS */ u_int8_t *ivp; + int hdrlen; + wh = mtod(m0, struct ieee80211_frame *); + hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(wh); M_PREPEND(m0, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDRLEN, M_NOWAIT); if (m0 == NULL) return m0; @@ -229,11 +231,12 @@ ieee80211_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct mbuf *m0, struct ieee80211_key *k) { struct ieee80211_frame *wh; - size_t hdrlen = sizeof(*wh); /* XXX QoS */ u_int64_t pn; u_int8_t *ivp; + int hdrlen; wh = mtod(m0, struct ieee80211_frame *); + hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(wh); ivp = (u_int8_t *)wh + hdrlen; /* check that ExtIV bit is be set */ @@ -274,9 +277,11 @@ ieee80211_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct mbuf *m0, struct ieee80211_key *k) { struct ieee80211_frame *wh; - size_t hdrlen = sizeof(*wh); /* XXX QoS */ u_int8_t *ivp; + int hdrlen; + wh = mtod(m0, struct ieee80211_frame *); + hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(wh); M_PREPEND(m0, IEEE80211_TKIP_HDRLEN, M_NOWAIT); if (m0 == NULL) return m0; @@ -306,11 +311,12 @@ ieee80211_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct mbuf *m0, struct ieee80211_key *k) { struct ieee80211_frame *wh; - size_t hdrlen = sizeof(*wh); /* XXX QoS */ u_int64_t tsc; u_int8_t *ivp; + int hdrlen; wh = mtod(m0, struct ieee80211_frame *); + hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(wh); ivp = (u_int8_t *)wh + hdrlen; /* check that ExtIV bit is be set */ @@ -399,12 +405,7 @@ ieee80211_wep_crypt(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m0, int txflag) n->m_len = n->m_ext.ext_size; } wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *); - if ((wh->i_fc[0] & - (IEEE80211_FC0_TYPE_MASK | IEEE80211_FC0_SUBTYPE_QOS)) == - (IEEE80211_FC0_TYPE_DATA | IEEE80211_FC0_SUBTYPE_QOS)) - len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_qosframe); - else - len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_frame); + len = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(wh); memcpy(mtod(n, caddr_t), wh, len); wh = mtod(n, struct ieee80211_frame *); left -= len; diff --git a/sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c b/sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c index 3734c26d48a..99103adf6b6 100644 --- a/sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c +++ b/sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* $NetBSD: ieee80211_input.c,v 1.24 2004/05/31 11:12:24 dyoung Exp $ */ -/* $OpenBSD: ieee80211_input.c,v 1.69 2007/08/27 20:14:21 damien Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ieee80211_input.c,v 1.70 2007/08/29 19:54:46 damien Exp $ */ /*- * Copyright (c) 2001 Atsushi Onoe * Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting @@ -368,10 +368,9 @@ ieee80211_input(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m, struct ieee80211_node *ni, /* can't get there */ goto out; } - if (wh->i_fc[0] & IEEE80211_FC0_SUBTYPE_QOS) - hdrlen = sizeof(struct ieee80211_qosframe); - else - hdrlen = sizeof(struct ieee80211_frame); + + hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(wh); + if (wh->i_fc[1] & IEEE80211_FC1_WEP) { if (ic->ic_flags & IEEE80211_F_WEPON) { m = ieee80211_wep_crypt(ifp, m, 0); @@ -1981,10 +1980,6 @@ ieee80211_recv_4way_msg1(struct ieee80211com *ic, if (pmkid != NULL && pmkid[1] < 4 + 16) return; - /* update the last seen value of the key replay counter field */ - ni->ni_replaycnt = BE_READ_8(key->replaycnt); - /* do not set ni_replaycnt_ok since the frame contains no MIC */ - /* generate a new nonce (SNonce) */ get_random_bytes(snonce, EAPOL_KEY_NONCE_LEN); @@ -2018,6 +2013,7 @@ ieee80211_recv_4way_msg2(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct ieee80211_eapol_key *key, struct ieee80211_node *ni, const u_int8_t *rsn) { + struct ieee80211_ptk tptk; const u_int8_t *pmk; size_t pmk_len; @@ -2028,15 +2024,17 @@ ieee80211_recv_4way_msg2(struct ieee80211com *ic, ni->ni_rsn_state = RSNA_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING; - /* derive PTK from PMK */ + /* derive TPTK from PMK */ ieee80211_derive_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, ic->ic_myaddr, ni->ni_macaddr, - ni->ni_nonce, key->nonce, (u_int8_t *)&ni->ni_ptk, - sizeof(ni->ni_ptk)); + ni->ni_nonce, key->nonce, (u_int8_t *)&tptk, sizeof(tptk)); /* check Key MIC field using KCK */ - if (ieee80211_eapol_key_check_mic(key, ni->ni_ptk.kck) != 0) + if (ieee80211_eapol_key_check_mic(key, tptk.kck) != 0) return; + /* use TPTK as PTK now that MIC is verified */ + memcpy(&ni->ni_ptk, &tptk, sizeof(tptk)); + /* * The RSN IE must match bit-wise with what the STA included in its * (Re)Association Request. @@ -2140,13 +2138,14 @@ ieee80211_recv_4way_msg3(struct ieee80211com *ic, return; /* - * Check that first RSN IE is identical to the one received in + * Check that first WPA/RSN IE is identical to the one received in * the beacon or probe response frame. */ if (ni->ni_rsnie == NULL || rsn1[1] != ni->ni_rsnie[1] || - memcmp(rsn1, ni->ni_rsnie, 2 + rsn1[1]) != 0) + memcmp(rsn1, ni->ni_rsnie, 2 + rsn1[1]) != 0) { /*ieee80211_new_state();*/ return; + } /* * If a second RSN information element is present, use its pairwise @@ -2169,18 +2168,22 @@ ieee80211_recv_4way_msg3(struct ieee80211com *ic, /* send message 4 to authenticator */ if (ieee80211_send_4way_msg4(ic, ni) != 0) - return; - - /* check that key length matches that of pairwise cipher */ - if (BE_READ_2(key->keylen) != - ieee80211_cipher_keylen(ni->ni_pairwise_cipher)) - return; - /* install the PTK */ - k = &ni->ni_pairwise_key; - ieee80211_map_ptk(&ni->ni_ptk, ni->ni_pairwise_cipher, k); - if (ic->ic_set_key != NULL && (*ic->ic_set_key)(ic, ni, k) != 0) - return; + return; /* ..authenticator will timeout */ + if (info & EAPOL_KEY_INSTALL) { + /* check that key length matches that of pairwise cipher */ + if (BE_READ_2(key->keylen) != + ieee80211_cipher_keylen(ni->ni_pairwise_cipher)) + return; + /* install the PTK */ + k = &ni->ni_pairwise_key; + ieee80211_map_ptk(&ni->ni_ptk, ni->ni_pairwise_cipher, k); + if (ic->ic_set_key != NULL && + (*ic->ic_set_key)(ic, ni, k) != 0) { + /* XXX deauthenticate */ + return; + } + } if (gtk != NULL) { u_int64_t rsc; u_int8_t kid; @@ -2198,12 +2201,18 @@ ieee80211_recv_4way_msg3(struct ieee80211com *ic, ieee80211_map_gtk(>k[8], ni->ni_group_cipher, kid, gtk[6] & (1 << 2), rsc, k); if (ic->ic_set_key != NULL && - (*ic->ic_set_key)(ic, ni, k) != 0) + (*ic->ic_set_key)(ic, ni, k) != 0) { + /* XXX deauthenticate */ return; + } + } + if (info & EAPOL_KEY_SECURE) { + if (ic->ic_opmode == IEEE80211_M_IBSS) { + if (++ni->ni_key_count == 2) + ni->ni_port_valid = 1; + } else + ni->ni_port_valid = 1; } - - /* mark the PAE port as valid */ - ni->ni_port_valid = 1; } /* @@ -2545,7 +2554,7 @@ ieee80211_recv_eapol(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct mbuf *m0, struct ieee80211_node *ni) { struct ieee80211_eapol_key *key; - u_int16_t info; + u_int16_t info, desc; if (m0->m_len < sizeof(struct ether_header) + sizeof(*key)) goto out; @@ -2570,8 +2579,13 @@ ieee80211_recv_eapol(struct ieee80211com *ic, struct mbuf *m0, #endif info = BE_READ_2(key->info); + /* discard EAPOL-Key frames with an unknown descriptor version */ + desc = info & EAPOL_KEY_VERSION_MASK; + if (desc != EAPOL_KEY_DESC_V1 && desc != EAPOL_KEY_DESC_V2) + goto out; + if (ni->ni_pairwise_cipher == IEEE80211_CIPHER_CCMP && - (info & EAPOL_KEY_VERSION_MASK) != EAPOL_KEY_DESC_V2) + desc != EAPOL_KEY_DESC_V2) goto out; /* determine message type (see 8.5.3.7) */ |