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.\" $OpenBSD: enc.4,v 1.27 2009/01/28 21:00:32 grunk Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2006 Jason McIntyre <jmc@openbsd.org>
.\"
.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
.\"
.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
.\"
.Dd $Mdocdate: January 28 2009 $
.Dt ENC 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm enc
.Nd encapsulating interface
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Cd "pseudo-device enc 1"
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Nm
interface is a virtual interface for
.Xr ipsec 4
traffic.
It allows packet filtering using
.Xr pf 4 ;
prior to encapsulation and after decapsulation,
packets may be monitored using
.Xr tcpdump 8 .
Only one
.Nm
interface, enc0, is supported.
.Pp
Packet filtering is documented in greater detail in
.Xr pf.conf 5 ,
however some details relevant to filtering on the
.Nm
interface are documented below.
.Pp
Firstly,
.Xr pf 4
is a stateful packet filter,
which means it can track the state of a connection.
It does this
.Em automatically .
States are normally
.Em floating ,
which means they can match packets on any interface.
However this is a potential problem for filtering IPsec traffic:
states need to be interface bound,
to avoid permitting unencrypted traffic
should the SAs expire and not be replaced.
Therefore all rules on the
.Nm
interface should explicitly set
.Dq keep state (if-bound) .
For example:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
pass in on enc0 proto ipencap from 172.25.0.45 to 1.2.3.4 \e
keep state (if-bound)
.Ed
.Pp
Secondly, the
.Nm
interface does not directly support bandwidth control via
.Xr pf 4
queueing.
Instead, IPsec packets must be tagged and the tagged packets
are assigned to queues.
.Xr ipsec.conf 5
provides an example of tag-based queueing
and further information on packet tagging.
.Pp
Finally,
the use of translation rules to map and redirect network traffic
requires some care.
Packets destined to be IPsec processed are seen by the
filter/translation engine twice,
both before and after being IPsec processed.
If a packet's translated address
on the way back fails to match an existing IPsec flow,
from the translated address to the original source address,
it will be discarded by the filter.
It is best to avoid this situation where possible,
though a flow may be explicitly created to work around it.
.Pp
As noted above,
.Xr tcpdump 8
may be invoked on the
.Nm
interface to see packets prior to encapsulation and after decapsulation.
For example:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# tcpdump -envps 1500 -i enc0 -l | grep 10.0.0.33
tcpdump: WARNING: enc0: no IPv4 address assigned
tcpdump: listening on enc0, link-type ENC
15:05:08.934708 (authentic,confidential): SPI 0x6bcac587: \e
172.25.0.45 \*(Gt 1.2.3.4: 10.9.9.28.7001 \*(Gt 10.0.0.33.7000: \e
[udp sum ok] udp 52 (ttl 64, id 5672, len 80) \e
(ttl 64, id 30009, len 100, bad cksum 0!)
15:05:09.063517 (authentic,confidential): SPI 0x4b70c05a: \e
1.2.3.4 \*(Gt 172.25.0.45: 10.0.0.33.7000 \*(Gt 10.9.9.28.7001: \e
[udp sum ok] udp 156 (ttl 63, id 14880, len 184) \e
(ttl 51, id 19689, len 204)
.Ed
.Pp
The packets above show (for each direction):
date, ESP (not AH), SPI, direction, and encapsulated part.
The first packet is headed from 172.25.0.45 to 1.2.3.4
and the encapsulated part from 10.9.9.28 to 10.0.0.33.
.Pp
Negotiations can be watched on the physical interface too:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# tcpdump -envps 1500 -i wi0 port 500 or port 4500
tcpdump: listening on wi0, link-type EN10MB
15:15:58.188747 0:2:6f:3a:3f:3e 0:10:f3:3:bd:8a 0800 226: \e
172.25.0.45.500 \*(Gt 1.2.3.4.500: [udp sum ok] \e
[...]
attribute ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM = AES_CBC
attribute HASH_ALGORITHM = SHA
attribute AUTHENTICATION_METHOD = RSA_SIG
attribute GROUP_DESCRIPTION = MODP_1024
attribute LIFE_TYPE = SECONDS
attribute LIFE_DURATION = 3600
attribute KEY_LENGTH = 128
[...]
15:15:59.080058 0:10:f3:3:bd:8a 0:2:6f:3a:3f:3e 0800 226: \e
1.2.3.4.500 \*(Gt 172.25.0.45.500: [udp sum ok] \e
[...]
attribute ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM = AES_CBC
attribute HASH_ALGORITHM = SHA
attribute AUTHENTICATION_METHOD = RSA_SIG
attribute GROUP_DESCRIPTION = MODP_1024
attribute LIFE_TYPE = SECONDS
attribute LIFE_DURATION = 3600
attribute KEY_LENGTH = 128
[...]
.Ed
.Pp
The attribute lines for the negotiation must match.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ipsec 4 ,
.Xr pf 4 ,
.Xr ipsec.conf 5 ,
.Xr pf.conf 5 ,
.Xr tcpdump 8
|
