remove ssh1 server code; ok djm@

16 files changed, 80 insertions, 2590 deletions

diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-chall.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-chall.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7224fc86707..00000000000
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-chall.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
-
-extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
-static KbdintDevice *device;
-
-char *
-get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts;
-	u_int i, numprompts;
-	u_int *echo_on;
-
-	device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
-	if (device == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
-	    &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) {
-		device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
-		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	if (numprompts < 1)
-		fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1");
-	challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]);
-	for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
-		free(prompts[i]);
-	free(prompts);
-	free(name);
-	free(echo_on);
-	free(info);
-
-	return (challenge);
-}
-int
-verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response)
-{
-	char *resp[1];
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	if (device == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	resp[0] = (char *)response;
-	if (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp) == 0)
-		authenticated = 1;
-	device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
-	authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
-	return authenticated;
-}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 633b6dc0ca9..00000000000
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.45 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
- * authentication.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser,
-    const char *chost, Key *client_host_key)
-{
-	HostStatus host_status;
-
-	if (auth_key_is_revoked(client_host_key))
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
-	if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
-		return 0;
-
-	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key,
-	    chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
-	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
-
-	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
- * its host key.  Returns true if authentication succeeds.
- */
-int
-auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
-{
-	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-	const char *chost;
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
-	debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
-	    cuser);
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid || client_host_key == NULL ||
-	    client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	chost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
-	debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
-
-	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
-		debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
-		packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
-
-	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
-	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
-		logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
-		    chost);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/*
-	 * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
-	 * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
-	 */
-
-	verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
-	    pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
-	packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
-	return 1;
-}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c
index d979c25ef09..69bc760ff82 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.47 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.48 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -182,20 +182,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
  * true if authentication succeeds.  If ignore_rhosts is true, only
  * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
  */
-
 int
-auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
-{
-	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
-	const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
-
-	hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
-	ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-	return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}
-
-static int
-auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
     const char *ipaddr)
 {
 	char buf[1024];
@@ -330,10 +318,3 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
 	restore_uid();
 	return 0;
 }
-
-int
-auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
-    const char *ipaddr)
-{
-       return auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
-}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 52969dcf7e6..00000000000
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.90 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * RSA-based authentication.  This code determines whether to admit a login
- * based on RSA authentication.  This file also contains functions to check
- * validity of the host key.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-
-#include "digest.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/*
- * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
- * responses to a particular session.
- */
-extern u_char session_id[16];
-
-/*
- * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
- * following format:
- *   options bits e n comment
- * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
- * and comment is any string of characters up to newline.  The maximum
- * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters.  See sshd(8) for a
- * description of the options.
- */
-
-BIGNUM *
-auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
-	BIGNUM *challenge;
-	BN_CTX *ctx;
-
-	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
-	/* Generate a random challenge. */
-	if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
-	if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
-	return challenge;
-}
-
-int
-auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
-{
-	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
-	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
-	int len;
-
-	/* don't allow short keys */
-	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-		error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
-		    __func__,
-		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
-	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
-	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
-		fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len);
-	memset(buf, 0, 32);
-	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
-	if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
-	    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 ||
-	    ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 ||
-	    ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
-		fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
-	ssh_digest_free(md);
-
-	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
-	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
-		/* Wrong answer. */
-		return (0);
-	}
-	/* Correct answer. */
-	return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
- * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
- * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
-{
-	BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
-	u_char response[16];
-	int i, success;
-
-	if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
-
-	challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
-
-	/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
-	if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
-
-	/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
-	packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
-	packet_send();
-	BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/* Wait for a response. */
-	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
-	BN_clear_free(challenge);
-	return (success);
-}
-
-static int
-rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
-    const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
-	char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-	int allowed = 0, bits;
-	FILE *f;
-	u_long linenum = 0;
-	Key *key;
-
-	debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
-	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key.  If
-	 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
-	 * user really has the corresponding private key.
-	 */
-	key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-		char *cp;
-		char *key_options;
-		int keybits;
-
-		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-			;
-		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-			continue;
-
-		/*
-		 * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
-		 * save their starting address and skip the option part
-		 * for now.  If there are no options, set the starting
-		 * address to NULL.
-		 */
-		if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
-			int quoted = 0;
-			key_options = cp;
-			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-					cp++;	/* Skip both */
-				else if (*cp == '"')
-					quoted = !quoted;
-			}
-		} else
-			key_options = NULL;
-
-		/* Parse the key from the line. */
-		if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
-			debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
-			    file, linenum);
-			continue;
-		}
-		/* cp now points to the comment part. */
-
-		/*
-		 * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified
-		 * by its modulus).
-		 */
-		if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
-			continue;
-
-		/* check the real bits  */
-		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
-		if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
-			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
-			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
-			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-
-		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
-		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-			continue;
-		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
-		free(fp);
-
-		/* Never accept a revoked key */
-		if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
-			break;
-
-		/* We have found the desired key. */
-		/*
-		 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
-		 * do not send challenge.
-		 */
-		if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
-			continue;
-		if (key_is_cert_authority)
-			continue;
-		/* break out, this key is allowed */
-		allowed = 1;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	/* Close the file. */
-	fclose(f);
-
-	/* return key if allowed */
-	if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
-		*rkey = key;
-	else
-		key_free(key);
-
-	return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * check if there's user key matching client_n,
- * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
- */
-
-int
-auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
-	char *file;
-	u_int i, allowed = 0;
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
-		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
-			continue;
-		file = expand_authorized_keys(
-		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
-		allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
-		free(file);
-	}
-
-	restore_uid();
-
-	return allowed;
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client.  This returns
- * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
- * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
- */
-int
-auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
-{
-	Key *key;
-	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
-
-	/* no user given */
-	if (!authctxt->valid)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
-		auth_clear_options();
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
-	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
-		/* Wrong response. */
-		verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-		packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-		/*
-		 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
-		 * another challenge and break the protocol.
-		 */
-		key_free(key);
-		return (0);
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Correct response.  The client has been successfully
-	 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
-	 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
-	 * authentication to be rejected.
-	 */
-	pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
-
-	packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
-	return (1);
-}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c
index 9c7e9edb908..5d48fd67759 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.115 2016/06/15 00:40:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.116 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
 	else
 		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
 
