diff options
author | Markus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2002-03-14 16:56:34 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Markus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2002-03-14 16:56:34 +0000 |
commit | f30e0b8f28c07d1fa4a518a80075d4bc7a240354 (patch) | |
tree | 970535cf8c37d8111b179f8d1e37d8e5f0a6993c /usr.bin/ssh | |
parent | f3bde49e992d458d12a56a406bac24ea22df0af9 (diff) |
split auth_rsa() for better readability and privsep; ok provos@
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/ssh')
-rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c | 202 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/ssh/auth.h | 4 |
3 files changed, 121 insertions, 89 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c index d1b7ae996d5..397b0a55c26 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.29 2002/03/04 12:43:06 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.30 2002/03/14 16:56:33 markus Exp $"); #include "packet.h" #include "uidswap.h" @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, Key *client_host_key /* A matching host key was found and is known. */ /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */ - if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key->rsa)) { + if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) { log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.", canonical_hostname); return 0; diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c index f7ae03cfdaf..ff9bf3b6420 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.50 2001/12/28 14:50:54 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.51 2002/03/14 16:56:33 markus Exp $"); #include <openssl/rsa.h> #include <openssl/md5.h> @@ -52,6 +52,51 @@ extern u_char session_id[16]; * description of the options. */ +static BIGNUM * +auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key) +{ + BIGNUM *challenge; + BN_CTX *ctx; + + if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed"); + /* Generate a random challenge. */ + BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0); + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new() failed"); + BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + + return challenge; +} + +static int +auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) +{ + u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; + MD5_CTX md; + int len; + + /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ + len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); + if (len <= 0 || len > 32) + fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len); + memset(buf, 0, 32); + BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); + MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); + MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); + + /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ + if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { + /* Wrong answer. */ + return (0); + } + /* Correct answer. */ + return (1); +} + /* * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client, * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to @@ -59,29 +104,19 @@ extern u_char session_id[16]; */ int -auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk) +auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key) { BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge; - BN_CTX *ctx; - u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16]; - MD5_CTX md; - u_int i; - int len; + u_char response[16]; + int i, success; if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed"); - if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed"); - /* Generate a random challenge. */ - BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0); - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_CTX_new() failed"); - BN_mod(challenge, challenge, pk->n, ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); + challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key); /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */ - rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, pk); + rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa); /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE); @@ -96,48 +131,26 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk) response[i] = packet_get_char(); packet_check_eom(); - /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ - len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); - if (len <= 0 || len > 32) - fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: bad challenge length %d", len); - memset(buf, 0, 32); - BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); - MD5_Init(&md); - MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); - MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); - MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); + success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response); BN_clear_free(challenge); - - /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ - if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { - /* Wrong answer. */ - return 0; - } - /* Correct answer. */ - return 1; + return (success); } /* - * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns - * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was - * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation. + * check if there's user key matching client_n, + * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise */ -int -auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n) +static int +auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) { char line[8192], *file; - int authenticated; + int allowed; u_int bits; FILE *f; u_long linenum = 0; struct stat st; Key *key; - char *fp; - - /* no user given */ - if (pw == NULL) - return 0; /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); @@ -151,29 +164,27 @@ auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n) /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); xfree(file); - return 0; + return (NULL); } /* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */ f = fopen(file, "r"); if (!f) { /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); - packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", file); - packet_send_debug("If your home is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable."); xfree(file); - return 0; + return (NULL); } if (options.strict_modes && secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { xfree(file); fclose(f); log("Authentication refused: %s", line); - packet_send_debug("Authentication refused: %s", line); restore_uid(); - return 0; + return (NULL); } - /* Flag indicating whether authentication has succeeded. */ - authenticated = 0; + + /* Flag indicating whether the key is allowed. */ + allowed = 0; key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); @@ -238,32 +249,8 @@ auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n) if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum)) continue; - /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */ - if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key->rsa)) { - /* Wrong response. */ - verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); - packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); - /* - * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send - * another challenge and break the protocol. - */ - break; - } - /* - * Correct response. The client has been successfully - * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the - * options; this will be reset if the options cause the - * authentication to be rejected. - * Break out of the loop if authentication was successful; - * otherwise continue searching. - */ - authenticated = 1; - - fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - verbose("Found matching %s key: %s", - key_type(key), fp); - xfree(fp); - + /* break out, this key is allowed */ + allowed = 1; break; } @@ -274,13 +261,58 @@ auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n) xfree(file); fclose(f); - key_free(key); - - if (authenticated) - packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted."); + /* return key if allowed */ + if (allowed && rkey != NULL) + *rkey = key; else + key_free(key); + return (allowed); +} + +/* + * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns + * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was + * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation. + */ +int +auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n) +{ + Key *key; + char *fp; + + /* no user given */ + if (pw == NULL) + return 0; + + if (auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key) == 0) { auth_clear_options(); + return (0); + } + + /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */ + if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) { + /* Wrong response. */ + verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); + packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); + /* + * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send + * another challenge and break the protocol. + */ + key_free(key); + return (0); + } + /* + * Correct response. The client has been successfully + * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the + * options; this will be reset if the options cause the + * authentication to be rejected. + */ + fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + verbose("Found matching %s key: %s", + key_type(key), fp); + xfree(fp); + key_free(key); - /* Return authentication result. */ - return authenticated; + packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted."); + return (1); } diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h index 56ef2de0357..37884198451 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.29 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.30 2002/03/14 16:56:33 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); int auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *, const char *, Key *); int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *); int auth_rsa(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *); -int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *); +int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *); #ifdef KRB4 #include <krb.h> |