diff options
author | Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2008-06-17 21:53:46 +0000 |
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committer | Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@cvs.openbsd.org> | 2008-06-17 21:53:46 +0000 |
commit | 60c21fe8c605a7e42340b55a40ac3465a3fb18ce (patch) | |
tree | a3dcb68fa716e3cd21cbc5ecec64ec2bbcc81e70 | |
parent | 013d3f13a1f57ea1fcf254baac3202651056eef7 (diff) |
CVE-2008-1379 - MIT-SHM arbitrary memory read.
(This patch was missing form the bunch of security patches committed
on june 11. noticed by brad@).
-rw-r--r-- | xserver/Xext/shm.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/xserver/Xext/shm.c b/xserver/Xext/shm.c index 3c0d1eef0..de908cfe8 100644 --- a/xserver/Xext/shm.c +++ b/xserver/Xext/shm.c @@ -848,8 +848,17 @@ ProcShmPutImage(client) return BadValue; } - VERIFY_SHMSIZE(shmdesc, stuff->offset, length * stuff->totalHeight, - client); + /* + * There's a potential integer overflow in this check: + * VERIFY_SHMSIZE(shmdesc, stuff->offset, length * stuff->totalHeight, + * client); + * the version below ought to avoid it + */ + if (stuff->totalHeight != 0 && + length > (shmdesc->size - stuff->offset)/stuff->totalHeight) { + client->errorValue = stuff->totalWidth; + return BadValue; + } if (stuff->srcX > stuff->totalWidth) { client->errorValue = stuff->srcX; |