-	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
+	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
 	    authmsg,
 	    method,
 	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
@@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
 	    authctxt->user,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-	    compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
 	    authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
 	    authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
 	free(authctxt->info);
@@ -247,12 +246,11 @@ auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
 
 	error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
-	    "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
+	    "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
 	    authctxt->user,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-	    compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
+	    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
 	packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
 	/* NOTREACHED */
 }
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h
index c7f6482c6d5..2ce0d373dfb 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.88 2016/05/04 14:04:40 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -103,20 +103,11 @@ struct KbdintDevice
 	void	(*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
 };
 
-int      auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
 int
 auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 
-int	 auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *);
 int      auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
-int      auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *);
-int      auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *);
-BIGNUM	*auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
-int	 auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]);
-int	 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
-
-int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
-    const char *, Key *);
+
 int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
 int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
 void	 pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
@@ -135,7 +126,6 @@ int	auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
 void	krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
 #endif /* KRB5 */
 
-void	do_authentication(Authctxt *);
 void	do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
 
 void	auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
@@ -162,9 +152,6 @@ int	bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
 struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
 
-char	*get_challenge(Authctxt *);
-int	verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
-
 char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
 char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
 
@@ -184,7 +171,6 @@ Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
 Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
 Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
 int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
-int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
 int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
 	     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
 
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth1.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth1.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 4f4a58aeed7..00000000000
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth1.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/queue.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *);
-static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *);
-
-struct AuthMethod1 {
-	int type;
-	char *name;
-	int *enabled;
-	int (*method)(Authctxt *);
-};
-
-const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
-		&options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
-		&options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
-		&options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
-		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
-		auth1_process_tis_challenge
-	},
-	{
-		SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
-		&options.challenge_response_authentication,
-		auth1_process_tis_response
-	},
-	{ -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
-};
-
-static const struct AuthMethod1
-*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
-		if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
-			return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
-
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-static char *
-get_authname(int type)
-{
-	const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
-	static char buf[64];
-
-	if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
-		return (a->name);
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
-	return (buf);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *password;
-	u_int dlen;
-
-	/*
-	 * Read user password.  It is in plain text, but was
-	 * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
-	 * not visible to an outside observer.
-	 */
-	password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	/* Try authentication with the password. */
-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
-
-	explicit_bzero(password, dlen);
-	free(password);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	BIGNUM *n;
-
-	/* RSA authentication requested. */
-	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
-	packet_get_bignum(n);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
-	BN_clear_free(n);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int keybits, authenticated = 0;
-	u_int bits;
-	char *client_user;
-	Key *client_host_key;
-	u_int ulen;
-
-	/*
-	 * Get client user name.  Note that we just have to
-	 * trust the client; root on the client machine can
-	 * claim to be any user.
-	 */
-	client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-
-	/* Get the client host key. */
-	client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-	bits = packet_get_int();
-	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-
-	keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
-		verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
-		    "actual %d, announced %d",
-		    BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
-	}
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
-	    client_host_key);
-	key_free(client_host_key);
-
-	auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user);
-	free(client_user);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	char *challenge;
-
-	if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
-	packet_put_cstring(challenge);
-	free(challenge);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	return (-1);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static int
-auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *response;
-	u_int dlen;
-
-	response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
-	explicit_bzero(response, dlen);
-	free(response);
-
-	return (authenticated);
-}
-
-/*
- * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
- * return only if authentication is successful
- */
-static void
-do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	int type = 0;
-	const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
-
-	debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
-	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
-
-	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
-	if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
-#ifdef KRB5
-	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
-#endif
-	    PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
-		auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication", NULL);
-		return;
-	}
-
-	/* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	for (;;) {
-		/* default to fail */
-		authenticated = 0;
-
-
-		/* Get a packet from the client. */
-		type = packet_read();
-		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
-			goto skip;
-		if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
-			logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
-			    "type %d", type);
-			goto skip;
-		}
-
-		if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
-			verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
-			goto skip;
-		}
-
-		authenticated = meth->method(authctxt);
-		if (authenticated == -1)
-			continue; /* "postponed" */
-
-		if (authctxt->as) {
-			auth_close(authctxt->as);
-			authctxt->as = NULL;
-		}
-		if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
-			fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
-			    authctxt->user);
-
-		/* Special handling for root */
-		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-		    !auth_root_allowed(meth->name))
-			authenticated = 0;
-
- skip:
-		/* Log before sending the reply */
-		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL);
-
-		if (authenticated)
-			return;
-
-		if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries)
-			auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
-
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs authentication of an incoming connection.  Session key has already
- * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
- */
-void
-do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	u_int ulen;
-	char *user, *style = NULL;
-
-	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
-	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-
-	/* Get the user name. */
-	user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
-		*style++ = '\0';
-
-	authctxt->user = user;
-	authctxt->style = style;
-
-	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
-	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
-		authctxt->valid = 1;
-	else {
-		debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user);
-		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-	}
-
-	/* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
-	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
-		fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
-		    "protocol 1");
-
-	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
-	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
-
-	/*
-	 * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
-	 * the server.
-	 */
-	if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
-	    authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
-		packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
-
-	/*
-	 * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
-	 * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
-	 */
-	do_authloop(authctxt);
-
-	/* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c
index 57f731aa207..e4a97b214c6 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.161 2016/07/22 03:39:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.162 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -131,10 +131,6 @@ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
 
 static Authctxt *authctxt;
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
-#endif
-
 /* local state for key verify */
 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
 static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
@@ -195,31 +191,6 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-    {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#endif
-    {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
 struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
 
 /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
@@ -266,17 +237,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	authctxt = _authctxt;
 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
 
-	if (compat20) {
-		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
-
-		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-	} else {
-		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
-	}
+	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
 
 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
 	while (!authenticated) {
@@ -287,9 +251,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
 		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
 		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
-			if (!compat20)
-				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
-				    "with SSH protocol 1");
 			if (authenticated &&
 			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
 			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
@@ -358,17 +319,13 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
 	signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
 
