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-rw-r--r--sbin/ipsecctl/ike.c325
1 files changed, 162 insertions, 163 deletions
diff --git a/sbin/ipsecctl/ike.c b/sbin/ipsecctl/ike.c
index 6dc2355c7b4..b0ab450c1e7 100644
--- a/sbin/ipsecctl/ike.c
+++ b/sbin/ipsecctl/ike.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ike.c,v 1.75 2012/08/30 20:03:18 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ike.c,v 1.76 2012/09/15 13:17:48 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Hans-Joerg Hoexer <hshoexer@openbsd.org>
*
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ ike_section_ipsec(struct ipsec_rule *r, FILE *fd)
static int
ike_section_p2(struct ipsec_rule *r, FILE *fd)
{
- char *exchange_type, *key_length;
+ char *exchange_type, *key_length, *transform;
+ char *enc_alg, *auth_alg, *group_desc, *encap;
int needauth = 1;
switch (r->p2ie) {
@@ -187,92 +188,88 @@ ike_section_p2(struct ipsec_rule *r, FILE *fd)
}
fprintf(fd, " force\n");
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-protocol-%s]:Transforms=phase2-transform-%s"
- " force\n", r->p2name, r->p2name);
-
key_length = NULL;
+ enc_alg = NULL;
if (r->p2xfs && r->p2xfs->encxf) {
if (r->satype == IPSEC_ESP) {
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:TRANSFORM_ID=",
- r->p2name);
switch (r->p2xfs->encxf->id) {
case ENCXF_3DES_CBC:
- fprintf(fd, "3DES");
+ enc_alg = "3DES";
break;
case ENCXF_DES_CBC:
- fprintf(fd, "DES");
+ enc_alg = "DES";
break;
case ENCXF_AES:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "128,128:256";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_128:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "128,128:128";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_192:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "192,192:192";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_256:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "256,256:256";
break;
case ENCXF_AESCTR:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_CTR");
+ enc_alg = "AES_CTR";
key_length = "128,128:128";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_128_CTR:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_CTR");
+ enc_alg = "AES_CTR";
key_length = "128,128:128";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_192_CTR:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_CTR");
+ enc_alg = "AES_CTR";
key_length = "192,192:192";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_256_CTR:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_CTR");
+ enc_alg = "AES_CTR";
key_length = "256,256:256";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_128_GCM:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_GCM_16");
+ enc_alg = "AES_GCM_16";
key_length = "128,128:128";
needauth = 0;
break;
case ENCXF_AES_192_GCM:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_GCM_16");
+ enc_alg = "AES_GCM_16";
key_length = "192,192:192";
needauth = 0;
break;
case ENCXF_AES_256_GCM:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_GCM_16");
+ enc_alg = "AES_GCM_16";
key_length = "256,256:256";
needauth = 0;
break;
case ENCXF_AES_128_GMAC:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_GMAC");
+ enc_alg = "AES_GMAC";
key_length = "128,128:128";
needauth = 0;
break;
case ENCXF_AES_192_GMAC:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_GMAC");
+ enc_alg = "AES_GMAC";
key_length = "192,192:192";
needauth = 0;
break;
case ENCXF_AES_256_GMAC:
- fprintf(fd, "AES_GMAC");
+ enc_alg = "AES_GMAC";
key_length = "256,256:256";
needauth = 0;
break;
case ENCXF_BLOWFISH:
- fprintf(fd, "BLOWFISH");
+ enc_alg = "BLOWFISH";
key_length = "128,96:192";
break;
case ENCXF_CAST128:
- fprintf(fd, "CAST");
+ enc_alg = "CAST";
break;
case ENCXF_NULL:
- fprintf(fd, "NULL");
+ enc_alg = "NULL";
needauth = 0;
break;
default:
@@ -280,137 +277,140 @@ ike_section_p2(struct ipsec_rule *r, FILE *fd)
r->p2xfs->encxf->name);
return (-1);
}
- fprintf(fd, " force\n");
- if (key_length)
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:KEY_LENGTH=%s"
- " force\n", r->p2name, key_length);
} else {
warnx("illegal transform %s", r->p2xfs->encxf->name);
