diff options
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 679 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h | 6 |
4 files changed, 389 insertions, 302 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h index 48d6d64bd17..86e5f8e20f7 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h +++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.45 2019/10/31 13:56:29 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.46 2019/11/01 03:45:13 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -615,6 +615,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void); #define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 132 #define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL 111 #define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE 122 +#define RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH 158 #define RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED 145 #define RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY 112 #define RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 124 diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index f71cee8ec1f..d23848d0d5b 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa_ameth.c,v 1.20 2019/10/31 13:56:29 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa_ameth.c,v 1.21 2019/11/01 03:45:13 jsing Exp $ */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project 2006. */ @@ -66,23 +66,81 @@ #include <openssl/rsa.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> - #include "asn1_locl.h" +#include "rsa_locl.h" + +static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg); + +/* Set any parameters associated with pkey */ +static int +rsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, ASN1_STRING **pstr, int *pstrtype) +{ + const RSA *rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; + + *pstr = NULL; + + /* If RSA it's just NULL type */ + if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + *pstrtype = V_ASN1_NULL; + return 1; + } + + /* If no PSS parameters we omit parameters entirely */ + if (rsa->pss == NULL) { + *pstrtype = V_ASN1_UNDEF; + return 1; + } + + /* Encode PSS parameters */ + if (ASN1_item_pack(rsa->pss, &RSA_PSS_PARAMS_it, pstr) == NULL) + return 0; + + *pstrtype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; + return 1; +} + +/* Decode any parameters and set them in RSA structure */ +static int +rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg) +{ + const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid; + const void *algp; + int algptype; + + X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg); + if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + return 1; + if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) + return 1; + if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { + RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); + return 0; + } + rsa->pss = rsa_pss_decode(alg); + if (rsa->pss == NULL) + return 0; + return 1; +} static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; + ASN1_STRING *str; + int strtype; + if (!rsa_param_encode(pkey, &str, &strtype)) + return 0; penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc); if (penclen <= 0) return 0; - if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA), - V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen)) + if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), + strtype, str, penc, penclen)) return 1; free(penc); + return 0; } @@ -91,15 +149,23 @@ rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p; int pklen; + X509_ALGOR *alg; RSA *rsa = NULL; - if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey)) + if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, pubkey)) return 0; - if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen))) { + if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) { RSAerror(ERR_R_RSA_LIB); return 0; } - EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA (pkey, rsa); + if (!rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa)) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return 0; + } return 1; } @@ -109,6 +175,7 @@ rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0 || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) return 0; + return 1; } @@ -117,11 +184,11 @@ old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { RSA *rsa; - if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey (NULL, pder, derlen))) { + if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { RSAerror(ERR_R_RSA_LIB); return 0; } - EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); + EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa); return 1; } @@ -136,17 +203,23 @@ rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { unsigned char *rk = NULL; int rklen; + ASN1_STRING *str; + int strtype; - rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk); + if (!rsa_param_encode(pkey, &str, &strtype)) + return 0; + rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk); if (rklen <= 0) { RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ASN1_STRING_free(str); return 0; } - if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0, - V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) { + if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0, + strtype, str, rk, rklen)) { RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ASN1_STRING_free(str); return 0; } @@ -157,11 +230,24 @@ static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p; + RSA *rsa; int pklen; + const X509_ALGOR *alg; - if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8)) + if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8)) + return 0; + rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen); + if (rsa == NULL) { + RSAerror(ERR_R_RSA_LIB); + return 0; + } + if (!rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) { + RSA_free(rsa); return 0; - return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen); + } + EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa); + + return 1; } static int @@ -182,123 +268,29 @@ int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa); } -static void -update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen) -{ - size_t i; - - if (!b) - return; - if (*pbuflen < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(b))) - *pbuflen = i; -} - -static int -do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv) -{ - char *str; - const char *s; - unsigned char *m = NULL; - int ret = 0, mod_len = 0; - size_t buf_len = 0; - - update_buflen(x->n, &buf_len); - update_buflen(x->e, &buf_len); - - if (priv) { - update_buflen(x->d, &buf_len); - update_buflen(x->p, &buf_len); - update_buflen(x->q, &buf_len); - update_buflen(x->dmp1, &buf_len); - update_buflen(x->dmq1, &buf_len); - update_buflen(x->iqmp, &buf_len); - } - - m = malloc(buf_len + 10); - if (m == NULL) { - RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (x->n != NULL) - mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n); - - if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) - goto err; - - if (priv && x->d) { - if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) - goto err; - str = "modulus:"; - s = "publicExponent:"; - } else { - if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) - goto err; - str = "Modulus:"; - s= "Exponent:"; - } - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, m, off)) - goto err; - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, m, off)) - goto err; - if (priv) { - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d,m, off)) - goto err; - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, m, off)) - goto err; - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, m, off)) - goto err; - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, m, off)) - goto err; - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, m, off)) - goto err; - if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, m, off)) - goto err; - } - ret = 1; -err: - free(m); - return (ret); -} - -static int -rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) +static X509_ALGOR * +rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg) { - return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0); -} + if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) + return NULL; -static int -rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) -{ - return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1); + return ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(&X509_ALGOR_it, alg->parameter); } static RSA_PSS_PARAMS * -rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) +rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg) { - const unsigned char *p; - int plen; RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; - *pmaskHash = NULL; - - if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) - return NULL; - - p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; - plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; - pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen); - - if (!pss) + pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(&RSA_PSS_PARAMS_it, alg->parameter); + if (pss == NULL) return NULL; - if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) { - ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter; - if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1 && - param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { - p = param->value.sequence->data; - plen = param->value.sequence->length; - *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); + if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) { + pss->maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); + if (pss->maskHash == NULL) { + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + return NULL; } } @@ -306,18 +298,31 @@ rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) } static int -rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, X509_ALGOR *maskHash, - int indent) +rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, int pss_key, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, int indent) { int rv = 0; + X509_ALGOR *maskHash = NULL; - if (!pss) { - if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0) + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + if (pss_key) { + if (pss == NULL) { + if (BIO_puts(bp, "No PSS parameter restrictions\n") <= 0) + return 0; + return 1; + } else { + if (BIO_puts(bp, "PSS parameter restrictions:") <= 0) + return 0; + } + } else if (pss == NULL) { + if (BIO_puts(bp,"(INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; + if (pss_key) + indent += 2; if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0) @@ -326,8 +331,9 @@ rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, X509_ALGOR *maskHash, if (pss->hashAlgorithm) { if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) goto err; - } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) { goto err; + } if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; @@ -342,24 +348,28 @@ rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, X509_ALGOR *maskHash, goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0) goto err; - if (maskHash) { + maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); + if (maskHash != NULL) { if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0) goto err; - } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) { goto err; - } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) + } + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) { goto err; + } BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) goto err; - if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0) + if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s Salt Length: 0x", pss_key ? "Minimum" : "") <= 0) goto err; if (pss->saltLength) { if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0) goto err; - } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) { goto err; + } BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) @@ -369,34 +379,92 @@ rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, X509_ALGOR *maskHash, if (pss->trailerField) { if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0) goto err; - } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) + } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) { goto err; + } BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); rv = 1; -err: + err: + X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); return rv; + +} + +static int +pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv) +{ + const RSA *x = pkey->pkey.rsa; + char *str; + const char *s; + int ret = 0, mod_len = 0; + + if (x->n != NULL) + mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n); + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) + goto err; + + if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s ", pkey_is_pss(pkey) ? "RSA-PSS" : "RSA") <= 0) + goto err; + + if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) + goto err; + str = "Modulus:"; + s = "Exponent:"; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (priv) { + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, NULL, off)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off)) + goto err; + } + if (pkey_is_pss(pkey) && !rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 1, x->pss, off)) + goto err; + ret = 1; + err: + return ret; +} + +static int +rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) +{ + return pkey_rsa_print(bp, pkey, indent, 0); +} + +static int +rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) +{ + return pkey_rsa_print(bp, pkey, indent, 1); } static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { - if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) { + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { int rv; - RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; - X509_ALGOR *maskHash; - pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); - rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent); - if (pss) - RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); - if (maskHash) - X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg); + + rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 0, pss, indent); + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); if (!rv) return 0; - } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) + } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) { return 0; + } if (sig) return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent); return 1; @@ -406,6 +474,9 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md; + const EVP_MD *mgf1md; + int min_saltlen; switch (op) { case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: @@ -414,12 +485,24 @@ rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) break; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: + if (pkey_is_pss(pkey)) + return -2; if (arg1 == 0) PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg); break; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: - *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1; + if (pkey->pkey.rsa->pss != NULL) { + if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pkey->pkey.rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, + &min_saltlen)) { + RSAerror(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + *(int *)arg2 = EVP_MD_type(md); + /* Return of 2 indicates this MD is mandatory */ + return 2; + } + *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; return 1; default: @@ -488,7 +571,36 @@ rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg) return md; } -/* convert algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */ +/* + * Convert EVP_PKEY_CTX in PSS mode into corresponding algorithm parameter, + * suitable for setting an AlgorithmIdentifier. + */ +static RSA_PSS_PARAMS * +rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) +{ + const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md; + EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx); + int saltlen; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0) + return NULL; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0) + return NULL; + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen)) + return NULL; + if (saltlen == -1) { + saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd); + } else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) { + saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2; + if ((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1) + saltlen--; + if (saltlen < 0) + return NULL; + } + + return rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen); +} + RSA_PSS_PARAMS * rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd, const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen) { @@ -517,6 +629,78 @@ rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd, const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen) return NULL; } +static ASN1_STRING * +rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) +{ + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx); + ASN1_STRING *os; + + if (pss == NULL) + return NULL; + + os = ASN1_item_pack(pss, &RSA_PSS_PARAMS_it, NULL); + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + return os; +} + +/* + * From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. If pkey isn't NULL + * then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initialised. If it is NULL parameters are + * passed to pkctx instead. + */ + +static int +rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx, + X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + int rv = -1; + int saltlen; + const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; + + /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */ + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + RSAerror(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + return -1; + } + /* Decode PSS parameters */ + pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg); + + if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen)) { + RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + + /* We have all parameters now set up context */ + if (pkey) { + if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey)) + goto err; + } else { + const EVP_MD *checkmd; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &checkmd) <= 0) + goto err; + if (EVP_MD_type(md) != EVP_MD_type(checkmd)) { + RSAerror(RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH); + goto err; + } + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0) + goto err; + /* Carry on */ + rv = 1; + + err: + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + return rv; +} + int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen) @@ -551,187 +735,56 @@ rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd, return 1; } -/* Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called - * when a signature is encountered requiring special handling. We - * currently only handle PSS. +/* + * Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature + * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS. */ + static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { - int rv = -1; - int saltlen; - const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL; - RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; - X509_ALGOR *maskHash; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx; - /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */ - if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) { + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { RSAerror(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return -1; } - - /* Decode PSS parameters */ - pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); - - if (pss == NULL) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); - goto err; - } - /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */ - if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) { - if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM); - goto err; - } - if (!maskHash) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER); - goto err; - } - mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm); - if (mgf1md == NULL) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST); - goto err; - } - } else - mgf1md = EVP_sha1(); - - if (pss->hashAlgorithm) { - md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm); - if (md == NULL) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST); - goto err; - } - } else - md = EVP_sha1(); - - if (pss->saltLength) { - saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); - - /* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main - * RSA routines will trap other invalid values anyway. - */ - if (saltlen < 0) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); - goto err; - } - } else - saltlen = 20; - - /* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) - * and PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway. - */ - if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) { - RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER); - goto err; + if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) { + /* Carry on */ + return 2; } - - /* We have all parameters now set up context */ - - if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey)) - goto err; - - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0) - goto err; - - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0) - goto err; - - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0) - goto err; - /* Carry on */ - rv = 2; - -err: - RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); - if (maskHash) - X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); - return rv; + return -1; } static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig) { - int pad_mode; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx; + int pad_mode; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) return 0; if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return 2; if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { - const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md; - RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL; - X509_ALGOR *mgf1alg = NULL; - ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL, *os2 = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx); - int saltlen, rv = 0; - - sigmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0) - goto err; - if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen)) - goto err; - if (saltlen == -1) - saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd); - else if (saltlen == -2) { - saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2; - if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0) - saltlen--; - } - pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new(); - if (!pss) - goto err; - if (saltlen != 20) { - pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); - if (!pss->saltLength) - goto err; - if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen)) - goto err; - } - if (EVP_MD_type(sigmd) != NID_sha1) { - pss->hashAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new(); - if (!pss->hashAlgorithm) - goto err; - X509_ALGOR_set_md(pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd); - } - if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != NID_sha1) { - ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL; - /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */ - mgf1alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); - X509_ALGOR_set_md(mgf1alg, mgf1md); - if (!ASN1_item_pack(mgf1alg, &X509_ALGOR_it, - &stmp)) - goto err; - pss->maskGenAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new(); - if (!pss->maskGenAlgorithm) - goto err; - X509_ALGOR_set0(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, - OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp); - } - /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */ - if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, &RSA_PSS_PARAMS_it, &os1)) - goto err; + ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL; + os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx); + if (!os1) + return 0; + /* Duplicate parameters if we have to */ if (alg2) { - os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1); - if (!os2) - goto err; - X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), + ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1); + if (!os2) { + ASN1_STRING_free(os1); + return 0; + } + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2); } - X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1); - os1 = os2 = NULL; - rv = 3; -err: - if (mgf1alg) - X509_ALGOR_free(mgf1alg); - if (pss) - RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); - ASN1_STRING_free(os1); - return rv; + return 3; } return 2; } @@ -773,3 +826,31 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = { .pkey_flags = ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS } }; + +const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_pss_asn1_meth = { + .pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, + .pkey_base_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, + .pkey_flags = ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL, + + .pem_str = "RSA-PSS", + .info = "OpenSSL RSA-PSS method", + + .pub_decode = rsa_pub_decode, + .pub_encode = rsa_pub_encode, + .pub_cmp = rsa_pub_cmp, + .pub_print = rsa_pub_print, + + .priv_decode = rsa_priv_decode, + .priv_encode = rsa_priv_encode, + .priv_print = rsa_priv_print, + + .pkey_size = int_rsa_size, + .pkey_bits = rsa_bits, + + .sig_print = rsa_sig_print, + + .pkey_free = int_rsa_free, + .pkey_ctrl = rsa_pkey_ctrl, + .item_verify = rsa_item_verify, + .item_sign = rsa_item_sign +}; diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c index 91d74307f09..9924dac581e 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c +++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_err.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa_err.c,v 1.18 2019/10/31 13:56:29 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa_err.c,v 1.19 2019/11/01 03:45:13 jsing Exp $ */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS), "data too large for modulus"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL) , "data too small"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE), "data too small for key size"}, + {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH) , "digest does not match"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED) , "digest not allowed"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY), "digest too big for rsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmp1 not congruent to d"}, diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h index d69946f95c0..621c89dc76c 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h +++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h @@ -1,9 +1,13 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa_locl.h,v 1.8 2019/10/31 13:56:29 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa_locl.h,v 1.9 2019/11/01 03:45:13 jsing Exp $ */ __BEGIN_HIDDEN_DECLS #define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 512 +/* Macros to test if a pkey or ctx is for a PSS key */ +#define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) +#define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd, const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen); int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd, |