-	if (compat20) {
-		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
 
-		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-	} else {
-		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-	}
 	if (!no_pty_flag) {
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
@@ -744,7 +701,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
 
 	/* Create valid auth method lists */
-	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+	if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
 		/*
 		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
 		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
@@ -756,14 +713,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
 
-	/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
-	if (!compat20)
-		monitor_permit_authentications(1);
-	else {
-		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
-	}
+	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
 
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -882,11 +834,8 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
 
-	if (compat20) {
-		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
-		auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
-	} else
-		auth_method = "bsdauth";
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
 
 	return (authok != 0);
 }
@@ -911,10 +860,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
 
-	if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
-	    (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
-		fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
-
 	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
 
 	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
@@ -948,17 +893,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 			    cuser, chost);
 			auth_method = "hostbased";
 			break;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
-			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
-			allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
-			    auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
-			    cuser, chost, key);
-			if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
-				auth_clear_options();
-			auth_method = "rsa";
-			break;
-#endif
 		default:
 			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
 			break;
@@ -995,9 +929,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
 
-	if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
-		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
-
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -1306,186 +1237,6 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	return (0);
 }
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	BIGNUM *p;
-	int rsafail;
-
-	/* Turn off permissions */
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
-
-	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
-
-	rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
-
-	BN_clear_free(p);
-
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
-
-	/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
-		fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
-
-	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	BIGNUM *client_n;
-	Key *key = NULL;
-	u_char *blob = NULL;
-	u_int blen = 0;
-	int allowed = 0;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	auth_method = "rsa";
-	if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
-		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-		buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
-		allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
-		BN_clear_free(client_n);
-	}
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
-	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
-	/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
-	monitor_reset_key_state();
-
-	if (allowed && key != NULL) {
-		key->type = KEY_RSA;	/* cheat for key_to_blob */
-		if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
-			fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
-		buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
-
-		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
-		key_blob = blob;
-		key_bloblen = blen;
-		key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
-	}
-	if (key != NULL)
-		key_free(key);
-
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
-
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	Key *key = NULL;
-	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid)
-		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
-	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
-	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
-		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
-	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
-		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
-	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
-	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
-		fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
-	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-	if (ssh1_challenge)
-		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
-	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
-
-	debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
-
-	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
-
-	free(blob);
-	key_free(key);
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
-	Key *key = NULL;
-	u_char *blob, *response;
-	u_int blen, len;
-	int success;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid)
-		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
-	if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
-
-	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
-	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
-		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
-	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
-		fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
-	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
-	response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-	if (len != 16)
-		fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
-	success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
-
-	free(blob);
-	key_free(key);
-	free(response);
-
-	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
-
-	/* reset state */
-	BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
-	ssh1_challenge = NULL;
-	monitor_reset_key_state();
-
-	buffer_clear(m);
-	buffer_put_int(m, success);
-	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
-
-	return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
 int
 mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
 {
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.c b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.c
index 57f8c8923c3..87c84996a33 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.88 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -74,7 +74,6 @@
 #include "ssherr.h"
 
 /* Imports */
-extern int compat20;
 extern z_stream incoming_stream;
 extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
 extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
@@ -371,18 +370,6 @@ mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host,
 }
 
 int
-mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user,
-    const char *host, Key *key)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */
-	ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0);
-	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-int
 mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
     Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
 {
@@ -560,28 +547,6 @@ mm_terminate(void)
 	buffer_free(&m);
 }
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num)
-{
-	int rsafail;
-	Buffer m;
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num);
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m);
-
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m);
-
-	rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m);
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num);
-
-	buffer_free(&m);
-
-	return (rsafail);
-}
-#endif
-
 static void
 mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
     char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
@@ -651,121 +616,6 @@ mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
 	return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
 }
 
-
-void
-mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16])
-{
-	Buffer m;
-	int i;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]);
-
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m);
-	buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
-{
-	Buffer m;
-	Key *key;
-	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-	int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n);
-
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m);
-
-	allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
-	/* fake forced command */
-	auth_clear_options();
-	have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
-	forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
-
-	if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
-		blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
-		if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__);
-		*rkey = key;
-		free(blob);
-	}
-	buffer_free(&m);
-
-	return (allowed);
-}
-
-BIGNUM *
-mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
-{
-	Buffer m;
-	BIGNUM *challenge;
-	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
-
-	key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
-	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
-		fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
-	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
-	free(blob);
-
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m);
-
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge);
-	buffer_free(&m);
-
-	return (challenge);
-}
-
-int
-mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
-{
-	Buffer m;
-	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-	int success = 0;
-
-	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
-	key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */
-	if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
-		fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
-	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
-
-	buffer_init(&m);
-	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen);
-	buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16);
-	free(blob);
-
-	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m);
-	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m);
-
-	success = buffer_get_int(&m);
-	buffer_free(&m);
-
-	return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32
 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.h b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.h
index 1b91bcec5d3..fd84aa8fcc2 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.30 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.31 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 extern int use_privsep;
 #define PRIVSEP(x)	(use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
 
-enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY};
+enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
 
 struct monitor;
 struct mm_master;
@@ -49,12 +49,7 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, Key *, int);
 int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
 int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
     const char *, Key *);
-int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
-    const char *, Key *);
 int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
-int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
-BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
@@ -69,10 +64,6 @@ void mm_terminate(void);
 int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
 void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
 
-/* SSHv1 interfaces */
-void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *);
-int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-
 /* Key export functions */
 struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
 int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.c b/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.c
index 2461702f6f4..c0b4cc731cb 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.184 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.185 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@
 #include "sshpty.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
@@ -82,25 +81,6 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern int use_privsep;
 
