1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
|
/************************************************************************
* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema. All rights reserved.
*
* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at
* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991,
* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
* provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such
* copies.
*
* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied
* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose.
************************************************************************/
/*
SYNOPSIS
void login_fbtab(tty, uid, gid)
char *tty;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
DESCRIPTION
This module implements device security as described in the
SunOS 4.1.x fbtab(5) and SunOS 5.x logindevperm(4) manual
pages. The program first looks for /etc/fbtab. If that file
cannot be opened it attempts to process /etc/logindevperm.
We expect entries with the folowing format:
Comments start with a # and extend to the end of the line.
Blank lines or lines with only a comment are ignored.
All other lines consist of three fields delimited by
whitespace: a login device (/dev/console), an octal
permission number (0600), and a ":"-delimited list of
devices (/dev/kbd:/dev/mouse). All device names are
absolute paths. A path that ends in "*" refers to all
directory entries except "." and "..".
If the tty argument (relative path) matches a login device
name (absolute path), the permissions of the devices in the
":"-delimited list are set as specified in the second
field, and their ownership is changed to that of the uid
and gid arguments.
DIAGNOSTICS
Problems are reported via the syslog daemon with severity
LOG_ERR.
BUGS
This module uses strtok(3), which may cause conflicts with other
uses of that same routine.
AUTHOR
Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
Eindhoven University of Technology
The Netherlands
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include "util.h"
#define _PATH_FBTAB "/etc/fbtab"
static void login_protect __P((char *, char *, int, uid_t, gid_t));
#define WSPACE " \t\n"
/*
* login_fbtab - apply protections specified in /etc/fbtab or logindevperm
*/
void
login_fbtab(tty, uid, gid)
char *tty;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
{
FILE *fp;
char buf[BUFSIZ], *devname, *cp, *table;
int prot;
if ((fp = fopen(table = _PATH_FBTAB, "r")) == NULL)
return;
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
if (cp = strchr(buf, '#'))
*cp = 0; /* strip comment */
if ((cp = devname = strtok(buf, WSPACE)) == 0)
continue; /* empty or comment */
if (strncmp(devname, "/dev/", sizeof("/dev/")-1) != 0 ||
(cp = strtok((char *) 0, WSPACE)) == 0 ||
*cp != '0' ||
sscanf(cp, "%o", &prot) == 0 ||
prot == 0 ||
(prot & 0777) != prot ||
(cp = strtok((char *) 0, WSPACE)) == 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: bad entry: %s", table,
cp ? cp : "(null)");
continue;
}
if (strcmp(devname + 5, tty) == 0)
for (cp = strtok(cp, ":"); cp; cp = strtok(NULL, ":"))
login_protect(table, cp, prot, uid, gid);
}
fclose(fp);
}
/*
* login_protect - protect one device entry
*/
static void
login_protect(table, path, mask, uid, gid)
char *table;
char *path;
int mask;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
{
char buf[BUFSIZ];
int pathlen = strlen(path);
struct dirent *ent;
DIR *dir;
if (strcmp("/*", path + pathlen - 2) != 0) {
if (chmod(path, mask) && errno != ENOENT)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: chmod(%s): %m", table, path);
if (chown(path, uid, gid) && errno != ENOENT)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: chown(%s): %m", table, path);
} else {
strncpy(buf, path, sizeof buf);
buf[pathlen - 1] = 0;
if ((dir = opendir(buf)) == 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: opendir(%s): %m", table, path);
} else {
while ((ent = readdir(dir))) {
if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") &&
strcmp(ent->d_name, "..")) {
strncpy(buf + pathlen - 1, ent->d_name,
sizeof(buf) - pathlen - 1);
login_protect(table, buf, mask,
uid, gid);
}
}
closedir(dir);
}
}
}
|
