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|
/* $OpenBSD: parser.c,v 1.30 2022/01/04 13:39:01 tb Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Claudio Jeker <claudio@openbsd.org>
* Copyright (c) 2019 Kristaps Dzonsons <kristaps@bsd.lv>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <sys/tree.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <imsg.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "extern.h"
static void build_chain(const struct auth *, STACK_OF(X509) **);
static struct crl *get_crl(const struct auth *);
static void build_crls(const struct crl *, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **);
static X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
static struct auth_tree auths = RB_INITIALIZER(&auths);
static struct crl_tree crlt = RB_INITIALIZER(&crlt);
static int
verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)
{
X509 *cert;
const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
char *file;
int depth, error, i, nid;
int saw_ipAddrBlock = 0;
int saw_autonomousSysNum = 0;
int saw_unknown = 0;
error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(store_ctx);
if (error != X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)
return ok;
if ((file = X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data(store_ctx)) == NULL)
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data");
if ((cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(store_ctx)) == NULL) {
warnx("%s: got no current cert", file);
return 0;
}
if ((exts = X509_get0_extensions(cert)) == NULL) {
warnx("%s: got no cert extensions", file);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
/* skip over non-critical and known extensions */
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
continue;
if (X509_supported_extension(ext))
continue;
if ((obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)) == NULL) {
warnx("%s: got no extension object", file);
return 0;
}
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
switch (nid) {
case NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock:
saw_ipAddrBlock = 1;
break;
case NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum:
saw_autonomousSysNum = 1;
break;
default:
warnx("%s: depth %d: unknown extension: nid %d",
file, depth, nid);
saw_unknown = 1;
break;
}
}
if (verbose > 1)
warnx("%s: depth %d, ipAddrBlock %d, autonomousSysNum %d",
file, depth, saw_ipAddrBlock, saw_autonomousSysNum);
/* Fail if we saw an unknown extension. */
return !saw_unknown;
}
/*
* Parse and validate a ROA.
* This is standard stuff.
* Returns the roa on success, NULL on failure.
*/
static struct roa *
proc_parser_roa(struct entity *entp, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
{
struct roa *roa;
X509 *x509;
int c;
struct auth *a;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
struct crl *crl;
if ((roa = roa_parse(&x509, entp->file, der, len)) == NULL)
return NULL;
a = valid_ski_aki(entp->file, &auths, roa->ski, roa->aki);
build_chain(a, &chain);
crl = get_crl(a);
build_crls(crl, &crls);
assert(x509 != NULL);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, entp->file))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
warnx("%s: %s", entp->file,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
X509_free(x509);
roa_free(roa);
sk_X509_free(chain);
sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
return NULL;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
/*
* Check CRL to figure out the soonest transitive expiry moment
*/
if (crl != NULL && roa->expires > crl->expires)
roa->expires = crl->expires;
/*
* Scan the cert tree to figure out the soonest transitive
* expiry moment
*/
for (; a != NULL; a = a->parent) {
if (roa->expires > a->cert->expires)
roa->expires = a->cert->expires;
}
/*
* If the ROA isn't valid, we accept it anyway and depend upon
* the code around roa_read() to check the "valid" field itself.
*/
if (valid_roa(entp->file, &auths, roa))
roa->valid = 1;
sk_X509_free(chain);
sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
X509_free(x509);
return roa;
}
/*
* Parse and validate a manifest file.
* Here we *don't* validate against the list of CRLs, because the
* certificate used to sign the manifest may specify a CRL that the root
* certificate didn't, and we haven't scanned for it yet.
* This chicken-and-egg isn't important, however, because we'll catch
* the revocation list by the time we scan for any contained resources
* (ROA, CER) and will see it then.
* Return the mft on success or NULL on failure.
*/
static struct mft *
proc_parser_mft(struct entity *entp, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
{
struct mft *mft;
X509 *x509;
int c;
struct auth *a;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
if ((mft = mft_parse(&x509, entp->file, der, len)) == NULL)
return NULL;
a = valid_ski_aki(entp->file, &auths, mft->ski, mft->aki);
build_chain(a, &chain);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
/* CRL checks disabled here because CRL is referenced from mft */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, entp->file))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
warnx("%s: %s", entp->file, X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
mft_free(mft);
X509_free(x509);
sk_X509_free(chain);
return NULL;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
sk_X509_free(chain);
X509_free(x509);
if (!mft_check(entp->file, mft)) {
mft_free(mft);
return NULL;
}
return mft;
}
/*
* Certificates are from manifests (has a digest and is signed with
* another certificate) Parse the certificate, make sure its
* signatures are valid (with CRLs), then validate the RPKI content.
* This returns a certificate (which must not be freed) or NULL on
* parse failure.