-static Buffer stdin_buffer;	/* Buffer for stdin data. */
-static Buffer stdout_buffer;	/* Buffer for stdout data. */
-static Buffer stderr_buffer;	/* Buffer for stderr data. */
-static int fdin;		/* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */
-static int fdout;		/* Descriptor for stdout (for reading);
-				   May be same number as fdin. */
-static int fderr;		/* Descriptor for stderr.  May be -1. */
-static long stdin_bytes = 0;	/* Number of bytes written to stdin. */
-static long stdout_bytes = 0;	/* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */
-static long stderr_bytes = 0;	/* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */
-static long fdout_bytes = 0;	/* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */
-static int stdin_eof = 0;	/* EOF message received from client. */
-static int fdout_eof = 0;	/* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */
-static int fderr_eof = 0;	/* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */
-static int fdin_is_tty = 0;	/* fdin points to a tty. */
-static int connection_in;	/* Connection to client (input). */
-static int connection_out;	/* Connection to client (output). */
-static int connection_closed = 0;	/* Connection to client closed. */
-static u_int buffer_high;	/* "Soft" max buffer size. */
 static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
 
 /*
@@ -179,64 +159,6 @@ sigterm_handler(int sig)
 	received_sigterm = sig;
 }
 
-/*
- * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending
- * to the client.
- */
-static void
-make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
-{
-	u_int len;
-
-	/* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */
-	while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 &&
-	    packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
-		len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
-		if (packet_is_interactive()) {
-			if (len > 512)
-				len = 512;
-		} else {
-			/* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
-			if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
-				len = packet_get_maxsize();
-		}
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
-		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len);
-		packet_send();
-		buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
-		stderr_bytes += len;
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the
- * client.
- */
-static void
-make_packets_from_stdout_data(void)
-{
-	u_int len;
-
-	/* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */
-	while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 &&
-	    packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
-		len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
-		if (packet_is_interactive()) {
-			if (len > 512)
-				len = 512;
-		} else {
-			/* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
-			if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
-				len = packet_get_maxsize();
-		}
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
-		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len);
-		packet_send();
-		buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
-		stdout_bytes += len;
-	}
-}
-
 static void
 client_alive_check(void)
 {
@@ -269,7 +191,8 @@ client_alive_check(void)
  * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
  */
 static void
-wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out,
+    fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
     u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms)
 {
 	struct timeval tv, *tvp;
@@ -293,7 +216,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
 	 * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
 	 * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
 	 */
-	if (compat20 && options.client_alive_interval) {
+	if (options.client_alive_interval) {
 		uint64_t keepalive_ms =
 		    (uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
 
@@ -302,37 +225,11 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
 			max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
 	}
 
-	if (compat20) {
 #if 0
-		/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
-		if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+	/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
+	if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
 #endif
-		FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
-	} else {
-		/*
-		 * Read packets from the client unless we have too much
-		 * buffered stdin or channel data.
-		 */
-		if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high &&
-		    channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
-			FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
-		/*
-		 * If there is not too much data already buffered going to
-		 * the client, try to get some more data from the program.
-		 */
-		if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
-			if (!fdout_eof)
-				FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
-			if (!fderr_eof)
-				FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
-		}
-		/*
-		 * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
-		 * to the program.
-		 */
-		if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
-			FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
-	}
+	FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
 	notify_prepare(*readsetp);
 
 	/*
@@ -376,8 +273,8 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
  * Processes input from the client and the program.  Input data is stored
  * in buffers and processed later.
  */
-static void
-process_input(fd_set *readset)
+static int
+process_input(fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
 {
 	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
 	int len;
@@ -389,10 +286,7 @@ process_input(fd_set *readset)
 		if (len == 0) {
 			verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
-			connection_closed = 1;
-			if (compat20)
-				return;
-			cleanup_exit(255);
+			return -1;
 		} else if (len < 0) {
 			if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) {
 				verbose("Read error from remote host "
@@ -406,366 +300,26 @@ process_input(fd_set *readset)
 			packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
 		}
 	}
-	if (compat20)
-		return;
-
-	/* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
-	if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
-		len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
-			/* do nothing */
-		} else if (len <= 0) {
-			fdout_eof = 1;
-		} else {
-			buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
-			fdout_bytes += len;
-		}
-	}
-	/* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
-	if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
-		len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
-			/* do nothing */
-		} else if (len <= 0) {
-			fderr_eof = 1;
-		} else {
-			buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
-		}
-	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
  */
 static void
-process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+process_output(fd_set *writeset, int connection_out)
 {
-	struct termios tio;
-	u_char *data;
-	u_int dlen;
-	int len;
-
-	/* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
-	if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
-		data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
-		dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
-		len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
-		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
-			/* do nothing */
-		} else if (len <= 0) {
-			if (fdin != fdout)
-				close(fdin);
-			else
-				shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
-			fdin = -1;
-		} else {
-			/* Successful write. */
-			if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' &&
-			    tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 &&
-			    !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
-				/*
-				 * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
-				 * traffic analysis
-				 */
-				packet_send_ignore(len);
-				packet_send();
-			}
-			/* Consume the data from the buffer. */
-			buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
-			/* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */
-			stdin_bytes += len;
-		}
-	}
 	/* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
 	if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
 		packet_write_poll();
 }
 
-/*
- * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client.
- * This is used when the program terminates.
- */
-static void
-drain_output(void)
-{
-	/* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */
-	if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
-		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
-				  buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
-		packet_send();
-		/* Update the count of sent bytes. */
-		stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
-	}
-	/* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */
-	if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
-		packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
-				  buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
-		packet_send();
-		/* Update the count of sent bytes. */
-		stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
-	}
-	/* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */
-	packet_write_wait();
-}
-
 static void
 process_buffered_input_packets(void)
 {
 	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, active_state);
 }
 