return (-1);
}
} else if (r->satype == IPSEC_ESP) {
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:TRANSFORM_ID=AES force\n",
- r->p2name);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:KEY_LENGTH=128,128:256 force\n",
- r->p2name);
+ enc_alg = "AES";
+ key_length = "128,128:256";
}
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:ENCAPSULATION_MODE=",
- r->p2name);
-
switch (r->tmode) {
case IPSEC_TUNNEL:
- fprintf(fd, "TUNNEL");
+ encap = "TUNNEL";
break;
case IPSEC_TRANSPORT:
- fprintf(fd, "TRANSPORT");
+ encap = "TRANSPORT";
break;
default:
warnx("illegal encapsulation mode %d", r->tmode);
return (-1);
}
- fprintf(fd, " force\n");
-
+ auth_alg = NULL;
if (r->p2xfs && r->p2xfs->authxf) {
- char *axfname = NULL;
-
switch (r->p2xfs->authxf->id) {
case AUTHXF_HMAC_MD5:
- axfname = "MD5";
+ auth_alg = "MD5";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA1:
- axfname = "SHA";
+ auth_alg = "SHA";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_RIPEMD160:
- axfname = "RIPEMD";
+ auth_alg = "RIPEMD";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
- axfname = "SHA2_256";
+ auth_alg = "SHA2_256";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA2_384:
- axfname = "SHA2_384";
+ auth_alg = "SHA2_384";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA2_512:
- axfname = "SHA2_512";
+ auth_alg = "SHA2_512";
break;
default:
warnx("illegal transform %s", r->p2xfs->authxf->name);
return (-1);
}
- if (r->satype == IPSEC_AH)
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:TRANSFORM_ID=%s",
- r->p2name, axfname);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM="
- "HMAC_%s", r->p2name, axfname);
- fprintf(fd, " force\n");
- } else if (needauth) {
- if (r->satype == IPSEC_AH)
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:TRANSFORM_ID="
- "SHA2_256 force\n", r->p2name);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM="
- "HMAC_SHA2_256 force\n", r->p2name);
- }
+ } else if (needauth)
+ auth_alg = "SHA2_256";
+ group_desc = NULL;
if (r->p2xfs && r->p2xfs->groupxf) {
- if (r->p2xfs->groupxf->id != GROUPXF_NONE) {
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:GROUP_DESCRIPTION=",
- r->p2name);
- switch (r->p2xfs->groupxf->id) {
- case GROUPXF_768:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_768");
- break;
- case GROUPXF_1024:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_1024");
- break;
- case GROUPXF_1536:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_1536");
- break;
- case GROUPXF_2048:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_2048");
- break;
- case GROUPXF_3072:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_3072");
- break;
- case GROUPXF_4096:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_4096");
- break;
- case GROUPXF_6144:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_6144");
- break;
- case GROUPXF_8192:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_8192");
- break;
- default:
- warnx("illegal group %s",
- r->p2xfs->groupxf->name);
- return (-1);
- };
- fprintf(fd, " force\n");
+ switch (r->p2xfs->groupxf->id) {
+ case GROUPXF_NONE:
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_768:
+ group_desc = "MODP_768";
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_1024:
+ group_desc = "MODP_1024";
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_1536:
+ group_desc = "MODP_1536";
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_2048:
+ group_desc = "MODP_2048";
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_3072:
+ group_desc = "MODP_3072";
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_4096:
+ group_desc = "MODP_4096";
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_6144:
+ group_desc = "MODP_6144";
+ break;
+ case GROUPXF_8192:
+ group_desc = "MODP_8192";
+ break;
+ default:
+ warnx("illegal group %s", r->p2xfs->groupxf->name);
+ return (-1);
}
} else
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:GROUP_DESCRIPTION="
- "MODP_1024 force\n", r->p2name);
+ group_desc = "MODP_1024";
+
+ /*
+ * create a unique transform name, otherwise we cannot have
+ * multiple transforms per p2name.