*/
static struct cert *
proc_parser_cert(const struct entity *entp, const unsigned char *der,
size_t len)
{
struct cert *cert;
X509 *x509;
int c;
struct auth *a = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
assert(entp->data == NULL);
/* Extract certificate data and X509. */
cert = cert_parse(&x509, entp->file, der, len);
if (cert == NULL)
return NULL;
a = valid_ski_aki(entp->file, &auths, cert->ski, cert->aki);
build_chain(a, &chain);
build_crls(get_crl(a), &crls);
assert(x509 != NULL);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, entp->file))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
warnx("%s: %s", entp->file,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
cert_free(cert);
sk_X509_free(chain);
sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
X509_free(x509);
return NULL;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
sk_X509_free(chain);
sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
X509_free(x509);
cert->talid = a->cert->talid;
/* Validate the cert to get the parent */
if (!valid_cert(entp->file, &auths, cert)) {
cert_free(cert);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Add validated CA certs to the RPKI auth tree.
*/
if (cert->purpose == CERT_PURPOSE_CA) {
if (!auth_insert(&auths, cert, a)) {
cert_free(cert);
return NULL;
}
}
return cert;
}
/*
* Root certificates come from TALs (has a pkey and is self-signed).
* Parse the certificate, ensure that it's public key matches the
* known public key from the TAL, and then validate the RPKI
* content.
*
* This returns a certificate (which must not be freed) or NULL on
* parse failure.
*/
static struct cert *
proc_parser_root_cert(const struct entity *entp, const unsigned char *der,
size_t len)
{
char subject[256];
ASN1_TIME *notBefore, *notAfter;
X509_NAME *name;
struct cert *cert;
X509 *x509;
assert(entp->data != NULL);
/* Extract certificate data and X509. */
cert = ta_parse(&x509, entp->file, der, len, entp->data, entp->datasz);
if (cert == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((name = X509_get_subject_name(x509)) == NULL) {
warnx("%s Unable to get certificate subject", entp->file);
goto badcert;
}
if (X509_NAME_oneline(name, subject, sizeof(subject)) == NULL) {
warnx("%s: Unable to parse certificate subject name",
entp->file);
goto badcert;
}
if ((notBefore = X509_get_notBefore(x509)) == NULL) {
warnx("%s: certificate has invalid notBefore, subject='%s'",
entp->file, subject);
goto badcert;
}
if ((notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(x509)) == NULL) {
warnx("%s: certificate has invalid notAfter, subject='%s'",
entp->file, subject);
goto badcert;
}
if (X509_cmp_current_time(notBefore) != -1) {
warnx("%s: certificate not yet valid, subject='%s'", entp->file,
subject);
goto badcert;
}
if (X509_cmp_current_time(notAfter) != 1) {
warnx("%s: certificate has expired, subject='%s'", entp->file,
subject);
goto badcert;
}
if (!valid_ta(entp->file, &auths, cert)) {
warnx("%s: certificate not a valid ta, subject='%s'",
entp->file, subject);
goto badcert;
}
X509_free(x509);
cert->talid = entp->talid;
/*
* Add valid roots to the RPKI auth tree.
*/
if (!auth_insert(&auths, cert, NULL)) {
cert_free(cert);
return NULL;
}
return cert;
badcert:
X509_free(x509);
cert_free(cert);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Parse a certificate revocation list
* This simply parses the CRL content itself, optionally validating it
* within the digest if it comes from a manifest, then adds it to the
* CRL tree.
*/
static void
proc_parser_crl(struct entity *entp, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
{
X509_CRL *x509_crl;
struct crl *crl;
const ASN1_TIME *at;
struct tm expires_tm;
if ((x509_crl = crl_parse(entp->file, der, len)) != NULL) {
if ((crl = malloc(sizeof(*crl))) == NULL)
err(1, NULL);
if ((crl->aki = x509_crl_get_aki(x509_crl, entp->file)) ==
NULL) {
warnx("x509_crl_get_aki failed");
goto err;
}
crl->x509_crl = x509_crl;
/* extract expire time for later use */
at = X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x509_crl);
if (at == NULL) {
warnx("%s: X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate failed",
entp->file);
goto err;
}
memset(&expires_tm, 0, sizeof(expires_tm));
if (ASN1_time_parse(at->data, at->length, &expires_tm,
0) == -1) {
warnx("%s: ASN1_time_parse failed", entp->file);
goto err;
}
if ((crl->expires = mktime(&expires_tm)) == -1)
errx(1, "%s: mktime failed", entp->file);
if (RB_INSERT(crl_tree, &crlt, crl) != NULL) {
warnx("%s: duplicate AKI %s", entp->file, crl->aki);
goto err;
}
}
return;
err:
free_crl(crl);
}
/*
* Parse a ghostbuster record
*/
static void
proc_parser_gbr(struct entity *entp, const unsigned char *der, size_t len)
{
struct gbr *gbr;
X509 *x509;
int c;
struct auth *a;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
if ((gbr = gbr_parse(&x509, entp->file, der, len)) == NULL)
return;
a = valid_ski_aki(entp->file, &auths, gbr->ski, gbr->aki);
build_chain(a, &chain);
build_crls(get_crl(a), &crls);
assert(x509 != NULL);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, x509, NULL))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_init");
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cb);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, entp->file))
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data");
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(ctx, MAX_CERT_DEPTH);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, chain);
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
if (X509_verify_cert(ctx) <= 0) {
c = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
if (verbose > 0 || c != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
warnx("%s: %s", entp->file,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(c));
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
sk_X509_free(chain);
sk_X509_CRL_free(crls);
X509_free(x509);
gbr_free(gbr);
}
/*
* Walk the certificate tree to the root and build a certificate
* chain from cert->x509. All certs in the tree are validated and
* can be loaded as trusted stack into the validator.