-/*
- * Performs the interactive session.  This handles data transmission between
- * the client and the program.  Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
- * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to
- * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the
- * child program).
- */
-void
-server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
-{
-	fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
-	int max_fd = 0;
-	u_int nalloc = 0;
-	int wait_status;	/* Status returned by wait(). */
-	pid_t wait_pid;		/* pid returned by wait(). */
-	int waiting_termination = 0;	/* Have displayed waiting close message. */
-	u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds;
-	u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes;
-	u_int stdout_buffer_bytes;
-	int type;
-
-	debug("Entering interactive session.");
-
-	/* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */
-	child_terminated = 0;
-	signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
-
-	if (!use_privsep) {
-		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
-		signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
-		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
-	}
-
-	/* Initialize our global variables. */
-	fdin = fdin_arg;
-	fdout = fdout_arg;
-	fderr = fderr_arg;
-
-	/* nonblocking IO */
-	set_nonblock(fdin);
-	set_nonblock(fdout);
-	/* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
-	if (fderr != -1)
-		set_nonblock(fderr);
-
-	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
-		fdin_is_tty = 1;
-
-	connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
-	connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
-
-	notify_setup();
-
-	previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0;
-
-	/* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */
-	if (packet_is_interactive())
-		buffer_high = 4096;
-	else
-		buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
-
-#if 0
-	/* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */
-	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
-	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
-	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
-	if (fderr != -1)
-		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
-#endif
-
-	/* Initialize Initialize buffers. */
-	buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
-	buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
-	buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
-
-	/*
-	 * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty
-	 * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and
-	 * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr.  This way
-	 * we don't need to check the descriptor everywhere.
-	 */
-	if (fderr == -1)
-		fderr_eof = 1;
-
-	server_init_dispatch();
-
-	/* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */
-	for (;;) {
-
-		/* Process buffered packets from the client. */
-		process_buffered_input_packets();
-
-		/*
-		 * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
-		 * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
-		 */
-		if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
-			if (fdin != fdout)
-				close(fdin);
-			else
-				shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
-			fdin = -1;
-		}
-		/* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */
-		make_packets_from_stderr_data();
-
-		/*
-		 * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the
-		 * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to
-		 * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we
-		 * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems
-		 * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character.
-		 */
-		max_time_milliseconds = 0;
-		stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
-		if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 &&
-		    stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) {
-			/* try again after a while */
-			max_time_milliseconds = 10;
-		} else {
-			/* Send it now. */
-			make_packets_from_stdout_data();
-		}
-		previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
-
-		/* Send channel data to the client. */
-		if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
-			channel_output_poll();
-
-		/*
-		 * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output
-		 * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the
-		 * client, and there is no pending buffered data.
-		 */
-		if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() &&
-		    buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) {
-			if (!channel_still_open())
-				break;
-			if (!waiting_termination) {
-				const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
-				char *cp;
-				waiting_termination = 1;
-				buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
-
-				/* Display list of open channels. */
-				cp = channel_open_message();
-				buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp));
-				free(cp);
-			}
-		}
-		max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
-		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
-		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
-		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
-		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
-
-		/* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */
-		wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
-		    &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds);
-
-		if (received_sigterm) {
-			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
-			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
-			cleanup_exit(255);
-		}
-
-		/* Process any channel events. */
-		channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-
-		/* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */
-		process_input(readset);
-
-		/* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */
-		process_output(writeset);
-	}
-	free(readset);
-	free(writeset);
-
-	/* Cleanup and termination code. */
-
-	/* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */
-	drain_output();
-
-	debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.",
-	    stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes);
-
-	/* Free and clear the buffers. */
-	buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
-	buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
-	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
-
-	/* Close the file descriptors. */
-	if (fdout != -1)
-		close(fdout);
-	fdout = -1;
-	fdout_eof = 1;
-	if (fderr != -1)
-		close(fderr);
-	fderr = -1;
-	fderr_eof = 1;
-	if (fdin != -1)
-		close(fdin);
-	fdin = -1;
-
-	channel_free_all();
-
-	/* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */
-	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
-
-	while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0)
-		if (errno != EINTR)
-			packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	if (wait_pid != pid)
-		error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld",
-		    (long)wait_pid, (long)pid);
-
-	/* Check if it exited normally. */
-	if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
-		/* Yes, normal exit.  Get exit status and send it to the client. */
-		debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
-		packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS);
-		packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-
-		/*
-		 * Wait for exit confirmation.  Note that there might be
-		 * other packets coming before it; however, the program has
-		 * already died so we just ignore them.  The client is
-		 * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives
-		 * the exit status.
-		 */
-		do {
-			type = packet_read();
-		}
-		while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
-
-		debug("Received exit confirmation.");
-		return;
-	}
-	/* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */
-	if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status))
-		packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.",
-				  WTERMSIG(wait_status));
-
-	/* Some weird exit cause.  Just exit. */
-	packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status);
-	/* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
 static void
 collect_children(void)
 {
@@ -793,7 +347,7 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
 	int max_fd;
-	u_int nalloc = 0;
+	u_int nalloc = 0, connection_in, connection_out;
 	u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
 
 	debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
@@ -822,14 +376,14 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state) &&
 		    packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
 			channel_output_poll();
-		if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 &&
+		if (options.rekey_interval > 0 &&
 		    !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
 			rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000;
 		else
 			rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
 
-		wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
-		    &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
+		wait_until_can_do_something(connection_in, connection_out,
+		    &readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
 
 		if (received_sigterm) {
 			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
@@ -840,10 +394,9 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		collect_children();
 		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
 			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-		process_input(readset);
-		if (connection_closed)
+		if (process_input(readset, connection_in) < 0)
 			break;
-		process_output(writeset);
+		process_output(writeset, connection_out);
 	}
 	collect_children();
 
@@ -870,53 +423,6 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int
-server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	char *data;
-	u_int data_len;
-
-	/* Stdin data from the client.  Append it to the buffer. */
-	/* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */
-	if (fdin == -1)
-		return 0;
-	data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len);
-	explicit_bzero(data, data_len);
-	free(data);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Eof from the client.  The stdin descriptor to the
-	 * program will be closed when all buffered data has
-	 * drained.
-	 */
-	debug("EOF received for stdin.");
-	packet_check_eom();
-	stdin_eof = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	u_int row = packet_get_int();
-	u_int col = packet_get_int();
-	u_int xpixel = packet_get_int();
-	u_int ypixel = packet_get_int();
-
-	debug("Window change received.");
-	packet_check_eom();
-	if (fdin != -1)
-		pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static Channel *
 server_request_direct_tcpip(void)
 {
@@ -1316,9 +822,9 @@ server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 }
 
 static void
-server_init_dispatch_20(void)
+server_init_dispatch(void)
 {
-	debug("server_init_dispatch_20");
+	debug("server_init_dispatch");
 	dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
@@ -1338,36 +844,3 @@ server_init_dispatch_20(void)
 	/* rekeying */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
 }
-static void
-server_init_dispatch_13(void)
-{
-	debug("server_init_dispatch_13");
-	dispatch_init(NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
-}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch_15(void)
-{
-	server_init_dispatch_13();
-	debug("server_init_dispatch_15");
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
-	dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose);
-}
-static void
-server_init_dispatch(void)
-{
-	if (compat20)
-		server_init_dispatch_20();
-	else if (compat13)
-		server_init_dispatch_13();
-	else
-		server_init_dispatch_15();
-}
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.h b/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.h
index 7311558f949..d5fbda16fa6 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/serverloop.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.7 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
 #ifndef SERVERLOOP_H
 #define SERVERLOOP_H
 