+ */
+ if (asprintf(&transform, "phase2-transform-%s-%s%s-%s-%s-%s",
+ r->p2name,
+ enc_alg ? enc_alg : "NONE",
+ key_length ? key_length : "",
+ auth_alg ? auth_alg : "NONE",
+ group_desc ? group_desc : "NONE",
+ encap) == -1)
+ errx(1, "asprintf phase2-transform");
+
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-protocol-%s]:Transforms=%s force\n",
+ r->p2name, transform);
+
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:TRANSFORM_ID=%s force\n", transform,
+ r->satype == IPSEC_AH ? auth_alg : enc_alg);
+ if (key_length)
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:KEY_LENGTH=%s force\n", transform,
+ key_length);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:ENCAPSULATION_MODE=%s force\n", transform, encap);
+ if (auth_alg)
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM=HMAC_%s force\n",
+ transform, auth_alg);
+ if (group_desc)
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:GROUP_DESCRIPTION=%s force\n", transform,
+ group_desc);
if (r->p2life && r->p2life->lt_seconds != -1) {
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:Life=phase2-life-%s force\n",
- r->p2name, r->p2name);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-life-%s]:LIFE_TYPE=SECONDS force\n",
- r->p2name);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-life-%s]:LIFE_DURATION=%d force\n",
- r->p2name, r->p2life->lt_seconds);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:Life=%s-life force\n",
+ transform, transform);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s-life]:LIFE_TYPE=SECONDS force\n",
+ transform);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s-life]:LIFE_DURATION=%d force\n",
+ transform, r->p2life->lt_seconds);
} else
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase2-transform-%s]:Life=LIFE_QUICK_MODE"
- " force\n", r->p2name);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:Life=LIFE_QUICK_MODE force\n",
+ transform);
+ free(transform);
return (0);
}
static int
ike_section_p1(struct ipsec_rule *r, FILE *fd)
{
- char *exchange_type;
- char *key_length;
+ char *exchange_type, *key_length, *transform;
+ char *enc_alg, *auth_alg, *group_desc, *auth_method;
switch (r->p1ie) {
case IKE_MM:
@@ -428,149 +428,148 @@ ike_section_p1(struct ipsec_rule *r, FILE *fd)
r->p1name);
fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-%s]:EXCHANGE_TYPE=%s force\n", r->p1name,
exchange_type);
- fprintf(fd, ADD "[phase1-%s]:Transforms=phase1-transform-%s force\n",
- r->p1name, r->p1name);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM=",
- r->p1name);
key_length = NULL;
if (r->p1xfs && r->p1xfs->encxf) {
switch (r->p1xfs->encxf->id) {
case ENCXF_3DES_CBC:
- fprintf(fd, "3DES");
+ enc_alg = "3DES";
break;
case ENCXF_DES_CBC:
- fprintf(fd, "DES");
+ enc_alg = "DES";
break;
case ENCXF_AES:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "128,128:256";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_128:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "128,128:128";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_192:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "192,192:192";
break;
case ENCXF_AES_256:
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "256,256:256";
break;
case ENCXF_BLOWFISH:
- fprintf(fd, "BLOWFISH");
+ enc_alg = "BLOWFISH";
key_length = "128,96:192";
break;
case ENCXF_CAST128:
- fprintf(fd, "CAST");
+ enc_alg = "CAST";
break;
default:
warnx("illegal transform %s", r->p1xfs->encxf->name);
return (-1);
}
} else {
- fprintf(fd, "AES");
+ enc_alg = "AES";
key_length = "128,128:256";
}
- fprintf(fd, "_CBC force\n");
-
- if (key_length)
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:KEY_LENGTH=%s force\n",
- r->p1name, key_length);
-
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:HASH_ALGORITHM=",
- r->p1name);
if (r->p1xfs && r->p1xfs->authxf) {
switch (r->p1xfs->authxf->id) {
case AUTHXF_HMAC_MD5:
- fprintf(fd, "MD5");
+ auth_alg = "MD5";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA1:
- fprintf(fd, "SHA");