*/
static void
build_chain(const struct auth *a, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
*chain = NULL;
if (a == NULL)
return;
if ((*chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
err(1, "sk_X509_new_null");
for (; a != NULL; a = a->parent) {
assert(a->cert->x509 != NULL);
if (!sk_X509_push(*chain, a->cert->x509))
errx(1, "sk_X509_push");
}
}
/*
* Find a CRL based on the auth SKI value.
*/
static struct crl *
get_crl(const struct auth *a)
{
struct crl find;
if (a == NULL)
return NULL;
find.aki = a->cert->ski;
return RB_FIND(crl_tree, &crlt, &find);
}
/*
* Add the CRL based on the certs SKI value.
* No need to insert any other CRL since those were already checked.
*/
static void
build_crls(const struct crl *crl, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls)
{
*crls = NULL;
if (crl == NULL)
return;
if ((*crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL)
errx(1, "sk_X509_CRL_new_null");
if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*crls, crl->x509_crl))
err(1, "sk_X509_CRL_push");
}
static void
parse_entity(struct entityq *q, struct msgbuf *msgq)
{
struct entity *entp;
struct tal *tal;
struct cert *cert;
struct mft *mft;
struct roa *roa;
struct ibuf *b;
unsigned char *f;
size_t flen;
int c;
while ((entp = TAILQ_FIRST(q)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(q, entp, entries);
b = io_new_buffer();
io_simple_buffer(b, &entp->type, sizeof(entp->type));
f = NULL;
if (entp->type != RTYPE_TAL) {
f = load_file(entp->file, &flen);
if (f == NULL)
warn("%s", entp->file);
}
switch (entp->type) {
case RTYPE_TAL:
if ((tal = tal_parse(entp->file, entp->data,
entp->datasz)) == NULL)
errx(1, "%s: could not parse tal file",
entp->file);
tal->id = entp->talid;
tal_buffer(b, tal);
tal_free(tal);
break;
case RTYPE_CER:
if (entp->data != NULL)
cert = proc_parser_root_cert(entp, f, flen);
else
cert = proc_parser_cert(entp, f, flen);
c = (cert != NULL);
io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
if (cert != NULL)
cert_buffer(b, cert);
/*
* The parsed certificate data "cert" is now
* managed in the "auths" table, so don't free
* it here (see the loop after "out").
*/
break;
case RTYPE_CRL:
proc_parser_crl(entp, f, flen);
break;
case RTYPE_MFT:
mft = proc_parser_mft(entp, f, flen);
c = (mft != NULL);
io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
if (mft != NULL)
mft_buffer(b, mft);
mft_free(mft);
break;
case RTYPE_ROA:
roa = proc_parser_roa(entp, f, flen);
c = (roa != NULL);
io_simple_buffer(b, &c, sizeof(int));
if (roa != NULL)
roa_buffer(b, roa);
roa_free(roa);
break;
case RTYPE_GBR:
proc_parser_gbr(entp, f, flen);
break;
default:
abort();
}
free(f);
io_close_buffer(msgq, b);
entity_free(entp);
}
}
/*
* Process responsible for parsing and validating content.
* All this process does is wait to be told about a file to parse, then
* it parses it and makes sure that the data being returned is fully
* validated and verified.
* The process will exit cleanly only when fd is closed.
*/
void
proc_parser(int fd)
{
struct entityq q;
struct msgbuf msgq;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct entity *entp;
struct ibuf *b, *inbuf = NULL;
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL)
cryptoerrx("X509_STORE_CTX_new");
TAILQ_INIT(&q);
msgbuf_init(&msgq);
msgq.fd = fd;
pfd.fd = fd;
for (;;) {
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if (msgq.queued)
pfd.events |= POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, INFTIM) == -1)
err(1, "poll");
if ((pfd.revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)))
errx(1, "poll: bad descriptor");
/* If the parent closes, return immediately. */
if ((pfd.revents & POLLHUP))
break;
if ((pfd.revents & POLLIN)) {
b = io_buf_read(fd, &inbuf);
if (b != NULL) {
entp = calloc(1, sizeof(struct entity));
if (entp == NULL)
err(1, NULL);
entity_read_req(b, entp);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&q, entp, entries);
ibuf_free(b);
}
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT) {
switch (msgbuf_write(&msgq)) {
case 0:
errx(1, "write: connection closed");
case -1:
err(1, "write");
}
}
parse_entity(&q, &msgq);
}
while ((entp = TAILQ_FIRST(&q)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&q, entp, entries);
entity_free(entp);
}
/* XXX free auths and crl tree */
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
msgbuf_clear(&msgq);
exit(0);
}
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