-void    server_loop(pid_t, int, int, int);
 void    server_loop2(Authctxt *);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/session.c b/usr.bin/ssh/session.c
index 1e0935334c6..268d1171de5 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/session.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.282 2016/03/10 11:47:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.283 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "sshpty.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -112,7 +111,6 @@ void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
 void	do_motd(void);
 int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
 
-static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
 static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
 
 static int session_pty_req(Session *);
@@ -249,11 +247,7 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	auth_debug_send();
 
-	if (compat20)
-		do_authenticated2(authctxt);
-	else
-		do_authenticated1(authctxt);
-
+	do_authenticated2(authctxt);
 	do_cleanup(authctxt);
 }
 
@@ -272,164 +266,6 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Prepares for an interactive session.  This is called after the user has
- * been successfully authenticated.  During this message exchange, pseudo
- * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings
- * are requested, etc.
- */
-static void
-do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	Session *s;
-	char *command;
-	int success, type, screen_flag;
-	int enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
-	u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0;
-
-	s = session_new();
-	if (s == NULL) {
-		error("no more sessions");
-		return;
-	}
-	s->authctxt = authctxt;
-	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
-
-	/*
-	 * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
-	 * or a command.
-	 */
-	for (;;) {
-		success = 0;
-
-		/* Get a packet from the client. */
-		type = packet_read();
-
-		/* Process the packet. */
-		switch (type) {
-		case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION:
-			compression_level = packet_get_int();
-			packet_check_eom();
-			if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) {
-				packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.",
-				    compression_level);
-				break;
-			}
-			if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
-				debug2("compression disabled");
-				break;
-			}
-			/* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */
-			enable_compression_after_reply = 1;
-			success = 1;
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY:
-			success = session_pty_req(s);
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
-			s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len);
-			s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
-
-			screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() &
-			    SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
-			debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag);
-
-			if (packet_remaining() == 4) {
-				if (!screen_flag)
-					debug2("Buggy client: "
-					    "X11 screen flag missing");
-				s->screen = packet_get_int();
-			} else {
-				s->screen = 0;
-			}
-			packet_check_eom();
-			if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
-			    xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
-				success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
-			else {
-				success = 0;
-				error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
-			}
-			if (!success) {
-				free(s->auth_proto);
-				free(s->auth_data);
-				s->auth_proto = NULL;
-				s->auth_data = NULL;
-			}
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
-			if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
-			    no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) {
-				debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
-				break;
-			}
-			debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request.");
-			success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST:
-			if (no_port_forwarding_flag) {
-				debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
-				break;
-			}
-			if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) {
-				debug("Port forwarding not permitted.");
-				break;
-			}
-			debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
-			if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0,
-			    &options.fwd_opts) < 0) {
-				debug("Port forwarding failed.");
-				break;
-			}
-			success = 1;
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE:
-			if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
-				success = 1;
-			break;
-
-		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
-		case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
-			if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
-				command = packet_get_string(&dlen);
-				debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command);
-				if (do_exec(s, command) != 0)
-					packet_disconnect(
-					    "command execution failed");
-				free(command);
-			} else {
-				if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0)
-					packet_disconnect(
-					    "shell execution failed");
-			}
-			packet_check_eom();
-			session_close(s);
-			return;
-
-		default:
-			/*
-			 * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
-			 * and a failure message is returned.
-			 */
-			logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
-		}
-		packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-		packet_send();
-		packet_write_wait();
-
-		/* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */
-		if (enable_compression_after_reply) {
-			enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
-			packet_start_compression(compression_level);
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 #define USE_PIPES 1
 /*
  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
@@ -577,14 +413,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 	close(pout[1]);
 	close(perr[1]);
 
-	if (compat20) {
-		session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
-		    s->is_subsystem, 0);
-	} else {
-		/* Enter the interactive session. */
-		server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
-		/* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */
-	}
+	session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
+	    s->is_subsystem, 0);
 #else
 	/* We are the parent.  Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
 	close(inout[0]);
@@ -594,13 +424,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 	 * Enter the interactive session.  Note: server_loop must be able to
 	 * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
 	 */
-	if (compat20) {
-		session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
-		    s->is_subsystem, 0);
-	} else {
-		server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
-		/* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
-	}
+	session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
+	    s->is_subsystem, 0);
 #endif
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -701,12 +526,7 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
 	packet_set_interactive(1, 
 	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
-	if (compat20) {
-		session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
-	} else {
-		server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
-		/* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
-	}
+	session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1730,14 +1550,8 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
 	}
 
 	s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
-
-	if (compat20) {
-		s->col = packet_get_int();
-		s->row = packet_get_int();
-	} else {
-		s->row = packet_get_int();
-		s->col = packet_get_int();
-	}
+	s->col = packet_get_int();
+	s->row = packet_get_int();
 	s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
 	s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
 
@@ -1759,9 +1573,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
 	}
 	debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
 
-	/* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
-	if (!compat20)
-		n_bytes = packet_remaining();
+	n_bytes = packet_remaining();
 	tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
 
 	if (!use_privsep)
@@ -1977,8 +1789,6 @@ void
 session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr,
     int is_tty)
 {
-	if (!compat20)
-		fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0");
 	/*
 	 * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
 	 * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
@@ -2379,7 +2189,7 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
-	if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+	if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
 		ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
 #endif
 
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/session.h b/usr.bin/ssh/session.h
index f18eaf329d7..98e1dafee2b 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/session.h
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/session.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.32 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.33 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ struct Session {
 	char	*auth_data;
 	int	single_connection;
 
