diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/t1_lib.c | 70 |
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c index 6af6d77eddb..d21e6ef6462 100644 --- a/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.159 2019/04/22 15:12:20 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.160 2019/04/22 16:03:54 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -896,10 +896,8 @@ tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, CBS *session_id, const unsigned char *etick, * required for a session cookie is never less than this, * this check isn't too strict. The exact check comes later. */ - if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { - ret = 2; - goto done; - } + if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) + goto derr; /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { @@ -908,19 +906,15 @@ tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, CBS *session_id, const unsigned char *etick, nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx, 0); if (rv < 0) goto err; - if (rv == 0) { - ret = 2; - goto done; - } + if (rv == 0) + goto derr; if (rv == 2) renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ if (timingsafe_memcmp(etick, - tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) { - ret = 2; - goto done; - } + tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) + goto derr; HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, @@ -936,10 +930,8 @@ tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, CBS *session_id, const unsigned char *etick, goto err; /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ - if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { - ret = 2; - goto done; - } + if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) + goto derr; eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ @@ -947,38 +939,29 @@ tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, CBS *session_id, const unsigned char *etick, HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) goto err; - if (timingsafe_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { - ret = 2; - goto done; - } + if (timingsafe_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) + goto derr; /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - if ((sdec = malloc(eticklen)) == NULL) { - ret = -1; - goto done; - } - if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { - ret = 2; - goto done; - } - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { - ret = 2; - goto done; - } + if ((sdec = malloc(eticklen)) == NULL) + goto err; + if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) + goto derr; + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) + goto derr; + slen += mlen; p = sdec; - if ((sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen)) == NULL) { - /* - * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a - * new ticket. - */ - ret = 2; - goto done; - } + /* + * For session parse failures, indicate that we need to send a new + * ticket. + */ + if ((sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen)) == NULL) + goto derr; /* * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect that @@ -1000,8 +983,13 @@ tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, CBS *session_id, const unsigned char *etick, goto done; + derr: + ret = 2; + goto done; + err: ret = -1; + goto done; done: free(sdec); |