path: root/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_verify.3

.\"	$OpenBSD: SSL_CTX_set_verify.3,v 1.3 2016/12/16 15:39:08 jmc Exp $
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.Dd $Mdocdate: December 16 2016 $
.Dt SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm SSL_CTX_set_verify ,
.Nm SSL_set_verify ,
.Nm SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth ,
.Nm SSL_set_verify_depth
.Nd set peer certificate verification parameters
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.In openssl/ssl.h
.Ft void
.Fo SSL_CTX_set_verify
.Fa "SSL_CTX *ctx"
.Fa "int mode"
.Fa "int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)"
.Fc
.Ft void
.Fo SSL_set_verify
.Fa "SSL *s"
.Fa "int mode"
.Fa "int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)"
.Fc
.Ft void
.Fn SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth "SSL_CTX *ctx" "int depth"
.Ft void
.Fn SSL_set_verify_depth "SSL *s" "int depth"
.Ft int
.Fn verify_callback "int preverify_ok" "X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx"
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Fn SSL_CTX_set_verify
sets the verification flags for
.Fa ctx
to be
.Fa mode
and
specifies the
.Fa verify_callback
function to be used.
If no callback function shall be specified, the
.Dv NULL
pointer can be used for
.Fa verify_callback .
.Pp
.Fn SSL_set_verify
sets the verification flags for
.Fa ssl
to be
.Fa mode
and specifies the
.Fa verify_callback
function to be used.
If no callback function shall be specified, the
.Dv NULL
pointer can be used for
.Fa verify_callback .
In this case last
.Fa verify_callback
set specifically for this
.Fa ssl
remains.
If no special callback was set before, the default callback for the underlying
.Fa ctx
is used, that was valid at the time
.Fa ssl
was created with
.Xr SSL_new 3 .
.Pp
.Fn SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth
sets the maximum
.Fa depth
for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for
.Fa ctx .
(See the
.Sx BUGS
section.)
.Pp
.Fn SSL_set_verify_depth
sets the maximum
.Fa depth
for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for
.Fa ssl .
(See the
.Sx BUGS
section.)
.Pp
The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of bitwise ORed
.Fa mode
flags:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Dv SSL_VERIFY_NONE
.Em Server mode:
the server will not send a client certificate request to the client,
so the client will not send a certificate.
.Pp
.Em Client mode:
if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled),
the server will send a certificate which will be checked.
The result of the certificate verification process can be checked after the
TLS/SSL handshake using the
.Xr SSL_get_verify_result 3
function.
The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.
.It Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
.Em Server mode:
the server sends a client certificate request to the client.
The certificate returned (if any) is checked.
If the verification process fails,
the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message
containing the reason for the verification failure.
The behaviour can be controlled by the additional
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
and
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
flags.
.Pp
.Em Client mode:
the server certificate is verified.
If the verification process fails,
the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message
containing the reason for the verification failure.
If no server certificate is sent, because an anonymous cipher is used,
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
is ignored.
.It Dv SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
.Em Server mode:
if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL
handshake is immediately terminated with a
.Dq handshake failure
alert.
This flag must be used together with
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER .
.Pp
.Em Client mode:
ignored
.It Dv SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
.Em Server mode:
only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL handshake.
Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a renegotiation.
This flag must be used together with
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER .
.Pp
.Em Client mode:
ignored
.El
.Pp
Exactly one of the
.Fa mode
flags
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_NONE
and
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
must be set at any time.
.Pp
The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in
verification procedure or using another application provided verification
function set with
.Xr SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback 3 .
The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure.
An application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth
information and the
.Fa verify_callback Ns ()
function, but the way this information is used may be different.
.Pp
.Fn SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth
and
.Fn SSL_set_verify_depth
set the limit up to which depth certificates in a chain are used during the
verification procedure.
If the certificate chain is longer than allowed,
the certificates above the limit are ignored.
Error messages are generated as if these certificates would not be present,
most likely a
.Dv X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
will be issued.
The depth count is
.Dq level 0: peer certificate ,
.Dq level 1: CA certificate ,
.Dq level 2: higher level CA certificate ,
and so on.
Setting the maximum depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, and 2.
The default depth limit is 100,
allowing for the peer certificate and an additional 100 CA certificates.
.Pp
The
.Fa verify_callback
function is used to control the behaviour when the
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
flag is set.
It must be supplied by the application and receives two arguments:
.Fa preverify_ok
indicates whether the verification of the certificate in question was passed
(preverify_ok=1) or not (preverify_ok=0).
.Fa x509_ctx
is a pointer to the complete context used
for the certificate chain verification.
.Pp
The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level
(the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate.
At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked.
Whenever a verification error is found, the error number is stored in
.Fa x509_ctx
and
.Fa verify_callback
is called with
.Fa preverify_ok
equal to 0.
By applying
.Fn X509_CTX_store_*
functions
.Fa verify_callback
can locate the certificate in question and perform additional steps (see
.Sx EXAMPLES ) .
If no error is found for a certificate,
.Fa verify_callback
is called with
.Fa preverify_ok
equal to 1 before advancing to the next level.
.Pp
The return value of
.Fa verify_callback
controls the strategy of the further verification process.
If
.Fa verify_callback
returns 0, the verification process is immediately stopped with
.Dq verification failed
state.
If
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and the TLS/SSL
handshake is terminated.
If
.Fa verify_callback
returns 1, the verification process is continued.
If
.Fa verify_callback
always returns 1,
the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification
failures and the connection will be established.
The calling process can however retrieve the error code of the last
verification error using
.Xr SSL_get_verify_result 3
or by maintaining its own error storage managed by
.Fa verify_callback .
.Pp
If no
.Fa verify_callback
is specified, the default callback will be used.
Its return value is identical to
.Fa preverify_ok ,
so that any verification
failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an
alert message, if
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
is set.
.Sh EXAMPLES
The following code sequence realizes an example
.Fa verify_callback
function that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of
verification failure, if wished.
The callback realizes a verification depth limit with more informational output.
.Pp
All verification errors are printed;
information about the certificate chain is printed on request.
The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
certificates.
.Pp
The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data
into/retrieve application data from the
.Vt SSL
structure (see
.Xr SSL_get_ex_new_index 3 ,
.Xr SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx 3 ) .
.Bd -literal
\&...