-	/* proto 2 */
 	int	chanid;
 	int	*x11_chanids;
 	int	is_subsystem;
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
index 762ba218860..c46b4ac63b5 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.471 2016/08/03 04:23:55 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.472 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "sshpty.h"
@@ -182,22 +181,12 @@ int have_agent = 0;
  * not very useful.  Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
  */
 struct {
-	Key	*server_key;		/* ephemeral server key */
-	Key	*ssh1_host_key;		/* ssh1 host key */
 	Key	**host_keys;		/* all private host keys */
 	Key	**host_pubkeys;		/* all public host keys */
 	Key	**host_certificates;	/* all public host certificates */
-	int	have_ssh1_key;
 	int	have_ssh2_key;
-	u_char	ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
 } sensitive_data;
 
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
- * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
- */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
-
 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
@@ -233,10 +222,6 @@ Buffer loginmsg;
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
-#endif
 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
 
 /*
@@ -352,43 +337,10 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state));
 }
 
-/*
- * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm.  Note that this
- * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
- * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
- * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
- * problems.
- */
-static void
-generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
-{
-	verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
-	    sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
-	if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
-		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-	sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
-	    options.server_key_bits);
-	verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
-
-	arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
-{
-	int save_errno = errno;
-
-	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
-	errno = save_errno;
-	key_do_regen = 1;
-}
-
 static void
 sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
 {
 	u_int i;
-	int mismatch;
 	int remote_major, remote_minor;
 	int major, minor;
 	char *s, *newline = "\n";
@@ -488,42 +440,13 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
 		    "refusing connection", remote_version);
 	}
 
-	mismatch = 0;
-	switch (remote_major) {
-	case 1:
-		if (remote_minor == 99) {
-			if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
-				enable_compat20();
-			else
-				mismatch = 1;
-			break;
-		}
-		if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
-			mismatch = 1;
-			break;
-		}
-		if (remote_minor < 3) {
-			packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
-			    "is no longer supported.  Please install a newer version.");
-		} else if (remote_minor == 3) {
-			/* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
-			enable_compat13();
-		}
-		break;
-	case 2:
-		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
-			enable_compat20();
-			break;
-		}
-		/* FALLTHROUGH */
-	default:
-		mismatch = 1;
-		break;
-	}
 	chop(server_version_string);
 	debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
 
-	if (mismatch) {
+	if (remote_major == 2 ||
+	    (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) {
+		enable_compat20();
+	} else {
 		s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
 		(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
 		close(sock_in);
@@ -542,10 +465,6 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
-		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-		sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
-	}
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
@@ -556,8 +475,6 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
 			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
 		}
 	}
-	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
-	explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
 }
 
 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
@@ -567,24 +484,14 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
 	Key *tmp;
 	int i;
 
-	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
-		tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
-		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-		sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
-	}
-
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
 			tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
-			if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
-				sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
 		}
 		/* Certs do not need demotion */
 	}
-
-	/* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie.  XXX - Okay Niels? */
 }
 
 static void
@@ -765,7 +672,7 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
 		key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
 		if (key == NULL)
 			key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
-		if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+		if (key == NULL)
 			continue;
 		/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
 		if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
@@ -914,7 +821,7 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
 	for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
 		key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
 		if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
-		    key->type == KEY_RSA1 || sshkey_is_cert(key))
+		    sshkey_is_cert(key))
 			continue;
 		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
@@ -1000,41 +907,11 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
 	/*
 	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
 	 *	string	configuration
-	 *	u_int	ephemeral_key_follows
-	 *	bignum	e		(only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
-	 *	bignum	n			"
-	 *	bignum	d			"
-	 *	bignum	iqmp			"
-	 *	bignum	p			"
-	 *	bignum	q			"
 	 */
 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
-	    sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q)) != 0)
-			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-	} else
-#endif
-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
-			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
 	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
 
@@ -1064,23 +941,6 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
 		buffer_append(conf, cp, len);
 	free(cp);
 
-	if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-		if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
-			key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-		sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
-		if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
-			fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters "
-			    "error", __func__);
-#endif
-	}
 	buffer_free(&m);
 
 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
@@ -1196,7 +1056,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
 {
 	fd_set *fdset;
 	int i, j, ret, maxfd;
-	int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
+	int startups = 0;
 	int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
 	socklen_t fromlen;
@@ -1242,11 +1102,6 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
 				unlink(options.pid_file);
 			exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
 		}
-		if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
-			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-			key_used = 0;
-			key_do_regen = 0;
-		}
 		if (ret < 0)
 			continue;
 
@@ -1378,19 +1233,6 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
 				close(config_s[0]);
 				close(config_s[1]);
 			}
-
-			/*
-			 * Mark that the key has been used (it
-			 * was "given" to the child).
-			 */
-			if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
-			    key_used == 0) {
-				/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
-				signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
-				alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
-				key_used = 1;
-			}
-
 			close(*newsock);
 		}
 
@@ -1529,8 +1371,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
 			break;
 		case 'b':
-			options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
-			    32768, NULL);
+			/* ignored */
 			break;
 		case 'p':
 			options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
@@ -1622,9 +1463,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
 	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
 
-	sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
-	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
-	sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
 	sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -1732,8 +1570,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
 		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
 
-		if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 &&
-		    have_agent) {
+		if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) {
 			debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
 			keytype = pubkey->type;
@@ -1748,10 +1585,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		}
 
 		switch (keytype) {
-		case KEY_RSA1:
-			sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
-			sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
-			break;
 		case KEY_RSA:
 		case KEY_DSA:
 		case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -1764,19 +1597,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
 			fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
 		debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
-		    key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ?
-		    sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
+		    key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
 		free(fp);
 	}
-	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
-		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
-		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-	}
-	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
-		logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
-		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
-	}
-	if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
 		exit(1);
 	}
@@ -1824,33 +1648,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		    key_type(key));
 	}
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	/* Check certain values for sanity. */
-	if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
-		if (options.server_key_bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
-		    options.server_key_bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
-			exit(1);
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
-		 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
-		 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
-		 */
-		if (options.server_key_bits >
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
-		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
-		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			options.server_key_bits =
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
-			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
-			debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
-			    options.server_key_bits);
-		}
-	}
-#endif
-
 	if (use_privsep) {
 		struct stat st;
 
