limit maximum work performed by the CRC compensation attack detector,

problem reported by Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team;
ok markus@ deraadt@

1 files changed, 23 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/deattack.c b/usr.bin/ssh/deattack.c
index f28f33d7415..591c9559fa9 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/deattack.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/deattack.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.29 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.30 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
  *
@@ -30,6 +30,24 @@
 #include "crc32.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 
+/*
+ * CRC attack detection has a worst-case behaviour that is O(N^3) over
+ * the number of identical blocks in a packet. This behaviour can be 
+ * exploited to create a limited denial of service attack. 
+ * 
+ * However, because we are dealing with encrypted data, identical
+ * blocks should only occur every 2^35 maximally-sized packets or so. 
+ * Consequently, we can detect this DoS by looking for identical blocks
+ * in a packet.
+ *
+ * The parameter below determines how many identical blocks we will
+ * accept in a single packet, trading off between attack detection and
+ * likelihood of terminating a legitimate connection. A value of 32 
+ * corresponds to an average of 2^40 messages before an attack is
+ * misdetected
+ */
+#define MAX_IDENTICAL	32
+
 /* SSH Constants */
 #define SSH_MAXBLOCKS	(32 * 1024)
 #define SSH_BLOCKSIZE	(8)
@@ -85,7 +103,7 @@ detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 	static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
 	static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
 	u_int32_t i, j;
-	u_int32_t l;
+	u_int32_t l, same;
 	u_char *c;
 	u_char *d;
 
@@ -122,10 +140,12 @@ detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 	}
 	memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
 
-	for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
+	for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
 		for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
 		    i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
 			if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
+				if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL)
+					return (DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED);
 				if (check_crc(c, buf, len))
 					return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
 				else