typedef struct {
	int	verbose_mode;
	int	verify_depth;
	int	always_continue;
} mydata_t;
int mydata_index;
\&...
static int
verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
	char buf[256];
	X509 *err_cert;
	int err, depth;
	SSL *ssl;
	mydata_t *mydata;

	err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
	err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
	depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);

	/*
	 * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently
	 * treated * and the application specific data stored into the
	 * SSL object.
	 */
	ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
	    SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
	mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);

	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);

	/*
	 * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
	 * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
	 * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
	 * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
	 * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
	 * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
	 * additional certificates would be logged.
	 */
	if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
		preverify_ok = 0;
		err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
		X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
	}
	if (!preverify_ok) {
		printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\en", err,
		    X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
	} else if (mydata->verbose_mode) {
		printf("depth=%d:%s\en", depth, buf);
	}

	/*
	 * At this point, err contains the last verification error.
	 * We can use it for something special
	 */
	if (!preverify_ok && (err ==
	    X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) {
		X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),
		    buf, 256);
		printf("issuer= %s\en", buf);
	}

	if (mydata->always_continue)
		return 1;
	else
		return preverify_ok;
}
\&...

mydata_t mydata;

\&...

mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);

\&...

SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
    verify_callback);

/*
 * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
 * an appropriate error in the logfile.
 */
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);

/*
 * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into the SSL
 * structure.
 */
mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);

\&...

SSL_accept(ssl); /* check of success left out for clarity */
if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {
	if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
		/* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
	}
}
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssl 3 ,
.Xr SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode 3 ,
.Xr SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations 3 ,
.Xr SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback 3 ,
.Xr SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx 3 ,
.Xr SSL_get_ex_new_index 3 ,
.Xr SSL_get_peer_certificate 3 ,
.Xr SSL_get_verify_result 3 ,
.Xr SSL_new 3
.Sh BUGS
In client mode, it is not checked whether the
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
flag is set, but whether
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_NONE
is not set.
This can lead to unexpected behaviour, if the
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_PEER
and
.Dv SSL_VERIFY_NONE
are not used as required (exactly one must be set at any time).
.Pp
The certificate verification depth set with
.Fn SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth
stops the verification at a certain depth.
The error message produced will be that of an incomplete certificate chain and
not
.Dv X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
as may be expected.