@@ -1930,9 +1727,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	} else {
 		server_listen();
 
-		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
-			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
 		signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
 		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
@@ -2070,11 +1864,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		alarm(options.login_grace_time);
 
 	sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out);
-
-	/* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
-	if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
-		generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
 	packet_set_nonblocking();
 
 	/* allocate authentication context */
@@ -2090,7 +1879,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (use_privsep) {
 		if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
 			goto authenticated;
-	} else if (compat20 && have_agent) {
+	} else if (have_agent) {
 		if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
 			error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
 			have_agent = 0;
@@ -2099,17 +1888,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	/* perform the key exchange */
 	/* authenticate user and start session */
-	if (compat20) {
-		do_ssh2_kex();
-		do_authentication2(authctxt);
-	} else {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-		do_ssh1_kex();
-		do_authentication(authctxt);
-#else
-		fatal("ssh1 not supported");
-#endif
-	}
+	do_ssh2_kex();
+	do_authentication2(authctxt);
+
 	/*
 	 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
 	 * the current keystate and exits
@@ -2139,16 +1920,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (use_privsep) {
 		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
 		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
-		if (!compat20)
-			destroy_sensitive_data();
 	}
 
 	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
 	    options.client_alive_count_max);
 
 	/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
-	if (compat20)
-		notify_hostkeys(active_state);
+	notify_hostkeys(active_state);
 
 	/* Start session. */
 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
@@ -2167,229 +1945,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	exit(0);
 }
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-/*
- * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
- * (key with larger modulus first).
- */
-int
-ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
-{
-	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-	int rsafail = 0;
-
-	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
-	    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
-		/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
-		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
-		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
-			    "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
-			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
-		}
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
-			rsafail++;
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
-			rsafail++;
-	} else {
-		/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
-		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
-		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
-			    "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
-		}
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
-			rsafail++;
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
-			rsafail++;
-	}
-	return (rsafail);
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH1 key exchange
- */
-static void
-do_ssh1_kex(void)
-{
-	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-	int i, len;
-	int rsafail = 0;
-	BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int;
-	u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
-	u_char fake_key_bytes[4096 / 8];
-	size_t fake_key_len;
-	u_char cookie[8];
-	u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
-
-	/*
-	 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
-	 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
-	 * spoofing attacks.  Note that this only works against somebody
-	 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
-	 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
-	 * cookie.  This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
-	 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
-	 */
-	arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
-
-	/*
-	 * Send our public key.  We include in the packet 64 bits of random
-	 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
-	 * spoofing.
-	 */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
-
-	/* Store our public server RSA key. */
-	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
-	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
-
-	/* Store our public host RSA key. */
-	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
-	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
-
-	/* Put protocol flags. */
-	packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
-
-	/* Declare which ciphers we support. */
-	packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
-
-	/* Declare supported authentication types. */
-	auth_mask = 0;
-	if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
-	if (options.rsa_authentication)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-	if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
-	if (options.password_authentication)
-		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
-	packet_put_int(auth_mask);
-
-	/* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
-	    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-	    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
-
-	/* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
-	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
-
-	/* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
-	cipher_type = packet_get_char();
-
-	if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
-		packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
-
-	/* Get check bytes from the packet.  These must match those we
-	   sent earlier with the public key packet. */
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
-			packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
-
-	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
-
-	/* Get the encrypted integer. */
-	if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
-	packet_get_bignum(real_key_int);
-
-	protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
-	packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	/* Setup a fake key in case RSA decryption fails */
-	if ((fake_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
-	fake_key_len = BN_num_bytes(real_key_int);
-	if (fake_key_len > sizeof(fake_key_bytes))
-		fake_key_len = sizeof(fake_key_bytes);
-	arc4random_buf(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len);
-	if (BN_bin2bn(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len, fake_key_int) == NULL)
-		fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_bin2bn failed");
-
-	/* Decrypt real_key_int using host/server keys */
-	rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(real_key_int));
-	/* If decryption failed, use the fake key. Else, the real key. */
-	if (rsafail)
-		session_key_int = fake_key_int;
-	else
-		session_key_int = real_key_int;
-
-	/*
-	 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer.  The key is in the
-	 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
-	 * key is in the highest bits.
-	 */
-	(void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
-	len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
-	if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
-		error("%s: bad session key len from %s port %d: "
-		    "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", __func__,
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-		    len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
-		rsafail++;
-	} else {
-		explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-		BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
-		    session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
-
-		derive_ssh1_session_id(
-		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
-		    cookie, session_id);
-		/*
-		 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
-		 * session id.
-		 */
-		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-			session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
-	}
-
-	/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
-	destroy_sensitive_data();
-
-	if (use_privsep)
-		mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
-
-	/* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */
-	BN_clear_free(real_key_int);
-	BN_clear_free(fake_key_int);
-
-	/* Set the session key.  From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
-	packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
-
-	/* Destroy our copy of the session key.  It is no longer needed. */
-	explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-
-	debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
-
-	/* Send an acknowledgment packet.  Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-}
-#endif
-
 int
 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int flag)
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd/Makefile b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd/Makefile
index f9cf59b99ca..eaea9460901 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/sshd/Makefile
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/sshd/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.88 2016/01/14 16:17:40 markus Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $
 
 .PATH:		${.CURDIR}/..
 .include "${.CURDIR}/../Makefile.inc"
@@ -12,17 +12,13 @@ MAN=	sshd.8 sshd_config.5
 SRCS=	sshd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c \
 	sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c serverloop.c \
 	auth.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c \
-	auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c groupaccess.c \
+	auth2-chall.c groupaccess.c \
 	auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
 	auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c \
 	monitor_mm.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c \
 	sftp-server.c sftp-common.c \
 	sandbox-pledge.c
 
-.if (${SSH1:L} == "yes")
-SRCS+=	auth-rsa.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth1.c
-.endif
-
 .include <bsd.own.mk> # for KERBEROS and AFS
 
 KERBEROS5=no