aliases/forwards expansion was not done correctly and a race could

cause delivery to happen before expansion is over, causing some of
the recipients to never receive the mail. change how the mfa, lka,
queue and smtp processes communicate to ensure smtp never receives
an acknowledgment before ALL expanded envelopes are on disk. While
at it, lka was doing work which belongs in mfa, fix that also.

this is based on an idea from a talk with jacekm@, change not over
but already better than what we had.

1 files changed, 127 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/usr.sbin/smtpd/mfa.c b/usr.sbin/smtpd/mfa.c
index 2be0f399fa9..18d6fcc7d21 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/smtpd/mfa.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/smtpd/mfa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: mfa.c,v 1.5 2009/01/01 16:15:47 jacekm Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: mfa.c,v 1.6 2009/01/04 00:58:59 gilles Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Gilles Chehade <gilles@openbsd.org>
@@ -23,10 +23,14 @@
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
 #include <event.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
+#include <strings.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "smtpd.h"
@@ -40,6 +44,10 @@ void		mfa_setup_events(struct smtpd *);
 void		mfa_disable_events(struct smtpd *);
 void		mfa_timeout(int, short, void *);
 
+int		mfa_check_rcpt(struct smtpd *, struct path *, struct sockaddr_storage *);
+int		mfa_check_source(struct smtpd *, struct map *, struct sockaddr_storage *);
+int		mfa_match_mask(struct sockaddr_storage *, struct netaddr *);
+
 void
 mfa_sig_handler(int sig, short event, void *p)
 {
@@ -156,14 +164,24 @@ mfa_dispatch_smtp(int sig, short event, void *p)
 			mr = imsg.data;
 			log_debug("mfa_dispatch_smtp: testing forward path");
 			ss.id = mr->id;
-			ss.code = 250;
+			ss.code = 530;
 			ss.u.path = mr->path;
 			ss.ss = mr->ss;
+			ss.msg = mr->msg;
 
 			ss.flags = mr->flags;
 
-			imsg_compose(env->sc_ibufs[PROC_LKA], IMSG_LKA_RCPT, 0,
-			    0, -1, &ss, sizeof(ss));
+			if (! mfa_check_rcpt(env, &ss.u.path, &ss.ss) &&
+			    ! (ss.flags & F_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATED)) {
+				imsg_compose(env->sc_ibufs[PROC_SMTP], IMSG_MFA_RCPT, 0,
+				    0, -1, &ss, sizeof(ss));
+			}
+			else {
+				ss.code = 250;
+				imsg_compose(env->sc_ibufs[PROC_LKA], IMSG_LKA_RCPT, 0,
+				    0, -1, &ss, sizeof(ss));
+			}
+
 			break;
 		}
 		default:
@@ -352,4 +370,109 @@ msg_cmp(struct message *m1, struct message *m2)
 		return (0);
 }
 
+int
+mfa_check_rcpt(struct smtpd *env, struct path *path, struct sockaddr_storage *ss)
+{
+	struct rule *r;
+	struct cond *cond;
+	struct map *map;
+	struct mapel *me;
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(r, env->sc_rules, r_entry) {
+		if (! mfa_check_source(env, r->r_sources, ss))
+			continue;
+
+		log_debug("client authorized");
+		TAILQ_FOREACH(cond, &r->r_conditions, c_entry) {
+			if (cond->c_type == C_ALL) {
+				path->rule = *r;
+				return 1;
+			}
+
+			if (cond->c_type == C_DOM) {
+				cond->c_match = map_find(env, cond->c_map);
+				if (cond->c_match == NULL)
+					fatal("mfa failed to lookup map.");
+
+				map = cond->c_match;
+				TAILQ_FOREACH(me, &map->m_contents, me_entry) {
+					if (strcasecmp(me->me_key.med_string,
+						path->domain) == 0) {
+						path->rule = *r;
+						return 1;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mfa_check_source(struct smtpd *env, struct map *map, struct sockaddr_storage *ss)
+{
+	struct mapel *me;
+
+	if (ss == NULL) {
+		/* This happens when caller is part of an internal
+		 * lookup (ie: alias resolved to a remote address)
+		 */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(me, &map->m_contents, me_entry) {
+
+		if (ss->ss_family != me->me_key.med_addr.ss.ss_family)
+			continue;
+
+		if (ss->ss_len == me->me_key.med_addr.ss.ss_len)
+			continue;
+
+		if (mfa_match_mask(ss, &me->me_key.med_addr))
+			return 1;
+
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mfa_match_mask(struct sockaddr_storage *ss, struct netaddr *ssmask)
+{
+	if (ss->ss_family == AF_INET) {
+		struct sockaddr_in *ssin = (struct sockaddr_in *)ss;
+		struct sockaddr_in *ssinmask = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ssmask->ss;
+
+		if ((ssin->sin_addr.s_addr & ssinmask->sin_addr.s_addr) ==
+		    ssinmask->sin_addr.s_addr)
+			return (1);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (ss->ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+		struct in6_addr	*in;
+		struct in6_addr	*inmask;
+		struct in6_addr	 mask;
+		int		 i;
+
+		bzero(&mask, sizeof(mask));
+		for (i = 0; i < (128 - ssmask->masked) / 8; i++)
+			mask.s6_addr[i] = 0xff;
+		i = ssmask->masked % 8;
+		if (i)
+			mask.s6_addr[ssmask->masked / 8] = 0xff00 >> i;
+
+		in = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ss)->sin6_addr;
+		inmask = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ssmask->ss)->sin6_addr;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+			if ((in->s6_addr[i] & mask.s6_addr[i]) !=
+			    inmask->s6_addr[i])
+				return (0);
+		}
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
 SPLAY_GENERATE(msgtree, message, nodes, msg_cmp);