+ auth_alg = "SHA";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
- fprintf(fd, "SHA2_256");
+ auth_alg = "SHA2_256";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA2_384:
- fprintf(fd, "SHA2_384");
+ auth_alg = "SHA2_384";
break;
case AUTHXF_HMAC_SHA2_512:
- fprintf(fd, "SHA2_512");
+ auth_alg = "SHA2_512";
break;
default:
warnx("illegal transform %s", r->p1xfs->authxf->name);
return (-1);
}
} else
- fprintf(fd, "SHA");
- fprintf(fd, " force\n");
+ auth_alg = "SHA";
if (r->p1xfs && r->p1xfs->groupxf) {
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:GROUP_DESCRIPTION=",
- r->p1name);
switch (r->p1xfs->groupxf->id) {
case GROUPXF_768:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_768");
+ group_desc = "MODP_768";
break;
case GROUPXF_1024:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_1024");
+ group_desc = "MODP_1024";
break;
case GROUPXF_1536:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_1536");
+ group_desc = "MODP_1536";
break;
case GROUPXF_2048:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_2048");
+ group_desc = "MODP_2048";
break;
case GROUPXF_3072:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_3072");
+ group_desc = "MODP_3072";
break;
case GROUPXF_4096:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_4096");
+ group_desc = "MODP_4096";
break;
case GROUPXF_6144:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_6144");
+ group_desc = "MODP_6144";
break;
case GROUPXF_8192:
- fprintf(fd, "MODP_8192");
+ group_desc = "MODP_8192";
break;
default:
warnx("illegal group %s", r->p1xfs->groupxf->name);
return (-1);
};
- fprintf(fd, " force\n");
} else
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:GROUP_DESCRIPTION="
- "MODP_1024 force\n", r->p1name);
-
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:AUTHENTICATION_METHOD=",
- r->p1name);
+ group_desc = "MODP_1024";
switch (r->ikeauth->type) {
case IKE_AUTH_PSK:
- fprintf(fd, "PRE_SHARED");
+ auth_method = "PRE_SHARED";
break;
case IKE_AUTH_RSA:
- fprintf(fd, "RSA_SIG");
+ auth_method = "RSA_SIG";
break;
default:
warnx("illegal authentication method %u", r->ikeauth->type);
return (-1);
}
- fprintf(fd, " force\n");
+
+ /* create unique name for transform, see also ike_section_p2() */
+ if (asprintf(&transform, "phase1-transform-%s-%s-%s-%s%s-%s",
+ r->p1name, auth_method, auth_alg, enc_alg,
+ key_length ? key_length : "",
+ group_desc) == -1)
+ errx(1, "asprintf phase1-transform");
+
+ fprintf(fd, ADD "[phase1-%s]:Transforms=%s force\n", r->p1name,
+ transform);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:AUTHENTICATION_METHOD=%s force\n", transform,
+ auth_method);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:HASH_ALGORITHM=%s force\n", transform, auth_alg);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM=%s_CBC force\n", transform,
+ enc_alg);
+ if (key_length)
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:KEY_LENGTH=%s force\n", transform,
+ key_length);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:GROUP_DESCRIPTION=%s force\n", transform,
+ group_desc);
if (r->p1life && r->p1life->lt_seconds != -1) {
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:Life=phase1-life-%s force\n",
- r->p1name, r->p1name);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-life-%s]:LIFE_TYPE=SECONDS force\n",
- r->p1name);
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-life-%s]:LIFE_DURATION=%d force\n",
- r->p1name, r->p1life->lt_seconds);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:Life=%s-life force\n",
+ transform, transform);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s-life]:LIFE_TYPE=SECONDS force\n",
+ transform);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s-life]:LIFE_DURATION=%d force\n",
+ transform, r->p1life->lt_seconds);
} else
- fprintf(fd, SET "[phase1-transform-%s]:Life=LIFE_MAIN_MODE"
- " force\n", r->p1name);
+ fprintf(fd, SET "[%s]:Life=LIFE_MAIN_MODE force\n", transform);
+ free(transform);
return (0);
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-27 14:01:39 +0000